Thanks for the response!!! Have a nice weekend!

On Friday, October 28, 2022 at 7:25:20 AM UTC-3 Titouan Rigoudy wrote:

> Meant to link to this other thread [1] as the one on which we need 3 LGTMs.
>
> Cheers,
> Titouan
>
> [1] 
> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/FlenxUPCDec/m/T2YBn0kEBQAJ
>
> On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 6:22 AM Titouan Rigoudy <tit...@google.com> wrote:
>
>> [blink-dev to bcc]
>>
>> Hi José,
>>
>> Thanks for reaching out, and sorry for the confusion!
>>
>> To be clear, the blog post states that this would be enabled in 107 *at 
>> the earliest*, which reflected our best estimate back when we wrote the 
>> post.
>>
>> We are now aiming to ship and start a deprecation trial in 109 at the 
>> earliest, if this thread gets 3 LGTMs by the end of next week. You can stay 
>> tuned here to know when this will ship, or follow along on Chromestatus 
>> [1]. The deprecation trial would allow you to request an extension until 
>> 113.
>>
>> Happy to answer any other questions you may have!
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Titouan
>>
>> [1] https://chromestatus.com/feature/5737414355058688
>>
>> On Mon, Oct 24, 2022 at 3:31 PM José Luis Campanello <
>> jose.luis....@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> i've been working to fix an application that will be affected by PNA 
>>> preflights (we have an application that talks to a private server and a 
>>> local -127.0.0.1- server).
>>>
>>> As I understood from this blog post (
>>> https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-preflight/#rollout-plan),
>>>  
>>> it seems PNA preflights will be enabled starting with release 107, but i 
>>> can't find any reference as to whether it is being actually released in 107 
>>> or later (I've seen 109, 112 and shipping on 113). I think I'm probably not 
>>> understanding correctly all the details of what I'm reading.
>>>
>>> Can you confirm when this feature will enabled in the standard chrome?
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, May 30, 2022 at 6:12:42 AM UTC-3 Titouan Rigoudy wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi there,
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for reaching out.
>>>>
>>>> Andrew: Indeed, this was crbug.com/1329248, apologies for the 
>>>> oversight. The change has been rolled back on Friday. Chrome 102 should 
>>>> pick up the configuration change upon restart.
>>>>
>>>> cpmtatest: by default, script fetches are made in no-cors mode with 
>>>> credentials. I believe [1] and [2] are the relevant specification bits 
>>>> here. If you think this should not be how PNA works, please file an issue 
>>>> in the GitHub repo [3].
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> Titouan
>>>>
>>>> [1] 
>>>> https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/urls-and-fetching.html#create-a-potential-cors-request
>>>> [2] 
>>>> https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/webappapis.html#fetch-a-classic-script
>>>> [3] https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, May 30, 2022 at 10:46 AM Who Cares <cpmt...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>> Now when chrome 102 is out I wanted to test it so I ran it with 
>>>>> *--enable-features=PrivateNetworkAccessRespectPreflightResults*
>>>>> There's one thing I'm trying to understand,
>>>>> I have an HTML page with a script tag, the src of this tag points to a 
>>>>> more private network, the default behavior of script tags is not to 
>>>>> trigger 
>>>>> CORS and since v102 they do trigger it which is expected.
>>>>> My question is:
>>>>> I'm getting this error: *"Response to preflight request doesn't pass 
>>>>> access control check: The value of the 'Access-Control-Allow-Credentials' 
>>>>> header in the response is '' which must be 'true' when the request's 
>>>>> credentials mode is 'include'."*
>>>>> I never asked to send credentials in my script tag, I guess I can 
>>>>> force not send it by adding *crossorigin="" *to the tag but shouldn't 
>>>>> the default behavior be not to send it with credentials?
>>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, May 28, 2022 at 12:47:02 AM UTC+3 Andrew Boeger wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi all -
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Just want to call out that this assumption...
