>ritu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >Bryon Daly wrote: > > > Sorry this is a *long* reply, as I've tried to > >include links to back > > up some of what I say, and have included excerpts > of some relevant parts... > > That's fine with me. My apologies for the delay but > I have been busy and unwell... <major snippage>
> Now I wouldn't try to claim that Saddam loved the US > but *why* was there > such a major threat perception with regards to him? > When did he threaten to attack the US? > And when and why did the US govt. start believing > that he could carry his threat out? <snip> > > And many of those same nations that were saying > >right before the war to > > give containment a chance were the same ones that > >were trying to get the Iraq > > sanctions reduced before the war talk started, so > >my guess is that if the US > > backed down, withdrew its troops, and took the > >pressure off, the "sanctions > > are killing millions of Iraqi babies" talk would > >start up again, and the > > inspectors would get kicked out again, etc. > > Why couldn't the US have kept the troops there until > Blix and his men > finished the inspections they were carrying out? > Further decisions could > have been made after taking Blix's report into > consideration. > See, that has been the most puzzling aspect of this > war for me: just > what *was* the hurry? It was a matter of weeks, not > months or years. > *Why* was there such a huge and immediate threat > perception that it was > considered necessary to alienate so many > people/countries, and attack > Iraq at that particular moment? > I know why a majority of the US citizens felt so > threatened [a > combination of the pshychological fall-outs of 9/11 > and the war rhetoric > launched by the US administration] but why did the > administration feel > so very threatened by Saddam Hussein? > Especially in view of the National Intelligence > Council report submitted to them last October: > http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4922.htm > > "But page 4 of the report, called the National > Intelligence Estimate, > deals with terrorism, and draws conclusions that > would come as a shock > to most Americans, judging from recent polls on > Iraq. The CIA, Defense > Intelligence Agency and the other U.S. spy agencies > unanimously agreed that Baghdad: > > had not sponsored past terrorist attacks against > America, > > was not operating in concert with al-Qaida, > > and was not a terrorist threat to America. > > "We have no specific intelligence information that > Saddam's regime has > directed attacks against U.S. territory," the report > stated. > > However, it added, "Saddam, if sufficiently > desperate, might decide that > only an organization such as al-Qaida could > perpetrate the type of > terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct." > > Sufficiently desperate? If he "feared an attack that > threatened the > survival of the regime," the report explained. " I have been following this discussion with interest. Thank you both for all the links. WRT reconstruction efforts (I snipped that part above), and adding to the "what *was* the hurry?" is the (re?)organization this month: http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/10/06/sprj.irq.main/index.html "...White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the plan represented a "new phase" in the rebuilding effort. ""This group can work to help cut through some of the bureaucracy and the red tape here in Washington so that we can make sure, as our efforts accelerate in Iraq, that [reconstruction forces there are] getting the full assistance from Washington," he said. "McClellan said the Iraq Stabilization Group would oversee four areas: fighting terrorism, developing the economy, overseeing political affairs and working with the news media. National security adviser Condoleezza Rice will head up the group..." 'War' was declared over in May (IIRC), yet an "Iraq Stabilization Group" - an "interagency coordinating council that will give it [the White House and thus I presume Bush] a more direct role in Iraq's reconstruction" was not created until *October*? This is highly inefficient, and appears incompetent to me. If one plans to go to war, and one is reasonably certain that one will handily win (from a purely military standpoint), one ought to have carefully crafted plans to 'win the peace' _before_ the first shot is fired. While I agree that it is unreasonable to expect a smooth transition from Saddam -> US forces occupation -> Iraq self-governance, comparisons to the Marshall Plan and how long it took to stabilize Germany overlook the fact that the US *started* this active conflict in Iraq, whereas America came late to WWII, and AFAIK hadn't _planned_ on reorganizing both Japan and Germany. [Which somebody else on the List may have pointed out already...?] Maybe General Petraeus' (cited in the snippage) methods ought to be applied to more of Iraq. Now. The group will also work on improving conditions in Afghanistan: http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/10/06/sprj.nitop.oversight.reut/index.html "...The creation of the group appears to place more responsibility and control with Rice and the White House as U.S. soldiers remain under attack in Iraq and the Taliban militias that formerly ruled Afghanistan appear to be reorganizing, the paper said... "...The working groups are to be run by four of Rice's deputies, a signal that the White House will have more say in trying to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, said the Times, adding that senior White House officials denied that interpretation..." Debbi __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? The New Yahoo! 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