At 11:07 AM 7/27/2003 -0500, you wrote:
> From: John D. Giorgis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> At 01:23 PM 7/24/2003 -0500 The Fool wrote:
>
>http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/24/technology/24VOTE.html?ex=1059710400&en
=
> >d989a69c518293a6&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE
> >
> >Computer Voting Is Open to Easy Fraud, Experts Say By JOHN SCHWARTZ
>
> Wouldn't a fail-safe answer be to have each computer terminal print a
paper
> "receipt" for each voter, which is then placed in a backup-system paper
> voting box?    These receipts could then be used for any official
recounts
> - or even frivolous recounts, which are billed to the challenging
party......

Which is exactly the point I'm making.  Thes machine do not print or
other wise provide a paper trail, and republicans from several states
have crafted laws that prohibit the use of machines that provide paper
trails.  And some of these machines keep several accounting books, that
different programs access.  These machines were designed for fraud.


So your name is John Schwatz?

I agree with you about the problem, but I don't think John's solution is perfect and wonder about all schemes.

Let me back up ten steps. Are we going to assume that the 100% best method would have the voter mark a dot on a large print paper ballot? And the voter has access to an unlimited supply of paper ballots, until he marks one correctly? See there can already be problems. What if the vote counters get a paper ballot with two candidates selected with the same mark? Same marks, one with an X through it, or one circled. Different marks, but obviously both marked? Make up your own situation, but my point is, if you are looking for problems you can find them. I'm not making a snide remark, isn't there a saying "Only a fool thinks he has a foolproof system?"

With John's separate paper receipt. It has to be big enough for the voter to know his votes were marked correctly, it can't just be a bar code. Assuming the voter puts it in a separate box: it may be easy for the poll workers to see that the voter only puts in one receipt, but how to know it's the correct receipt, that he didn't pull a false one out of his pocket? Enough people do this by targeting a polling place, then challenge the results and demand a re-vote when their side doesn't win.

You can say: the printout comes from the back or side of the machine pre-folded. The voter has to get the paper slip, check it, or not, and put it into the box in front of all the poll workers. It would take a select group of magicians to perform a slight of hand to stuff in bad receipts, but we only need it to happen once for the whole system to be questioned.

Kevin T. - VRWC

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