>>>>>> Chrome 102 should also not break anything, since we are sending 
>>>>>> preflights in warning-only mode. If the preflight fails, a warning is 
>>>>>> displayed in DevTools but the request proceeds as before
>>>>>> ... turned out to be false.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The change recently deployed DOES break things. It has broken our 
>>>>>> internal admin tool our CS teams use to manage customer accounts. 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bug opened here > 
>>>>>> https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1329248
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In meantime, I have my users moving to other browsers because this 
>>>>>> has broken a critical function for them. 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 3:47:36 AM UTC-5 Titouan Rigoudy 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi there,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> John: that's due to another facet of Private Network Access (not 
>>>>>>> this intent) that started a deprecation trial in Chrome 94. See 
>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5436853517811712. Unless signed up 
>>>>>>> for the deprecation trial, HTTP websites are no longer allowed to make 
>>>>>>> any 
>>>>>>> requests to private servers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin: there will be no breaking change in Chrome 101. I need to 
>>>>>>> update the blog post to make the new timeline clearer.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chrome 102 should also not break anything, since we are sending 
>>>>>>> preflights in warning-only mode. If the preflight fails, a warning is 
>>>>>>> displayed in DevTools but the request proceeds as before. As explained 
>>>>>>> above, this will remain the case until at least Chrome 105, at which 
>>>>>>> point 
>>>>>>> we may turn on enforcement: when a preflight fails, the request should 
>>>>>>> not 
>>>>>>> be sent and fail. That remains subject to compatibility risk evaluation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 3:06 AM Martin H <mrtn...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Titouan, Blink Devs,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thank you for this news above. 
>>>>>>>> I work for a software vendor affected by this change, our software 
>>>>>>>> installs a small (https://localhost:60500) web server on a users 
>>>>>>>> local machine and our https:// SAAS web application connects  to this 
>>>>>>>> to 
>>>>>>>> hand off various features
>>>>>>>> We were under the impression this change was to occur in Chrome 101 
>>>>>>>> and have been moving to that timeline rapidly but reading the above I 
>>>>>>>> understand this has changed (confusingly though much of the 
>>>>>>>> documentation 
>>>>>>>> online still carries older dates and talks about the change as early 
>>>>>>>> as 101 
>>>>>>>> or 102. )
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Should I now understand that *if* this makes Chrome 102 as hoped, 
>>>>>>>> you will have 3 mile stone releases (aka 102, 103, 104 ) with an 
>>>>>>>> intent to 
>>>>>>>> ship "private network access" changes in 105?  
>>>>>>>> I would understand it's just an estimate based on feedback around 
>>>>>>>> this change but as it stands our business is anticipating change as 
>>>>>>>> early 
>>>>>>>> as next week as this is when 101 was due to ship production. 
>>>>>>>> it would therefore be extremely beneficial if we understand we have 
>>>>>>>> more time to work with customers around this, we have produced updated 
>>>>>>>> compliant local components on our end and released this in the past 
>>>>>>>> few 
>>>>>>>> weeks but as you might expect we need time to address this with every 
>>>>>>>> single one of our customers, as Chromium based browsers form the 
>>>>>>>> overwhelming majority of users. 
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ultimately my requirement is to advise customers on the change as 
>>>>>>>> best as possible, including how to ensure the change is not deployed 
>>>>>>>> as 
>>>>>>>> some will need time to update their entire fleets. 
>>>>>>>> When I install Chrome dev 102 build, it seems like our software 
>>>>>>>> still works as is today. I assume as it's not on yet. Would someone be 
>>>>>>>> able 
>>>>>>>> to state which flags I should enable to replicate what will happen 
>>>>>>>> when 
>>>>>>>> this change goes live?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is it just the #block-insecure-private-network-requests 
>>>>>>>> Do I need to 
>>>>>>>> configure #private-network-access-send-preflights or 
>>>>>>>> #private-network-access-respect-preflight-results
>>>>>>>> Today all these settings are just "Default
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks in advance, please let me know if there is a better forum 
>>>>>>>> for this request.
