Thanks for getting the security people to weigh in on this because that was really the main question for me. And it will still be controllable by a finch flag.

LGTM1 dependent on there being a published document outlining the options for web developers (i.e. the document you are already working on).

/Daniel

On 2023-11-10 09:45, Fergal Daly wrote:
On Fri, 10 Nov 2023 at 17:29, Yoav Weiss <yoavwe...@chromium.org> wrote:

    Thanks David!
    It's great to see that this will be disabled in modes where we
    *know* the machine is shared.

    Fergal - could you address concerns about web developer advice?
    What should we tell web developers to do on their logout pages?


Yes, we are in discussion with dev-rel about this. They were already looking at producing advice for auth best practices. We will ensure that this is covered in that,

F



    On Fri, Nov 10, 2023 at 8:37 AM David Dworken
    <ddwor...@google.com> wrote:

        Chiming in to say that we discussed the security concerns
        around this proposal quite extensively internally and overall
        we believe that with the short timeout, the security risks are
        acceptable. The residual security risk is for servers that
        implement purely server-side logouts and is only exploitable
        for a very short period of time (3 minutes). In addition,
        other mitigations like this one
        <https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1468438> further
        reduce the risk such that we believe it is unlikely that this
        will lead to new security issues.

        On Friday, October 13, 2023 at 7:14:46 AM UTC-7
        vmp...@chromium.org wrote:

            On Fri, Oct 13, 2023 at 12:00 AM 'Fergal Daly' via
            blink-dev <blin...@chromium.org> wrote:

                On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 at 23:05, Yoav Weiss
                <yoav...@chromium.org> wrote:



                    On Thu, Oct 12, 2023 at 3:56 PM Vladimir Levin
                    <vmp...@chromium.org> wrote:

                        Are there any spec changes planned for this
                        feature? I'm not sure if the README linked
                        under Specification is meant to make it into
                        WHATWG, maybe to close out
                        https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/7189

                        The only spec I could find about CCNS is
                        https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9111#section-5.2.1.5,
                        so I'm not sure how to reconcile possibly
                        contradicting language in the specs


                    Great questions! Fergal - can you answer that?


                RFC9111 is about HTTP caches. BFCache is not a HTTP
                cache, so RFC 9111 does not apply. Of course the
                reality of implementations and expectations vs spec is
                a problem. Some more discussion here
                
<https://github.com/fergald/explainer-bfcache-ccns/blob/main/README.md#current-interactions-between-bfcache-and-ccns>


            I'm not sure I agree with this, or the reasoning in the
            link. First of all, this intent thread is
            about ignoring CCNS in _some cases_. In other cases, CCNS
            is respected, so it seems like BFCache is de facto subject
            to RFC 9111.

            This is, I guess, a bit philosophical but the spec says:
            the cache MUST NOT intentionally store the information in
            non-volatile storage and MUST make a best-effort attempt
            to remove the information from volatile storage as
            promptly as possible after forwarding it.

            Note that the spec here does not make any exceptions for
            things like cookie state not changing or anything else.
            The document when frozen is indeed a volatile storage of
            the server response, processed and stored in some
            particular format (ie the DOM tree). I admit it's a bit
            weird to think about it this way, since the live document
            is technically also this cache. Whereas I agree that
            BFCache is not strictly an HTTP Cache, I don't quite
            follow why CCNS should not apply to the BFCache in some cases.

            To me, BFCache seems like "a better http cache" which
            already has rendered results, not a completely separate
            cache that is not subject to CCNS.

            But I'm late to the game, and I see that the topic of
            "BFCache is not HTTP Cache" has already been discussed a
            lot. I'm not convinced by existing arguments, but I also
            don't think I'll be able to convince anyone of my position.

            My problem with the consensus in
            https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/5744 is the
            following. People seem to agree that we don't want a *new*
            api that specifically prevents pages from entering
            BFCache. I don't believe it's appropriate to draw a
            conclusion that there is consensus that BFCache should not
            be subject to any *existing* APIs that prevent pages from
            entering it. This might be true independently, but I don't
            think one follows from the other.  To quote this comment
            <https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/5744#issuecomment-811958634>:
            "... And what is the problem with the bank case? I'd
            expect bank may want to ensure its page doesn't enter
            bfcache, or any other cache, by using no-store (and other)
            header(s) or something ..."

            That comment sounds to me like "the status quo is good
            enough, because there are already ways of preventing any
            cache, including bfcache." If we were to claim consensus
            on doing this work, I'd personally want to see a more
            explicit "let's make it so pages still enter BFCache
            despite CCNS in these cases." The comment from cdumez you
            quoted is good, but maybe following-up there is worthwhile.


            I concede though that I'm by no means an expert here, so I
            don't want to block moving this forward any longer. I just
            want to say that it's typically easy to be fast if you
            show stale data, and shifting the blame to the site for
            using CCNS instead of refreshing needed content in script
            doesn't seem appropriate. I personally would not want to
            be the judge of whether CCNS use is appropriate or not
            since I don't know what "appropriate" is in this case.


