> From: David Brin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > And posting comments in 'blogger' is...difficult. > > 'Blogger' > > is...Complete Garbage. > > Sorry about that.I merely find it irksome. > > May I repost your comment? >
Here are some links to posts that were made to this list about diebold/voting machines over the past few years that you should find helpful: Diebolds 3 sets of accounting books: <<http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:OjSPZB7qog8J:www.wheresthepaper.o rg/BBV_GEMSreport.htm+black+box+voting+diebold+3+sets+books&hl=en>> Diebold systems contain feature that allows tampering at central tabulator: <<http://www.mccmedia.com/pipermail/brin-l/Week-of-Mon-20040906/022602.h tml>> ID Cards, Election Stealing, and Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: <<http://www.mccmedia.com/pipermail/brin-l/Week-of-Mon-20040419/018197.h tml>> Thousands Turned Away from the Polls in CA on super tuesday: http://www.mccmedia.com/pipermail/brin-l/Week-of-Mon-20040419/018240.htm l Sequoia Spot-Test doesn't match on test machine: http://www.mccmedia.com/pipermail/brin-l/Week-of-Mon-20040816/021798.htm l Diebold Memos Disclose Florida 2000 E-Voting Fraud <<http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0310/S00211.htm>> Leaked Diebold Memos: <<http://www.why-war.com/features/2003/10/diebold.html#excerpts>> Diebold Voting Machines At High Risk of Compromise : <<http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/index.php?p=449>> Now Your Vote Is The Property Of A Private Corporation: <<http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0306-04.htm>> ---- On January 17, 2001, Lana Hines, a county elections official sent out an inquiry as to how Al Gore ended up with a vote-count of -16,022. (NEGATIVE 16,022)which just happens also to have been the total number of votes cast for various independent and third-party candidates who also ran. This is what Talbot Iredale, Vice President of Research & Development at Global/Diebold wrote: <<http://216.239.57.104/search?q=cache:AJM-TolRYw8J:www.sunrise.it/s/lis ts/support.w3archive/200101/msg00069.html+&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>> Re: Memory card checksum errors (was: 2000 November Election) To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: Memory card checksum errors (was: 2000 November Election) From: "Talbot Iredale" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2001 13:31:04 -0800 References: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> John, Here is all the information I have about the 'negative' counts. Only the presidential totals were incorrect. All the other races the sum of the votes + under votes + blank votes = sum of ballots cast. The problem precinct had two memcory cards uploaded. The second one is the one I believe caused the problem. They were uploaded on the same port approx. 1 hour apart. As far as I know there should only have been one memory card uploaded. I asked you to check this out when the problem first occured but have not heard back as to whether this is true. When the precinct was cleared and re-uploaded (only one memory card as far as I know) everything was fine. Given that we transfer data in ascii form not binary and given the way the data was 'invalid' the error could not have occured during transmission. Therefore the error could only occur in one of four ways: Corrupt memory card. This is the most likely explaination for the problem but since I know nothing about the 'second' memory card I have no ability to confirm the probability of this. Invalid read from good memory card. This is unlikely since the candidates results for the race are not all read at the same time and the corruption was limited to a single race. There is a possiblilty that a section of the memory card was bad but since I do not know anything more about the 'second' memory card I cannot validate this. Corruption of memory, whether on the host or Accu-Vote. Again this is unlikely due to the localization of the problem to a single race. Invalid memory card (i.e. one that should not have been uploaded). There is always the possiblity that the 'second memory card' or 'second upload' came from an un-authorised source. If this problem is to be properly answered we need to determine where the 'second' memory card is or whether it even exists. I do know that there were two uploads from two different memory cards (copy 0 (master) and copy 3). Tab ---- <<http://www.blackboxvoting.