>>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 3:28:37 AM UTC+10 John Doe wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Sorry seems I accidently switched the S sides in the first 
>>>>>>>>> question, I meant from public HTTP to private HTTPS so it shouldn't 
>>>>>>>>> be 
>>>>>>>>> mixed content, and in such case there's no preflight request.
>>>>>>>>> As I mentioned I installed chrome 98 to test it, when accessing a 
>>>>>>>>> resource from public HTTPS to private HTTPS there's a preflight 
>>>>>>>>> request but 
>>>>>>>>> no such request on an access from public HTTP to private HTTPS.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tuesday, April 19, 2022 at 7:27:42 PM UTC+3 Titouan Rigoudy 
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi there,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 1. Such requests are blocked by mixed content. This launch does 
>>>>>>>>>> not change that.
>>>>>>>>>> 2. You will want to respond 200 OK to PNA preflight requests to 
>>>>>>>>>> your private HTTPS server with the right headers. See the blog post 
>>>>>>>>>> [1] for 
>>>>>>>>>> details.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> [1] 
>>>>>>>>>> https://developer.chrome.com/blog/private-network-access-preflight/#server-side-requests
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Apr 17, 2022 at 4:56 PM John Doe <clas...@gmail.com> 
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 1. In Chrome 98, there were no preflight requests when accessing 
>>>>>>>>>>> from public HTTPS to private HTTP, will the same be true in the 
>>>>>>>>>>> final 
>>>>>>>>>>> version?
>>>>>>>>>>> 2. In the case when I have a private HTTPS server that I want 
>>>>>>>>>>> everyone to have access to (also via public HTTP), what options do 
>>>>>>>>>>> I have ?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, April 6, 2022 at 8:23:58 PM UTC+3 Titouan Rigoudy 
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for the timely question, I was about to send an update 
>>>>>>>>>>>> here.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We have fixed nearly all of the blockers identified in the 
>>>>>>>>>>>> above doc. The only outstanding issue is the aforementioned crash, 
>>>>>>>>>>>> which 
>>>>>>>>>>>> required a bit more design work than the rest. That work has been 
>>>>>>>>>>>> completed 
>>>>>>>>>>>> and CLs to fix the problem are now in review; they should land 
>>>>>>>>>>>> shortly and 
>>>>>>>>>>>> make it in Chrome 102.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We would like to ship again in Chrome 102 in warning-only mode, 
>>>>>>>>>>>> just as we last tried in Chrome 98. Preflights will be sent but 
>>>>>>>>>>>> their 
>>>>>>>>>>>> results will not be enforced. Failed preflights will show warnings 
>>>>>>>>>>>> in 
>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTools, but requests will otherwise continue unimpeded.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Things will stay that way for at least 3 milestones. We will 
>>>>>>>>>>>> gather compatibility data by monitoring failed preflights, then 
>>>>>>>>>>>> circle back 
>>>>>>>>>>>> here to garner approvals to turn on enforcement. That launch will 
>>>>>>>>>>>> be 
>>>>>>>>>>>> accompanied by a deprecation trial for web developers to sign up 
>>>>>>>>>>>> for a time 
>>>>>>>>>>>> extension if they failed to notice the warnings in time.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 6, 2022 at 3:29 AM Logan Wei <shapi...@gmail.com> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hello,  is there now an updated timeline to roll out this 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> change?  Will the trial restart in Chrome 102 or a later version? 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wednesday, March 2, 2022 at 6:36:21 PM UTC+8 Titouan 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Rigoudy wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's the promised doc: 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fdwetZXUz_Q03ZpGwXizq5AE1yn_lMhamUJMwvsHvTU/edit
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (public, comment access for committers only)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Feb 17, 2022 at 3:29 PM Mike Taylor <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for the update Titouan. Looking forward to reading 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your doc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/17/22 9:25 AM, Titouan Rigoudy wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi all, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just to let you know that due to a couple issues, chief 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> among which a renderer crash (crbug.com/1279376), we are 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> rolling this feature back from Chrome 98.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A few issues have been identified and will block our next 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attempt at shipping this. In the meantime, we gathered some 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> information about impact and notified developers of the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upcoming change. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'll write a doc summarizing the timeline and lessons learned, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then share 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as appropriate here.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 6, 2021 at 5:26 PM Chris Harrelson <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> chri...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LGTM3 for step 1.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 6, 2021 at 6:11 AM Mike Taylor <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LGTM2 for step 1.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/6/21 5:31 AM, Titouan Rigoudy wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *assuming I get 2 more LGTMs, that is.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 6, 2021 at 11:31 AM Titouan Rigoudy <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tit...@google.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks! I'll come back for further discussion with UKM 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> data in hand. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 6, 2021 at 10:58 AM Yoav Weiss <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yoav...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree UKM analysis should not block step 1, as it 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> holds little risk. (There's still some risks that servers 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will choke in the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> face of preflights, but that seems minor compared to the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enforcement risk) 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore,* LGTM1 for step 1* (preflights with no 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> enforcement), but not further (yet). Please come back to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this thread with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any data you may have as a result of adding UKMs.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 6:44 PM 'Titouan Rigoudy' via 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Yoav, do you think UKM analysis should block sending 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preflights without enforcing their success? I believe 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sending these will 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> allow us to get more precise information on the affected 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> websites through 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the usecounter recorded in crrev.com/c/3310846. I can 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then analyze UKM data and use the results to inform the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> decision whether 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and when to switch enforcement on? 