                BFCache and cases where it can/can't be used are
                specced in the HTML standard. We have had very little
                engagement from other vendors on this particular idea
                but Safari tried to cache all CCNS pages in the past.
                I am hoping that if we demonstrate a way to cache some
                of them safely, they would be on board. Also any
                browser is free to be *more* conservative than the
                spec while still staying in-spec as BFCaching at all
                is always optional.

                Here
                
<https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/5744#issuecomment-661997090>
                is cdumez of Safari

                    Safari / WebKit shipped with all pages going into
                    the bfcache no matter what (including
                    cache-control: no-store). The only push back we
                    received was the fact that after you log out of a
                    site, you could still go back and see a page you
                    should no longer be able to see. We agreed that
                    this feedback was valid and our short-term fix was
                    to bypass the bfcache when the page uses
                    cache-control: no-store. Sadly, many sites use
                    this and their intention is likely not to prevent
                    the bfcache. This is not something we like for the
                    long term.

                F


                    Also, Vlad previously asked about the recommended
                    pattern for folks to handle credential revocation
                    with BFCache and his concerns with the snippet
                    suggested upthread. It'd be great to address that.


                        Thanks!
                        vmpstr

                        On Thu, Oct 12, 2023 at 2:32 AM Yoav Weiss
                        <yoav...@chromium.org> wrote:

                            I just discussed this with Fergal offline:

                              * The risky scenario is one where
                                revocation of sensitive info (logout,
                                access revoked) happens on the
                                server-side only without a client-side
                                update.
                              * In such a scenario on a shared
                                computer, someone could back-button
                                their way into someone else's
                                sensitive info.
                              * It might be interesting to talk to
                                security folks (and maybe Project Zero
                                folks) to see if this is not
                                happening already with content that's
                                not CCNS decorated.
                              * It would be good to run a survey of
                                potentially-sensitive services and try
                                to get a signal from them on how many
                                of them are properly doing revocation
                                on the client side.
                                  o I'd love ideas on how we can scale
                                    such a survey beyond manual
                                    inspection of a few known services.
                              * It could be interesting to try and
                                ship a version of this with a shorter
                                timeout, to minimize the risk of users
                                leaving the machine unattended.
                                  o If we go that route, it'd be good
                                    to think through how we'd be able
                                    to increase that timeout over
                                    time, after gaining more
                                    confidence that the risky scenario
                                    isn't happening in the wild.



                            On Thu, Oct 5, 2023 at 2:36 AM Jason
                            Robbins <jrob...@google.com> wrote:

                                At this morning's API Owners meeting,
                                they asked me to add all review gate
                                types to all of the "web developer
                                facing code change" features that are
                                currently under review, including this
                                one.  So, I have added Privacy,
                                Security, Enterprise, Debuggability,
                                and Testing gates to your feature entry.

                                Please click the gate chips in the
                                "Prepare to ship" stage on your
                                feature detail page. For each one,
                                answer survey questions and request
                                that of the cross-functional review. 
                                You can request them all in parallel.
                                In cases where you already have the
                                go/launch
                                <https://goto.google.com/launch> bit
                                approved, you can note that in a
                                comment on that gate for a potentially
                                faster review.

                                Thanks,
                                jason!
                                On Monday, October 2, 2023 at
                                9:09:18 AM UTC-7 Jason Robbins wrote:

                                    On Friday, September 29, 2023 at
                                    1:01:54 PM UTC-7 Chris Harrelson
                                    wrote:

                                        Please also make sure to
                                        complete all of the other
                                        shipping gate reviews
                                        
<https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/blink-dev/c/bqvB1oap0Yc/m/YlO8DEHgAQAJ>.


                                    I think a bug in ChromeStatus may
                                    have caused some confusion on this
                                    feature entry.  The feature entry
                                    has type "Web developer facing
                                    code change", so its bilnk-dev
                                    thread should have had subject
                                    line prefix "Web-facing change
                                    PSA" rather than "Intent to
                                    ship".  And, according to the
                                    launching-features doc
                                    
<https://www.chromium.org/blink/launching-features/#psa-prepare-to-ship>,
                                    it does not require any approvals,
                                    which is why there are no other
                                    gates offered in the ChromeStatus
                                    UI. A fix for that subject-line
                                    prefix bug should go live today.

                                    Of course, the point of a PSA is
                                    to allow concerns to be raised and
                                    I see that this is a very active
                                    thread.  So, all that should be
                                    worked through. Its a mater of the
                                    the API Owners prerogative to
                                    request any other reviews that
                                    they think are appropriate, but it
                                    is not automatically required by
                                    the process for this feature type.
                                    Also, I see that the launch entry
                                    
<https://launch.corp.google.com/launch/4251651>
                                    had some approvals.

                                    Thanks,
                                    jason!

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