Thanks Martin - more comments inline.

Will you be at the Paris IETF meeting?

On 2/17/12 10:41 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Hi Robert,

thank you very much for the detailed review.

We will provide a new version considering your comments.

Please find already some answers inside.


Best regards, Martin




-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]
Im Auftrag von Robert Sparks
Gesendet: Freitag, 13. Januar 2012 23:41
An: [email protected]; [email protected]
Betreff: [BLISS] AD review: draft-ietf-bliss-call-completion-14

Summary: This document has issues that need to be addressed
           before progressing to IETF Last Call.

This document was very difficult to review. Please call out
anyone who provided a substantive review in the document
quality section of an updated shepherd writeup - they deserve
the acknowledgement!

I think there might be places where the structure of the
document became stressed as the design changed over time.
Please consider an editorial pass focusing on organizing the
resulting implementation requirements in ways that are easier
to reference.

Major issues

    - The document's proposed use of PUBLISH is not consistent with the
      semantics of that method. It attempts to use PUBLISH to affect
      the subscription state, not the state of the event being
      subscribed to (it's telling that PUBLISHing to this event package
      doesn't allow setting the state being subscribed to). Among other
      things, this prevents separating the state agent from the state
      authority.
The concept is the following: The caller sends it's own status information in 
the PUBLISH request. In this case there is no change in the CC monitor (the 
queue) state done by the PUBLISH request directly, but either an indirect 
change of the state based on the information about the caller status. The CC 
monitor acts as a state composer, composing the state of the queue from the 
states of the different callers.
This isn't composition. It's conflation of unrelated things. You have an application that's operating on two unrelated sources of information. If you really want to use sip events to carry the information about the caller, you should be considering a separate event package for it. If that feels wrong, it's another sign that PUBLISH is
not the hammer you're looking for to pound on this particular nail.

Speaking more generally to the events architecture, an element that has enough information to act as a publisher necessarily has the information it needs to be able to serve subscriptions directly. It is choosing to publish to a state agent to deal with matters outside of the contents of the package itself (not always being connected, having limited bandwidth, etc.). Even in an idealized presence system where the ultimate presence document is composed from many contributing publishers, the individual sources have enough information (and it makes sense within the definition of the package) to accept subscriptions to their part of the total state. Further, subscribing to presence.winfo at the state agent will provide meaningful data to each of the contributing sources.





      The document modifies how PUBLISH identifies the
      resource being manipulated by looking at the From URI and not
      only at the Request-URI.  How the Callee's agent responds to the
      request to change this subscription state is underspecified -
      when can it reject a request? What is the caller supposed to do
      if the request fails?
As mentioned the PUBLISH is not a RPC, the CC agent on behalf of the callee 
publishes information about the reachability of the callee for CC recalls. The 
monitor composes the state. This state can be used to evaluate if it is useful 
to start a CC recall or not.
I think you were still trying to respond to the first point above here.
This is a different question, and will stand independent of what technique you use to make the request to change the information about the caller. What happens when that request needs to fail (due to parsing, overload, authorization, application-specific logic, or any of the other reasons
UAS have to reject requests)?



    - As written, the first paragraph of section 9.7 asks this package
      to violate the basic mechanics of RFC3265. It is a violation of
      the architecture to completely ignore the the expiration time
      value requested in an initial or refresh SUBSCRIBE request. The
      responder may choose an expiration time less than or equal to the
      value there. It may not choose a longer expiration time for the
      subscription.
Yes this is unclear, what is meant is that the duration in the exoires answer 
shall not exceed the remaining CC timer.


    - There is some important conversation missing from the security
      considerations section.

        - The dialog event package requires authentication, and digest
          authentication is mandatory to implement. This package
          doesn't appear to require any authentication other than
          presenting a (possibly well known) URI. More discussion of
          the policy for accepting subscriptions is needed to allow
          implementers to protect the privacy of the callee. Otherwise,
          it becomes trivial to use this package to obtain, for
          instance, information about the callee's phone usage.
          Similarly, the presence event package has a rich
          authorization model, and discusses the security (particularly
          privacy) implications of having the authorization settings
          too open.