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 5:19 PM Titouan Rigoudy <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tit...@google.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I agree! 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 5:17 PM Mike West <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mk...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> _I_ don't think we should do that, but I'd defer to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan's preference. :) 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 5:14 PM Mike Taylor <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks - I also don't think there's a lot of value 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in this particular header being the odd-one-out, just 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wanted to confirm 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we're not going to ship "true" first and try to change 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that to ?1 later 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (which is always challenging).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/2/21 11:11 AM, Mike West wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm not sure it makes sense to introduce a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structured header here, given that it's layering on top 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of CORS headers 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that I don't think there's substantial interest in 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> changing. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:55 PM 'Titouan Rigoudy' via 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is no support for structured headers so far, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for consistency reasons, and there has been no 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> movement to deprecate the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "true" value for Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of such a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deprecation seems minimal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I could pretty easily add support for the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structured "?1" value on top of the "true" token for 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the new 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network header, and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> specify that, but I'm not 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sure it would be terribly useful. Do you think 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> otherwise?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Titouan
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 2, 2021 at 4:45 PM Mike Taylor <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Titouan,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm curious what the plan is for structured 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> headers. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/issues/45
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is marked as blocked - has there been other progress 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or thinking behind the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scenes?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 11/29/21 10:36 AM, 'Titouan Rigoudy' via 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blink-dev wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Contact emails tit...@chromium.org, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> va...@chromium.org, cl...@chromium.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Explainer 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/explainer.md
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Specification 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Design docs 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Summary 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sends a CORS preflight request ahead of any 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private network requests for subresources, asking for 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explicit permission 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from the target server. A private network request is 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any request from a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> public website to a private IP address or localhost, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or from a private 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> website (e.g. intranet) to localhost. Sending a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preflight request mitigates 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the risk of cross-site request forgery attacks 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> against private network 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> devices such as routers, which are often not prepared 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to defend against 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this threat.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Blink component 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Blink>SecurityFeature>CORS>PrivateNetworkAccess 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/list?q=component:Blink%3ESecurityFeature%3ECORS%3EPrivateNetworkAccess>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TAG review 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/w3ctag/design-reviews/issues/572
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> TAG review status Pending
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Risks 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Interoperability and Compatibility 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The main interoperability risk, as always, is if 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other browser engines do not implement this. Compat 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> risk is 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> straightforward: web servers that do not handle the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> new preflight requests 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will eventually break, once the feature ships. The 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> plan to address this is 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as follows: 1. Send preflight request, ignore result, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> always send actual 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request. Failed preflight requests will result in a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> warning being shown in 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> devtools. 2. Wait for 3 milestones. 3. Gate actual 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request on preflight 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> request success, with deprecation trial for 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> developers to buy some more 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time. 4. End deprecation trial 4 milestones later. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> UseCounters: 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3753
