At 05:23 PM 4/6/2005 -0700,Nick wrote: >Are you saying that war is the only way to get rid of an evil dictator? Or >war was the only way to get rid of this one? Am I mistaken in believing that >in almost every other case, our policy has been not to go to war for that >reason? Is "removing an evil dictator" justification for this war? > >For what it's worth, there is no major religion that accepts such a >justification. There are two great religious traditions with regard to war -- >pacifism and "just war" theology. The latter never allows for a pre-emptive >war. Virtually every major religious body in the world (the one notable >exception being the Southern Baptist Association) urged us not to undertake >it, before it began, which means before we even knew for sure that Iraq was no >threat to us. > >Very aggressive inspections by an international force more like police than >military, indicting the leader in a world court and other pressure could be >brought to bear in such situations. Well-developed policies and plans for >such intervention, backed by international agreement, would go a very long way >toward peace. And so would many things that I have a direct part in -- >consumption of oil and other scarce resouces, more diverse voices in the >media, a more intelligent national discussion of issues and values... > >Nick
Nick, You ask if "removing an evil dictator" is justification for war. I answer *yes* to that question, and further believe that yes it was "the only way to get rid of this one." We spent 12 years trying all sorts of sanctions, air strikes, no-fly-zones, and funding for opposition groups, all to no avail in Iraq. As an amateur geologist, I surely agree that nothing lasts forever, but the experience in places like Cuba, the DPRK, and now Zimbabwe all suggest that this could be a very, very, long time in coming. Thus, I believe that the evils perpetuated by the Iraqi regime for ia reasonably long lifespan into the future under the status quo must be considered in evaluating the justness of the Iraq War. Anyhow, you go on to suggest that there are "two great religious traditions with regard to war - pacifism and just war theology." I think that your statement is a little Christian-centric, perhaps intentionally on your part. But even within the Christian milieu, I think that one of the reasons for the lack of a more robust tradition regarding war is the fact that Christian theology has not quite caught up with a post-Holocaust, cum-United Nations, post-Clinton Doctrine, single hyperpower world. I would point out that the Catholic Catechism phrases this criteria regarding just war, as merely that the war must be waged against an "aggressor", and that 'the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain.'" (As an aside, the other criteria for just war in the Catholic Catechism are the exhaustion of other means (12 years in this case), serious prospect of success (not really a question in this case), and the use of arms must not produce greater evils (i.e. you can't justify a war to stop the execution of one innocent man, since war would result in the death of other innocents.) I know that you are not a Catholic, so I will respond to your definition of a just war first, but I want to make sure that you are aware of the different frame of reference from which I will be operating. In the past, war was essentially a geo-strategic event. Countries conducted wars to expand their power or influence at the expense of other countries. After the horrors of the Holocaust, it became suddenly at least conceivable that it could be desirable to conduct a war for moral reasons, rather than for strategic reasons. The creation of the United Nations following World War II crystalized a concept of "international peace and security" that was in the collective interest of nations. These ideas were more-or-less put on hold during The Cold War, however, until Bill Clinton formally made it a policy that the US would, when it could, make war on another country principally on humanitarian grounds and in defence of universal human rights. In a world with a single hyperpower, it now becomes ever more conceivable that the US could use the extraordinary imbalance of power in its favor on behalf of human rights where it does not have an immediate strategic interest. Anyhow, in my interpretation, the only "update" to just war theology required for the modern world, would be to consider a regime like Saddam Hussein's as being an "aggressor" based upon its crimes against humanity, its past history, and the reasonable consideration of its future actions, particularly with its hands on WMD's. But more on this later.... Under your interpretation "just war theology" requires imminent self-defence (or perhaps even *immediate* self-defense) as a pre-condition for "just war." This logic, however, would preclude a country intervening against a government conducting a genocide against its own people. I find that alone to be a compelling argument against "just war theology" as you describe. As Dan M. is fond of noting, Catholicism teaches us to recognize sin both in "what I have done, and what I have failed to do." While I recognize the existance of counter-arguments here, I find very unsatisfying any theology that would require the United States to stand on the sidelines of a genocide, even when it is reasonably able to intervene, and indeed even when it is willing to intervene. Of course, a more concrete example, comes from the original application of the Clinton Doctrine in Kosovo. As near as I can tell from following the subsequent discussion, you have argued that what I would call the "Kosovo War" was not a war at all, but a police action. I am hoping that you can perhaps expand upon this distinction. Under my understanding of just war theology, a police action would require the exercise of legitimate authority. Yugoslavia was a separate country from the US, however, and thus the laws of the United States provided no legitimate authority. Yugoslavia was also not a part of NATO, and had not attacked a NATO Member, so the North Atlantic Treaty also did not provide any legitimate authority. [As an aside - some of our NATO Allies, such as Greece, were adamantly opposed to the actions in Kosovo, although they did not exercise their veto to preclude NATO from taking action. So you can't rely upon the unanimity of our allies in supporting our actions in Kosovo] On the other hand, as Yugoslavia is a party to the San Francisco Treaty (aka the UN Charter - to which I might add that the US had a veto power over its Membership), the US was committed by Treaty to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. (Territorial Integrity is important here, as a direct outcome of this event was the US carving