        - As written, there does not appear to be any protection
          against an attacker causing everyone else that might be in a
          queue to be marked not-available, ensuring his call moves to
          the front of the queue. He only needs to know the AoRs of the
          callers he might be competing with and send PUBLISH requests
          with those AoRs in the From header field.
        - What keeps a new caller from just adding the m= attribute to
          a new INVITE in order to get the preferential treatment by
          the network and the callee's UA described in several sections
          of the document? Was an approach that used a temp-GRUU
          considered instead? It would not have the property of being
          as easy to guess as adding an m= URI parameter to an AoR.
As for many mechanisms in the CC draft also here we had to consider the 
interworking to the PSTN. There we have only a very basic CC prioritization 
indicator in the IAM, saying not much more than 'this IAM is prioritized for 
CC'. That's why the callee's monitor MUST record the From URI from the initial 
call, to have the chance to check it against incoming INVITEs and verify id 
this INV is in fact for CC. Clarifying text for this is needed in the draft.
That clarifying text needs to capture the scenarios above, and answer the questions. For instance, if there is nothing to keep an attacker from marking everyone else in the queue as not available, the document needs to call that out as a security consideration. (I hope this isn't what the group plans to end with).

        - A malicious callee could return several (many) NOTIFYs with
          different to-tags, each containing a different cc-URI,
          leading the caller to parallel-fork a large number of
          subscriptions to a victim.
Some questions

    - Section 9.10 calls out that subscribers need to be prepared to
      get NOTIFYs from multiple places due to forks in the SUBSCRIBE,
      but nothing in the document explores how this affects the
      call-completion application. What keeps the following scenario
      from occurring: Adam tries to call me, but I'm busy (on my desk
      phone). He subscribes for call completion, and the subscribe gets
      forked to both my desk and home phone. My home phone is not busy,
      so it sends a NOTIFY with "ready" right away. Adam's phone calls
      my home phone.
To avoid this situation Adam should add the 'm' (mode) URI parameter, in this 
case set to 'BS' (busy subscriber). In this case a CC recall is triggered twhen 
a busy condition at a callee UA has ended. Of course this situation also 
depends a littlebit on the forking proxy, does it for the initial INVITE send 
back the 180 from your home phone (indication CC possible 'NR') and also the 
486 (indication CC possible 'BS')? Clarifying text is needed.


    - What keeps this from happening? Adam calls and I reject his call
      because I'm waiting for another  (I press X and the phone just
      reports that I'm busy). Adam's phone subscribes for
      call-completion and gets a NOTIFY of "ready" - his phone calls
      mine again, forcing me to re-reject him. This repeats until I
      take my phone off the hook (or engage a global DND) causing me to
      not be able to receive the call I was waiting for.
If the callee's monitor does not want to enable the caller to make use of the CC service, 
it will not insert a Call-Info header field with "purpose=call-completion" in 
the final response message.
Where is the text in the document that defines that behavior?
Of course Adam's phone could try to sunscribe for CC at your phone, but in this 
case your phone simply rejects the subscription, which should not affect your 
reachability for the call you are waiting for.
Similarly, where in the text is this made clear? It is separable from the the scenario above - Adam could write a script to subscribe to every address at an enterprise. What normative text causes all those subscriptions to be rejected?


    - Would a callee ever want to subscribe to call-completion.winfo to
      see who's in his queue? Will the current design prevent
      implementing a server for call-completion.winfo?
Actually we never discussed this option. We will check it.


Remaining issues (mostly in document order)

    - application/call-completion needs to be sent to type review.
    - It would be useful to more carefully describe exactly what the
      resource being subscribed to.
    - Please call out how this document updated 3261 in the
      introduction.
    - Section 4.2 paragraph 1: Is 100rel required? recommended?
    - It's not easy to understand from the text why the subscribing UA
      is attempting to subscribe to multiple URIs (the first occurrence
      is in 4.2 paragraph 4). Some additional motivating text would
      help.
    - The document mischaracterizes 'merged' requests as being those
      that share the same Call-ID. As Section 8.2.2.2 of RFC3261
      defines, it's more than that - the things that have to be the
      same are the From tag, Call-Id, and CSeq. This occurs several
      places in the document:  6.2 second paragraph, description of
      example in section 8, 9.7 third paragraph. It's worth noting that
      the UA core in 8.2.2.2 does this merge detection - you are
      restating a requirement, not adding one -  you should probably
      just note that the UA will behave as required by that section of
      RFC3261.
    - It's worth explicitly calling out (at least in section 6.2) that
      you are expecting the subscribing UA to fork its own requests (so
      that the merge behavior you are describing can take place). This
      means keeping more than the Call-Id constant. An implementer will
      have to select or develop a SIP implementation that allows them
      to do that.
    - There needs to be additional clarity to the specification of the
      use of the service-retention indication. What is the caller's
      (the subscriber's) endpoint supposed to do differently when it
      sees the service-retention option arrive in a NOTIFY? The
      difference in the behavior of the callee's system is hard to
      extract - the most salient description is the last paragraph of
      4.2.
    - Section 6.2 first paragraph: m parameter of a SUBSCRIBE SHOULD
      match the m parameter passed through the Call-Info header. Why is
      this not MUST?
Again because of the PSTN interworking, on TCAP there isn't an equivalent for 
all the m-parameter values.