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3755
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/3757
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The above measure pages that make at least one 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private network request for 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which we would now send a preflight request.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gecko: Worth prototyping (
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/mozilla/standards-positions/issues/143
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> )
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> WebKit: No signal (
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://lists.webkit.org/pipermail/webkit-dev/2021-November/032040.html)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Pending response.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Web developers: No signals Anecdotal evidence so 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> far suggests that most web developers are OK with 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this new requirement, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though some do not control the target endpoints and 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would be negatively 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> impacted.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Other signals:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ergonomics 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> None.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Activation 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Gating access to the private network overnight on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preflight requests would likely result in widespread 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> breakage. This is why 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the plan is to first send requests but not act on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their result, giving 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> server developers time to implement code handling 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these requests. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Deprecation warnings will be surfaced in DevTools to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alert web/client 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> developers when the potential for breakage later on 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is detected. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Enforcement will be turned on later (aiming for 3 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> milestones), along with a 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deprecation trial for impacted web developers to buy 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> themselves some more 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time. Experience suggests a large fraction of 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> developers will not notice 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the advance deprecation warnings until things break.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Security 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This change aims to be security-positive, 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preventing CSRF attacks against soft and juicy 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> targets such as router admin 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interfaces. DNS rebinding threats were of particular 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concern during the 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> design of this feature: 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYPIeP90MQ_pQ6UAo0mCB3g2Z_AynfPWHbDnHIST6VI/edit#heading=h.189j5gnadts9
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Debuggability 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Relevant information (client and resource IP 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> address space) is already piped into the DevTools 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> network panel. 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Deprecation warnings and errors will be surfaced in 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the DevTools issues 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> panel explaining the problem when it arises.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is this feature fully tested by web-platform-tests 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/docs/testing/web_platform_tests.md>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ? Yes
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTrial instructions 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/WICG/private-network-access/blob/main/HOWTO.md
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Flag name 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PrivateNetworkAccessRespectPreflightResults
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Requires code in //chrome? False
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tracking bug https://crbug.com/591068
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Launch bug https://crbug.com/1274149
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Estimated milestones 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTrial on desktop 98 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> DevTrial on android 98 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Link to entry on the Chrome Platform Status 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://chromestatus.com/feature/5737414355058688
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Links to previous Intent discussions Intent to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prototype: 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/PrB0xnNxaHs/m/jeoxvNjXCAAJ
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This intent message was generated by Chrome 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Platform Status <https://www.chromestatus.com/>.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are 
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emails from it, send an email to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blink-dev+...@chromium.org.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9fdAK%2BnrTfUzug8ub_DhV_LE0b7XrgZ7j5%2Bj_BHtW-FXg%40mail.gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9fdAK%2BnrTfUzug8ub_DhV_LE0b7XrgZ7j5%2Bj_BHtW-FXg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> .
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are 
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9f3dAnHromxwvp8jWRxVLYVKZ0PAG5snX2KDFAYz4kc7Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> .
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to 
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emails from it, send an email to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> blink-dev+...@chromium.org.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/CAPATO9ePgpof%2BBDWS9X7sfHHAqgc6Arem3b78ZGC%3D%2Bp4jB6_AQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> .
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Google Groups "blink-dev" group.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from it, send an email to blink-dev+...@chromium.org.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/6e557fb7-5b1d-20bc-aae5-65526ca8efb7%40chromium.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msgid/blink-dev/6e557fb7-5b1d-20bc-aae5-65526ca8efb7%40chromium.org?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> .
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

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