On 20 Apr 2005, Dan Minette wrote
We agree that one cannot emperically derive morality.
But what if one can do something else, which is to derive what our
morality is, in practice, under various conditions?
(Keith Henson is arguing that.)
For example, one argument is that when the choice is between you dying
and someone else dying, then psychologically the probability is that
you will develop a rationale justifying your life ahead of the
other's.
If the other looks or speaks differently, then probabilistically
speaking, such a rationale will make use of that difference.
On the other hand, when the choice is between you and another
cooperating on the one hand, or you becoming worse off, then the
argument is that the probability is that you will develop a rationale
justifying cooperation.
You will learn -- or a descendent will learn -- to say that `even
though that other looks and speaks differently than me, that person is
as human as I, at least in some ways, and deserves cooperation of some
sort.' Thus Americans of English descent who previously had referred
to them as `dumb' changed their statements concerning Irish, Swedes,
Poles, and Italians ...
Although this mode of approach is the same as saying that
... at a minimum, morality requires the existance of Truths that
exist apart from humans...but that we can come to understand.
the Truths come from a different source. Does the source of the
Truths make a difference?
--
Robert J. Chassell
[EMAIL PROTECTED] GnuPG Key ID: 004B4AC8
http://www.rattlesnake.com http://www.teak.cc
_______________________________________________
http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