I see there are more questions why there is SHOULD and not MUST. I still have 
to check them in particular. But as i said, most of the softening in the draft 
is due to enable an interworking with the PSTN CC service. For the latter more 
information can be found in ETSI ETS 300 356-18 and ITU-T Q.733.
Please watch for opportunities to make this clear in the text.
    - Why does the document specify a request-disposition of no-cancel
      for SUBSCRIBE requests? An intermediary cannot send a CANCEL to
      forked legs of a SUBSCRIBE request in the first place.

    - In section 6.2 paragraph 4, you mean to say the caller's agent
      must be prepared to receive multiple NOTIFYs establishing
      different dialogs for each initial SUBSCRIBE request it sends. It
      is not possible for the agent to receive multiple (final)
      responses to the SUBSCRIBE request itself.

    - The string 'cc-state' appears for the first time in section 6.3
      with no context. The discussion of state before that in the
      document is a superset of the states represented with cc-state.
      Please at least provide a forward pointer. It would be better to
      explicitly describe what cc-state is before you get to this
      section.

    - The first sentence in section 6.3 is hard to parse. Could it be
      broken into more than one sentence? Why are the SHOULDs in this
      section not MUSTs?

    - In section 7.1, why is the callee's monitor required to send at
      least one non-100 provisional (with a Call-Info in it)? Is it
      because the final response might not be delivered to the calling
      endpoint due to forking. If so, don't you need to require 100rel?

    - Why is the SHOULD in 7.1 paragraph 3 not a MUST?

    - Why does 7.1 paragraph 4 start "When applicable,"?
Means simply 'if CC is offered'.

    - In this version of the document, the last paragraph of 7.1 is the
      only definition of the possible values for the m= URI parameter.
      It would help to list them with the definition of the parameter
      itself.
    - The requirements around forking in section 7.2 paragraph 2 belong
      in section 9. Why is the requirement to respond with a 482 to all
      but one fork a SHOULD and not a MUST?

    - Why is the SHOULD in 7.3 paragraph 2 not a MUST?

    - Subsections of Section 7 use SHALL instead of MUST - it would be
      better to be consistent throughout the document.
    - In 7.4 paragraph one, where you say "if the CC call fails", it
      would be better to say "if the CC call is not accepted". The call
      could fail without the callee's monitor seeing any of the
      signalling.
    - In 7.4 paragraph 1, last sentence, in what circumstance would the
      callee's monitor NOT terminate the relevant subscription?
I think this SHOULD should or better must be a MUST.

    - 7.4 paragraph 2 (which assumes the UA can only handle one call at
      a time) should be made consistent with 7.3 paragraph 3 (which
      allows UAs that can support multiple calls)
    - 7.6 paragraph 1 says "SHALL process the queue as described in
      subclause 7.3". But 7.3 does not talk about processing queues.

    - In the example, you show a 487 to the invite and motivate it by
      some proxy having generated a CANCEL. That proxy would have
      received a 487, but assuming it got no better responses from any
      other leg, it would most likely send a 480. If there weren't
      intervening proxies, the response might be one of several
      400-class responses (perhaps a 408). Please call out that there
      may be many variations in this failure response.

    - Proxies will not aggregate Call-Info header fields from multiple
      final responses into the response they send upstream. In a
      general deployment, the only time you will see that the callee
      supports call-completion (at least given how the capability is
      signaled in this document) is if it's final response is chosen as
      "best" by every proxy in the chain. It's worth pointing out that
      some 4xx responses from the callee's UA are more likely to be
      chosen as "best" than others. It's also probably worth pointing
      out that in in situations like you allude to in the example in
      section 8, when proxies cancel legs, the 487 they stimulate from
      the callee's UAs are not likely to be chosen as "best".
Text for forking proxies need, s.a.