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1 0>> Voting Machine: Interview with Paul Miller & Kathryn Ferguson (Sequoia) Posted on Friday, March 28 @ 19:10:53 EST by BevHarris State of Washington Secretary of State's Office Dave Elliott and Paul Miller would be the ones that know about certification dates for upgrades. I spoke with Paul Miller 360-664-3442 Harris: "I'm wanting to know, how can I find out the dates that program updates for the AccuVote system were certified by the state?" Miller: "It depends upon if its an upgrade to the actual tabulation equipment. If it's a minor modification on how they run the reports that is not an issue that necessarily requires recertification." br> Harris: "If they put a CD in the machine and run "setup" and it installs an update program, how would you know what it does? Do you just ask the manufacturer what it does, or what?" Miller: "Well, replacing a Rom chip on the device itself, something like that, usually they will let us know what's been modified and we'll make the decision as to whether to test it." Harris: "If elections officials are mailed a CD to overwrite the program with an updated one, when and how do you certify that?" Miller: "That is not an issue." Harris: "I don't understand." Miller: "The part that we certify is the tabulation equipment, the system that reads the ballot and stores the results." Harris: "So, if the optical scan machines read results, and as I understand it the results are stored on a memory card, and then the results are either transferred to a central server by modem and read there, or they can be taken out of the machine and brought to a central location how does that work?" Miller: "The results are stored in the Rom chips and are transferred to the memory card." Harris: "So what is it that you test, when there is an upgrade?" Miller: "We look at the device at the polling site and the central tabulating -- these are essentially the same device as at the polling place. For Global it's fitted with the central counting at the polling place itself." Harris: "For example, I was just talking to the Elections Supervisor on the San Juan Islands, and the polling places are on different islands, and each one has an optical scanner machine, as I understand it. So isn't there a program involved, which tabulates the results when they are modemed in to the server?" Miller: "You're talking about polling place votes. Also there are absentee and those are what I refer to as central counting. The process when they are modeming in numbers, you've got independent numbers at polling places you're modeming in from, and those independent devices can be checked as part of canvassing. The central counting I'm referring to is the absentee ballots, which aren't counted at the polling place, they're counted at the elections office. Those are run through the machines like those at the polling place." Harris: "My question remains, how do you certify program upgrades? Who tells you there is an upgrade? Because when an Elections Supervisor tells me, 'I get a CD in the mail and it doesn't have instructions, and then I run it,' what I want to know is, what is the control system for that?" Miller: "The first step on any process and the thing that we primarily rely on is that they are required to run the equipment through the ITA (Independent Testing) labs. What we're looking for when we certify is primarily that it meet the Washington State standards and the ability to do rotations and so forth as the law requires." Harris: "So you don't really look at the software, or certify any updates that come in on CDs?" Miller: "But the CD -- it depends on what kind of upgrade we're talking about--" Harris: "Would you look at the CD if the change was substantive?" Miller: "You're talking about the lines of code?" Harris: "I just want to know what the procedure is to safeguard the integrity of the system when an elections official replaces one version of the program with an update, such as a new CD that comes in the mail." Miller: "What you need to understand is that we set up and run Logic and Accuracy tests before every election that are designed to be checked, specific to each election. The purpose of that is that people can make mistakes so the Logic and Accuracy tests catch that, but it also catches that the system counts the votes accurately." Harris: "Would you ever look at the CD?" Miller: "That's when we rely on the labs to do that and the rigorous testing they do." Harris: "When the manufacturer provides an upgrade by CD or by replacing a ROM or whatever, do you need to get it recertified?" Miller: "Sometimes." Harris: "Who tracks that?" Miller: "I don't understand." Harris: "The lady I talked to got a CD and then ran it to upgrade her GEMS program. How does anybody know what's on that program? Even if an independent testing lab examines the updated CD, who tracks that at your office to make sure the CD these Election Supervisors are installing has been certified by an ITA?" Miller: "You have to talk to somebody else. Somebody needs to track the rewriting." Harris: "Who does that?" Miller: "We rely on the lab." Harris: "Who makes sure the new CDs sent out to