out Kosovo from Yugoslavia as a statelet with indeterminate Final Status.) Thus, under this Treaty, the UN Security Council might have conferred legitimate authority on the United States to intervene in Kosovo, but it expressly *did not* in this case. So again, I am curious as to how you distinguish "war" from "police action", and why you think that "police action" is a more appropriate description of US actions in Kosovo in the absence of legitimate authority. Lastly, you propose a number of alternatives to regime change in Iraq, but honestly I do not find them to be all that different from the de facto alternative of simply the "status quo." You muse the existence of aggressive inspections by an international police force - but not only does such a force not exist, but after 12 years of non-compliance, only a military force effecting regime change could truly have secured the unconditional compliance that was demanded by the UN. Indictment by an international tribunal, even if such a tribunal had legal authority to do so, would almost certainly do little to undermine Saddam Hussein. Meanwhile, the US did spend well over a whole year developing plans for war in Iraq and seeking international agreement. As it is, a majority of US allies supported the Iraq war, whereas only a few very vocal allies (France, Germany, Canada, etc.) did not. Further international agreement was simply not possible. And finally, things like adjusting resource consumption and changing the nature of the US polity are surely far too long term to be any different from a policy of the "status quo." So, to return to the original question, if one interprets Saddam Hussein as an "aggressor" under Catholic Just War theory, one must examine whether the damage being inflicted by Saddam Hussein was "lasting, grave, and certain" and then whether a war against Iraq would produce a greater evil. I am going to sum up these criteria by simply referring to them as the "totality of the circumstances." After all, the mere existence of any "just war" theology demonstrates that "war" is not considered to be an inherently evil action. Thus, the standard Catholic examination of the morality of an action would then proceed to the intentions and the totality of the circumstances. If you are going to argue that Bush's intentions in the Iraq War were to do evil, then we are probably too far apart for us to have meaningful discussion. Thus, I will proceed to the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the Iraq War, as I mentioned above, and I think that these circumstances overwhelmingly favor the justness of the War. In the case of Iraq, we had a history of egregious oppression of his own people: the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, the ethnic cleansing of the Marsh Arabs, etc.; and the ongoing oppression of his people at a slightly lower scale: the unnecessary deaths of thousands of children under the age of 5 each month due to misappropriation of oil revenues to weapons and palaces according to the UN, systematic oppression of political dissidents, widespread use of torture, disappearances, and other abuses. The US had the ability to either let this state of affairs continue indefinitely, or else attempt to make a change for the better. I believe that this reason alone constitutes "lasting, grave, and certain damage" from the regime of Saddam Hussein. Also in the case of Iraq we had direct geo-strategic interests. Saddam Hussein had previously attempted to occupy the territory of two of his neighbors (Iran and Kuwait), and had launched armed attacks against two others (Israel, Saudi Arabia.) Saddam Hussein had a known interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, his success in which could force the US, which was committed to defending Turkey, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf States, between honoring those commitments in a military conflict with a nuclear power, or permitting Iraq to become a Middle East hegemon. Moreover, the US knew from past experience in India, Pakistan, and the DPRK that US intelligence services were incapable of predicting precisely when a country would successfully acquire nuclear weapons, particularly if such weapons were to perhaps be bought ready-made on the black market from an inpoverished, nuclear-armed state (DPRK.) Furthermore, the US had also recently been the subject of a bio-terrorism attack, resulting in the deaths of five Americans, and without being able to conclusively prove the origin of this attack. Saddam Hussein was known to have previously amassed vast stockpiles of bio-weapons, and after 12 years of UN resolutions requiring him to do so, he had not yet provided a satisfactory account of their disposition. So long as Saddam Hussein was in power, there was the distinct possibility of Iraq being a production and distribution point for bioweapons onto the black market, which might eventually be used in further bio-terrorism attacks on the US, which also would presumably be difficult to trace back to their source. Additionally, in the post-September 11th world, Iraq was posing a number of softer geopolitical problems for the US. Saddam Hussein was funding Palestinian terrorist operations against Israel, prolonging that conflict, and the concomitant resentment of Arab peoples against the US for its sympathy with the Israelis in the face of terrorism. Moreover, Saddam Hussein was waging an Arabic public relations campaign against us, blaming the suffering of the Iraqi people under his regime on the United States - despite the fact that the UN permitted Saddam Hussein to sell unlimited amounts of oil for the purchase of food and medicine, which was fuelling anti-Americanism against the US throughout the world. Furthermore, so long as Saddam Hussein was in power, the US was committed to the defence of Saudi Arabia in the event of future agression by Saddam Hussein. This relationshp is a prime grievance cited by Osama bin Laden against the United States, and moreover, made it difficult for the US to apply pressure on the Saudi regime to make reforms. Lastly, in the post Sept. 11th world, the US became acutely aware of the democratic deficit - indeed the utter absence of democracy - in the Arab world. Dealing with the above by effecting regime change in Iraq would provide the opportunity to install a democracy in the heart of the Arab world. The benefecial effects of democracy, particularly in the Arab World, do not need enumerating here. All told, I think that the balance of the "totality of circumstances" outlined above clearly outweighed the the negatives, and led to the conclusion that regime change in Iraq would ultimately contribute to the greater good. John D. _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
