Unprecedented Logic
Why slippery-slope arguments against invading Iraq
don't hold water.
By Eugene Volokh
Posted Tuesday, March 18, 2003, at 3:35 PM PT
http://slate.msn.com/?id=2080344
A pre-emptive U.S. attack on Iraq, Canadian Prime
Minister Jean Chr�tien has argued, "might be
considered as a precedent for others to try to do the
same thing. Where do you stop? You know, if you can do
that there, why not elsewhere?" Democratic
presidential contender Howard Dean says the same
thing: "What is to prevent China, some years down the
road, from saying, 'Look what the United States did in
Iraq�we're justified in going in and taking over
Taiwan'?" Should we be moved by this concern about
precedents, which is a form of the slippery-slope
argument? Not really, and here's why.
Precedents do matter in many situations. First, in
domestic law and politics, people care about
consistency: If one group gets a tax break, for
instance, people may think another group should be
treated equally. Second, precedents affect people's
judgment of what's right and wrong: When faced with a
tough moral, judicial, or legislative question, we're
often swayed by what influential decision-makers have
done in the past. That's one reason why "The Supreme
Court has long held ..." or "Congress has consistently
said that ..." are such a powerful arguments, so long
as listeners don't already have their own firm
opinions and so long as they generally respect the
precedent-setting institution and are willing to be
influenced by its judgment.
Precedents thus matter not just in courts, but also in
legislation, and even in international disputes,
especially in areas such as trade. If Country A gets
to restrict imports of movies, people might feel that
Country B deserves to be treated equally, and over
time, more people might come to assume that such
restrictions are proper.
But regardless of the arena, precedents chiefly
influence those who care about equality and
consistency and those willing to defer to the
precedent-setter's judgment. The Chinese government,
to take Howard Dean's example, fits neither category.
When China is deciding whether or not to invade
Taiwan, it will focus on its own interests, not on
being consistent with what other governments have
done. And Chinese officials are unlikely to be
influenced by America's judgment about when a war is
just: They simply don't respect our views the same way
that we might respect our own Supreme Court or
Congress.
Nor will the supposed "precedent" set by an American
attack on Iraq substantially affect the West's views
about the Chinese attack. Some in the West�and
especially in the United States�might care about
consistency and might be influenced by America's
judgment that pre-emptive war is sometimes
permissible. But these people will likely be much more
influenced by whether China really has a factual basis
for a pre-emptive war. Howard Dean's scenario is
troubling precisely because we know that Taiwan is not
a military threat to China. If that's so, then the
West should oppose the invasion of Taiwan whether or
not we invade Iraq.
Others have suggested that India might pre-emptively
attack Pakistan based on the alleged precedent of our
attack on Iraq. India is a democracy, and its citizens
may well care about consistency and respect America
and its allies enough to be influenced by our judgment
(especially if their own government ultimately
endorses the allied attack). And India might have a
plausible pre-emption argument against Pakistan.
But what is really stopping India from attacking
Pakistan now, even though it feels that it's been
seriously provoked? It's not concern about consistency
or legalism�it's that Pakistan has a huge army and
nuclear bombs and that India has little to gain from
such a war. These factors will generally dictate
national decision-making about war regardless of
whether America sets a supposed precedent supporting
pre-emptive attacks.
If all this is true, then our decision to invade Iraq
will likely make a difference as a precedent only when
five factors are simultaneously present: 1) The nation
involved�or at least countries with decisive influence
over that nation�seriously cares about international
consistency or respects the moral force of our
judgment, which probably means it is a democracy and
likely our ally. 2) The nation's potential target
really poses a serious threat, so the claim of
"pre-emptive self-defense" seems plausible. 3) The
threat isn't serious enough that the nation will just
do what it thinks it must do regardless of concerns
about consistency, legality, or others' opinion. 4)
The nation feels that it can act with relative safety
because the target isn't yet very well-armed. 5) The
nation won't be dissuaded from its action by the cost
and danger of war or by the pressure of allies who
will likely continue to counsel against war in most
cases.
This will happen rarely�and when it does happen, we
shouldn't be all that troubled. If democracies become
a bit quicker to act when there really is a good claim
for pre-emptive self-defense, and when neither cost
nor risk nor their allies' pressure suffices to
dissuade them, that might on balance be good. Are we
sorry, for instance, that the Israelis pre-emptively
bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981?
We might be slightly more troubled if democracies
become slower to condemn non-democracies that act
based on trumped-up claims of threat. Still, there are
two reasons why we shouldn't much fear this, either:
First, the essence of sound foreign policy is
distinguishing real threats from fake ones; most of
the time, democracies will know when another country's
supposed justification for pre-emptive attack is
well-founded. And second, in practice democracies
rarely stop other nations' aggressions, and when they
do, it's because of self-interest, not precedents or
legal rules. Consider how long it took for outsiders
to stop the Balkan wars, a move ultimately motivated
by the Europeans' interest in maintaining a peaceful
Europe.
Precedents and slippery slopes can be powerful forces
and can sound like powerful arguments. We should
indeed think about the indirect consequences of our
actions, not just the immediate ones. But the phrases
"what about the precedent?" and "where do you stop?"
don't magically mandate inaction. Rather, people who
make these arguments must concretely explain how our
action today would supposedly help lead to others'
action tomorrow. They haven't done so here.
Our invading Iraq will not set a dangerous precedent
or much of a precedent at all. We should focus on the
costs and benefits of this war, and not on its
supposed precedential effects on future wars.
=====
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John D. Giorgis - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq:
Your enemy is not surrounding your country � your enemy is ruling your
country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be
the day of your liberation." -George W. Bush 1/29/03
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