elections officials are tested and certified by the lab?" Miller: "Well that brings us to, we do the L and A test. That's the primary way we do it. It happens every election." Harris: "So you're relying on only the L and A for upgrades?" Miller: "Depending on the significance of the upgrade." Harris: "How do you know what the significance is, when it's a program on a CD that you haven't seen?" Miller: "The manufacturer is supposed to notify us when they make upgrades." Harris: "Am I understanding this correctly, that the manufacturer is supposed to notify you of the upgrade, and based on what they say the upgrades do, you decide whether anyone needs to certify the new CD software?" Miller: "Correct." Harris: "In Washington State, there is a spot check of the hand count against the machines, isn't there?" Miller: "The political parties have the right to request hand count of three precincts in any county on election night." Harris: "Do they have to pay for that?" Miller: "No." Harris: "That seems like a good policy to have. What about the Sequoia touch screen machines you have in Snohomish County? How can a candidate request a hand count of three precincts?" Miller: "On the touch screen -- we do have the hand recounts of close races too." Harris: "On a machine with no voter-verified paper trail?" Miller: "Well, there's no way to do a hand recount on a DRE." Harris: "How do you do an L and A on a DRE? It seems like if you try to simulate the voting situation and push a whole bunch of votes, your finger would get tired." Miller: "The test is set up to ensure -- you don't necessarily need to do hundreds of votes. You set up a, you ensure that you cover every contest on the ballot." Harris: "How many ballots did they run on the L and A for those touch screen machines? Was it 10, 100, 1000?" Miller: "Again what you want to do is check each and every race and you set up a pattern one for the first race, two for the second, you vote that pattern and run reports and ensure the numbers come up right." Harris: "Who makes up the pattern?" "We make up the pattern." Harris: "If a machine miscounts after higher numbers of votes were cast, how would you know?" Miller: "What's the scenario, what's the way that would happen?" Harris: "Well, for example, let's say a programmer set it up that way." Miller: "What you're implying is that there is a way for a programmer to know where a candidate will be on the ballot to give that candidate a benefit. That's impossible." Harris: "Regardless of who sets up the ballot, the ballot does identify who is a Republican and who is a Democrat. So there would be a way for the program to know that. Why couldn't a programmer, for example, set the machine to wait for a couple hundred votes and then put, say, one out of every 10 Democrat votes into the Republican bin?" Miller: "It's not the programmer that programs the machine." Harris: "But whoever does it identifies, for example, who is a Democrat and who is a Republican, so regardless of who inputs that, the machine would be able to read and identify that too." Miller: "I'm not going to talk about proving a negative." Harris: "But the positive, which can be proved, is that every election system that's ever been used in the USA has, at one time or another, been tampered with. And what we do know is that $800 million has gone toward contributions to candidates. So certainly we can predict that someone will try to tamper with a programmer. And therefore, what I'm asking, is what safeguards do we have in place to make sure that, if someone tampers with a program or a CD update --" Miller: "I think we've gone as far as we can go." Interview with Kathryn Ferguson of Sequoia Systems, on the Dave Ross Show Ross: "And I also have the, I'm going to see if I can get the staff to call up Sequoia Systems, see what they have to say about this. Harris; "That'd be great!" .... Ross: "We're going to talk in a moment, I believe, to Kathryn Ferguson of Sequoia Systems, one of the systems that you say has been in trouble before..." .... Ross: "Okay now I'm just getting a message from Tina that Kathy hung up. Are you going to call her back, was it a disconnection or what? You're calling her back, okay." .... Ross: "We're still going to try and get Kathy Ferguson on but Tina's telling me she's....not answering. So we've left a message." .... ---- That's just what I could find without doing an extensive google search. As for mike saying that he puts backdoors in everthing he writes: He should be fired. Seriously. That is completely unprofessional behaviour. Their is NEVER a need for or justification for putting backdoors into software. Ever. ---- "If voting could really change things, it would be illegal." --Diebold Internal Memos _______________________________________________ http://www.mccmedia.com/mailman/listinfo/brin-l