    - The third paragraph of section 9.4 is very unclear. I can't parse
      the first sentence at all. In the second sentence, it might be
      clearer to say "can never" instead of "cannot" (assuming my guess
      at what the paragraph is trying to say is correct). The third
      sentence doesn't make sense, and I wonder if the text matched a
      previous design better? Moving between available and
      not-available (using PUBLISH) doesn't affect the subscription
      duration - what is the sentence trying to talk about when it
      mentions granting a duration as part of resuming a subscription?
For example if it is clear that you leave your office latest at 8 in the 
evening, and a subscription for CC arrives at your desk phone at 7:45, expires 
set to 1 hour, expires in the response should be set to 15 minutes.

    - Section 9.5 third paragraph points to a format described in
      section 8. It means to point to section 10.

    - The description of NOTIFY bodies in section 9.5 allows bodies of
      type application/sdp to be sent in notifies as long as that type
      occurs in the Accept header field of the most recent SUBSCRIBE
      request on the dialog. Is that intentional?

    - Section 9.6 is vague about a call-completion service specific
      timer. It points into 9.4 claiming the timer is described there,
      but 9.4 is talking about subscription duration, only noting that
      the duration default value is chosen based on a timer value from
      other specifications. Why is this MAY important? What are the
      implementations supposed to do with this implication?

    - In the second paragraph of section 9.7, should the 480 include a
      retry-after? Why was 403 chosen for long-term-denial _error_
      situations. Why isn't that a 500?

    - The first sentence of section 9.8 would be much more effective if
      it said (or pointed to text that describes) what the event
      triggering conditions actually are.

    - The third paragraph of section 9.8 has a MUST requirement that is
      conditional on an agent initiating an INVITE "promptly", but
      there's no characterization of "promptly" in the document. How
      does it account for the time it takes to reconfirm the caller is
      actually present and available before initiating the INVITE due
      to a recall? (This should also be accounted for in the first part
      of the security considerations).

    - Section 9.9 (corresponding to section 4.4.8 of RFC3261) is not
      adequate. It needs to actually describe the package specific
      subscription processing (including how the state is built), or
      provide a finer reference to where that specification lies than
      "in this and possibly in other documents". Section 7 has most of
      this information, but it's fairly widely scattered. Please
      consider consolidating the normative behavior into one place.

    - Section 9.11 claims the service typically involves a single
      notification per notifier per subscription. This cannot be the
      case. There will typically be three - the initial notify in
      response to the subscribe request, the notify representing the
      state transition from queued to ready, and the notify
      corresponding to the termination of the subscription. (It is not
      clear from the document when you expect the notification of
      "ready" to immediately terminate the subscription, if ever.)

    - The timing restrictions in section 9.11 seem artificial, and
      interact badly with the application this package is intended to
      support (the implication is that the server should delay  send a
      "ready" for example). Can the document explain how these
      restrictions were chosen?

    - Why does the call-completion information format make a provision
      for X- headers since you ignore lines with unknown names?

    - Instead of saying "Two lines with the same name MUST NOT be
      present, except where specifically permitted", consider saying
      "The header lines defined in this document can occur at most once
      in any given call-completion document. Extensions must define
      whether defined lines may occur more than once. How likely is
      this format to be extended? Do these need to be put in a
registry?

    - Why does the syntax for cc-URI allow cc-URI header line
      parameters? You certainly want the URI to be able to contain URI
      parameters, but when would you ever use the header line
      parameters? What you have now allows

      cc-URI: random display text
<sip:name@domain;uri-param=uri-value>;cc-uri-header-param-name
=cc-uri-header-param-value

      How is having that display text ever useful? When would
you every use
      a cc-uri-header-param? In other words, why isn't this simply
      cc-URI = "cc-URI" HCOLON addr-spec?

    - Item 2 in the security considerations section is unclear. It
      seems to be placing a requirement on the subscriber (the caller),
      but it's not clear what that requirement is (don't suspend any
      subscriptions longer than a typical call? than some duration a
      user entered for _this_ call? or what?). What's the subscriber
      supposed to do if it would have suspended a subscription that
      long - terminate the subscription? How does this protect the
      privacy of the callee?

    - The media-type form sections should point to specific sections in
      this document. Consider calling out the most important
      interoperability and security considerations.

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