Julian <[email protected]> writes: > On 03/27/2014 05:52 PM, [email protected] wrote: >> I am writing to stress out the need of a solution, integrated with >> icecat, to use false browser fingerprints and result in opting-out >> from surveillance. > > Nothing wrong with adding anti-fingerprinting to IceCat, but I just > want to point out that the best way to stop fingerprinting (and > surveillance in general) is to use the Tor Browser Bundle at its > default settings. IceCat can never be as good at stopping tracking as > that, for various reasons.
Actually, if we are talking about fingerprinting strictly rather than pure anonimity, I'm not sure how the tor browser fares (I remember the tor browser draft mentioned fingerprinting at some point.) Anything that modifies the behavior of your browser has an effect on fingerprinting. This includes the measures (addons, fixes) taken to block third-party requests, disable a global js variable, and the like. The more the browser is out of the ordinary the more unique its fingerprint. The best way to get a browser to have a more common fingerprint is to have it masquerade as a common browser, running in a common operating system, with the expected behavior of a browser, etc, ... Running stuff that will make your browser more private will make your fingerprint more unique... So it's just a matter of finding the right balance (you still don't want to leak private data), or finding a way to mess with the values/mechanisms used for fingerprinting. Anyway, this is just my personal opinion which I haven't verified recently (more like a year and a half ago.) -- http://gnuzilla.gnu.org
