Dan Minette said,
With access points on both sides of the freeway, we're probably
talking about 500-1000 authorized access points.
Right! We need thousands of police or troops. This job cannot be
done by a small number.
I remember people talked about this more than 40 years ago, when the
goal was to evacuate cities because the Soviets were threatening.
... When, for example, the freeway is backed up and the frontage
road is flowing, people will just pull off the freeway, drive on
grass or dirt for a bit ..., and then go on the feeder road.
Even if all the official entrances were blocked, there would be
virtually an unlimited supply of Texas entrance ramps.
Again, many police or troops are necessary.
Suppose there are two or three national guardsmen every 100 meters;
for 800 km (500 miles), 24,000 militia are needed. (Maybe more are
needed; I don't know.)
Plus, the same cops who were asked to set up the counterflow would
be the ones that would have to regulate the entrance ramps.
That is what a militia is for: we are talking a large number. That
is why planning, training, and exercises are important. That is why
some people have to be paid professionals. It is not easy.
The physical process of doing the counterflow took longer than
expected.
Yes; it should take several hours. Among other things, an exercise
should determine in practice how long it takes. As I said, none of
this is easy.
Rob Seeberger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Though from what I have seen and heard, the main objection to
opening the contra lanes is the law enforcement manpower it would
sap ...
Right. I doubt there are enough state and city police to do the job,
and to stop looting, and to preventing entrance to evacuated zones.
That is why the militia is needed. And why they need good training --
to avoid shooting (or even bothering) people wrongly.
After all, the goal of speeding up an auto evacuation by enforcing
limits on access is to cause less bother and fewer deaths than a slow
auto evacuation on the same roads.
It is really hard.
Alternatively, one can engage in a slow auto evacuation in which the
powers-that-be talk about staggered entry, but do nothing to enforce
that plan except give what in the circumstances are a few tickets --
in effect, removing incentives for cooperation.
Dan said,
The problem is that some folks delayed, and others went when they
didn't really need to. There were three stages of mandatory
evacuation, about 10 hours apart, IIRC...and the roads would have
handled that traffic OK. I think it's those folks who decided to
get out of town, but were not in those areas that added to the
problem.
People `... not in those areas ...' give a good reason for enforcing
access. Otherwise the `three stages' are not mandatory but voluntary.
Figuring out on an individual basis who is who is both difficult and
irritating. It also takes time.
That is why it is better to control access in general. By `extending
the road' -- by blocking off cross roads and such -- the
powers-that-be can run a road into an area for a short time. Then,
when people are urged to evacuate by car, most be people from the
area, although not all. And the action will not take long.
Practicing this is expensive. From a traffic management point of
view, it is like multiple Memoral Day parades. You cannot cross a
parade route and you cannot cross a blocked off road.
Moreover, the exercise is less exciting than a parade. It will be
unpopular unless turned into some sort of community event that enough
people are willing to accept or even like.
None of this was done by Civil Defense of the early 1960s. At that
time, the US government was unwilling to undertake such exercises in
the 150 or so larger US cities (or more precisely, in their `standard
metropolitan areas'). I suspect that is one reason many decided that
Civil Defense was crock.
Also, many reckoned that if the Soviets did make any kind of attack,
it would be a surprise attack. There would not be enough time for
anyone near or in a coastal city to even consider evacuation.
(There are several reasons for the surprise attack presumption: first,
the country had experienced a surprise attack in relatively recent
memory, and people tend to think that what has happened once will
happen again. Second, many figured that a surprise attack would do
more damage to the US `second strike' capability than anything else.
One reason the US moved its B-52s out of Massachusetts was to reduce
such possible damage. That is also given as the reason for huge
investments in protected missile `silos' and in missile carrying
submarines.
(Incidentally, several US bomber pilots told me that they figured they
would be able to take off from air fields in the middle of the US
before an attack, even a surprise attack. From the air, they would
see the attack, their home bases destroyed, and their wives and
children killed; and they would seek revenge.)
I think this is the largest two day evacuation of an area in human
history. I've heard numbers of 1.5 million people evacuating.
Yes, as a storm evacuation, it worked. And that is good.
However, at the same time, this was also a test of what might happen
if there were some other event, or the believable threat of one.
If people who are stuck in a traffic jam can get out of before a
hurricane, that is good. But it is not so good if people are stuck
during a more rapidly moving crisis, or if they come to think that
evacuation is a waste.
It is a question of time. Too little and nothing can be done.
Enough, and perhaps the emergency can be handled well.
Also, as a practical matter, it is likely that the powers-that-be will
take note that Houston was not hit by this hurricane this time. I
would not be surprised if next time they order an evacuation later,
when the danger is more obvious. Remember, the auto evacuation of New
Orleans took place only the day before Katrina made landfall.
To protect themselves, politicians need well known, public criteria.
A false call is bad. President Ford prepared the US for a swine flu
epidemic that did not occur. As far as I know, he made a good
decision based on probabilities and dangers. Nonetheless, he was hurt
by that decision because few people saw it as a reasonable response to
fuzzy information.
--
Robert J. Chassell
[EMAIL PROTECTED] GnuPG Key ID: 004B4AC8
http://www.rattlesnake.com http://www.teak.cc
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