> What I have read recently was that Islam was *intrinsically*
> non-democratic, that the idea that we can freely ask questions [:-)] was
> alien to Islam, so debate was impossible.
Well, traditional interpretations are akin to (and perhaps just slightly more
stringent) than traditional Catholic interpretations on this point. Think
of the traditional need for an imprimatur from the office of Inquisition for
publication that was until recently required of Catholics and that still
often appears in official publications of the Catholic church.
The Quran explicitly declares a few topics taboo, such as
speculation about the interelationship of free will and predestination. Both
are Quranic principles, the simultaneous occurrence of both is essentially a
mystery, so theological debate is fruitless. The credo is the credo and
leave it at that. For political reasons the Quran prohibits sarcastic humor
or slanderous propaganda about Muhammad and converting people away from
Islam. (Tradition, but not necessarily the Quran prescribe the death penalty
for blasphemy and apostasy.)
However, there is in classical Islamic theology great fear of social strife
(fitna). Furthermore, like the Catholic church into the later part of the
20th century, the concensus of opinion among Muslim scholars discouraged
direct theological inquiry and participation by the less educated laity.
Theology should be the province of well formed scholars.
It is worth noting that the "fundamentalists" were both caused by and
subsequently causes of democratization of theological interpretation in
Islam. This is very much analogous to the revolution produced by direct
access to translated Bibles in northern Europe during the 1500's and 1600's.
The Catholic patriarchs were right about the deleterious effects of letting
the rabble do their own theology. However (if we ignore the fact that in the
long term we are all dead) the long term effect of democratizing Christianity
was probably for the best. Eventually (in Vatican II) even Rome came around
to the new approach.
Islam may be in the turbulent early phase of an analogous historical
process.
Ecstatic, charismatic, or mystical approaches were available in Sufi orders
and training in Sufi mysteries were more accessible for most believers.
However, even in Sufi orders there were hierarchies of initiation. These
were designed to protect the masses from the dangerous advanced theology and
practices of the Sufi and to protect the Sufis from the ire of the unprepared
masses and the political princes.
There was also a school of nearly atheist Philosophers
(Filasaafa/Filasaafii<sp?>). The Filasaafii did not so much hide their
teaching as wrap them in obtuse jargon and indirect presentations. Again
interested parties would need the assistance of a mentor to make progress as
a scholar.
In short, the traditional Muslim city did *not* demand orthodoxy from its
citizens the way some (but not even most) Catholic communities did in Europe,
particularly at the height of the Protestant challenge. Islam traditionally
demanded that citizens not challenge the received orthodoxy and that anyone
wanting to explore the limits of orthodoxy and beyond do so discreetly so as
not to cause fitna.
Furthermore, there is a principle of Islamic theology that strongly
discourages, or even forbids, theological, ritual, or legal innovation.
------
Balanced against this (particularly among the Sunni) is a tradition of
consultation with notables and scholars. This does not constitute a
democratic institution per se. (Indeed it hardly constitutes in institution
at all) There is also a tradition of scholars and religious leaders staying
aloof from "powers and principalities" (particularly among the Shi'a and
Sufis). Again this was often honored in breach. Third, Islamic law is
theoretically an independent check on despotic rule. Again, this was seldom
the case. However, Sharia commercial and personal law was often adjudicated
even when there was no state to institute a formal system of courts.
------
In short, there are serious barriers to open debate in Islamic theology and
in actual Muslim cultural forms. These may not be insurmountable.
Muslim political activists and scholars are all over the map when it comes to
questions of free-speech and democracy. The center of mass among these
voices is to the right of the cultures that they belong to.
The center of gravity among the voices of the religious would tend to endorse
a "guided" representative democracy much like currently exists in Iran. A
major control is the ability to approve or deny the candidates the religious
approval to stand for election. As a result Iran has fair, but only
semi-free elections. In addition qualified religious authorities have the
constitutional means to veto (really to declare un-Islamic and thus
un-constitutional any legislation). Iran also can serve as a model for
"refereed" debate since religious authorities have censorial powers over the
press.
However, as we see in the case of Iran, public opinion is somewhat less
severe than the opinion of duly formed religious authorities. The Iranian
system has demonstrated clear tendencies to push itself to the left and does
not seem to be at a stable equilibrium although the government does show
signs of constitutional and institutional legitimacy. Iran may manage to
work toward a more broadly open democracy without inducing further bouts of
full-blown civil strife such as occurred in 1979.
