The point I was trying to make (and rather badly I must admit) was that
there *were* people in the government who were warning top advisors that
Iraq had designs on Kuwait. Furthermore, on Aug 1, 1990, the National
Intelligence Officer for Warning issued an official warning that (in his
judgement of course) that there would be an invasion of Kuwait by the end
of the day.
Of course hindsight is always 20/20, it has the benefit of knowing what has
actually happened as opposed to what might happen.
john
At 11:23 AM 8/22/2001 -0500, you wrote:
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "John Garcia" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: "Brin-L" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2001 7:40 AM
>Subject: Re: Landmines RE: US Foreign Policy Re: *DO* we share a
>civilization?
>
> > >
> > >* - In March of 1990, the Northcoast Model United Nations Conference at
> > >Kent State - Ashtabula Campus in Ohio ran a mock UN Security Council
>Crisis
> > >where Iraq invaded Kuwait. This simulation is one of the only known
> > >predictions of an invasion.
> >
> > One can make a case that the government did know (or should have
>suspected)
> > that the invasion was imminent. See Atkinson's Crusade or Trainor's The
> > General's War.
> >
>
>I'm sure the case can be made, but one problem I have with this is the
>advantages of Monday morning quarterbacking vs. Sunday afternoon
>quarterbacking. Another example of this is when there are signs that a
>youth is troubled before he shoots someone. The difficulty is that, once
>you know something happened, you can point out the warning signs. Before it
>happens, how do you seperate this youth from the ones who exhibit the same
>signs?
>
>Dan M.
