Documentation of the Bush administration’s determination and plans for
war and accompanying denials
1-30-2001: Ten days after taking office, at Bush’s first national
security meeting, the top item on the agenda is finding an excuse for
invading Iraq.
3-5-2001: Pentagon produces “Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield
Contracts”, including a map of areas for potential oil exploration,
for Cheney’s task force.
9-20-01: Bush tells Tony Blair, “… When we have dealt with
Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq.”
9-20-01: PNAC letter to Bush: “Even if evidence does not link Iraq
directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of
terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove
Saddam Hussein from power.”
11-21-01: Bush to Rumsfeld: “What have you got in terms of plans for
Iraq? What is the status of the war plan? I want you to get on it. I
want you to keep it secret.”
1-29-02: Bush delivers his “Axis of Evil” speech, written by his
speech writer David Frum after being asked “Can you sum up in a
sentence or two our best case for going after Iraq?”
3-8-02: First Downing Street memo prepared by top Britain national
security aid states that “Washington believes the legal basis for an
attack on Iraq already exists…”
3-22-02: Downing Street memo states “US scrambling to establish a link
between Iraq and Al Qaeda is so far frankly unconvincing… It sounds
like a grudge between Bush and Saddam.”
March 2002: Cheney tells Republican senators that the question is no
longer if the U.S. will invade Iraq but when.
4-4-02: Bush to Blair: “I made up my mind that Saddam needs to go.”
5-23-02: Bush states his opposition to hearings on the 9-11 attacks.
June 2002: Condoleeza Rice to a deputy raising doubts about the need
for war with Iraq: “Save your breath. The president has already made
up his mind.”
July 2002: Bush approves secret request from General Tommy Franks for
$700 million in war preparations.
7-23-02: Downing Street memo written by Britain foreign secretary
after visit with U.S. officials: “Military action was now seen as
inevitable… The intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy…”
August 2002: White House Iraq Group created to market war.
8-7-02: Bush given Iraq war plan by General Franks.
8-20-02: Bush: “We may or may not attack. I have no idea yet”
8-26-02: Cheney: There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons
of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use
against our friends… and against us.”
9-16-01: Rumsfeld: “The president hasn’t made a decision to do
anything with respect to Iraq.”
9-25-02: Bush: “You can’t distinguish between Al Qaeda and Saddam when
you talk about the war on terror.”
October 2002: Bush administration decided not to take out al-Zarqawi
because any terrorist in Iraq helps case for war. According to a
former NSC member, “People were more obsessed with developing the
coalition to overthrow Saddam than to execute the president’s policy
of preemption against terrorists.”
10-8-02: Knight Ridder report: “A growing number of military officers,
intelligence professionals and diplomats in his own government
privately have deep misgivings about the administration’s double-time
march toward war. These officials charge that administration hawks
have exaggerated evidence of the threat that Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein poses… Analysts at the working level in the intelligence
community are feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon to cook
the intelligence books…”
10-16-02: Bush to U.S. public: “I have not ordered the use of force. I
hope the use of force will not become necessary.”
November 2002: CIA station chiefs at a secret meeting in London: War
is inevitable, just a few months away.
11-7-02: Bush: “War is not my first choice. It’s my last choice.”
12-31-02: Bush to U.S. press: “You said we’re headed to war in Iraq. I
don’t know why you say that… I’m the person who gets to decide, not
you.”
January 2003: Deputy CIA Director John McLaughlin to Scooter Libby, on
being pressured to bolster the WMD intelligence: “I’m not going back
to the well on this. We’ve done our work.”
1-31-03: Notes of meeting between Bush and Blair make clear that Bush
intends to invade Iraq even if U.N. inspectors found no evidence of
WMD.
3-7-03: U.S., Britain, and Spain present resolution to Saddam Hussein
giving him an ultimatum to disarm by March 17 or face war.
3-8-03: Bush: “We are doing everything we can to avoid war in Iraq.”
3-20-03: U.S. begins war on Iraq.
Accumulation and marketing of phony evidence of Saddam Hussein’s
intentions and development of WMD, in order to support war in Iraq
The efforts to tie Saddam Hussein to the 9-11 attacks on our country
were initiated remarkably quickly, especially considering the
amazingly slow response mounted against the attacks themselves. Within
two days of 9-11, the following occurred:
9-11-01: Five hours following the attacks on the World Trade Centers
and the Pentagon, minutes taken by a Rumsfeld aide stated “Best info
fast. Judge whether good enough {to} hit SH {Saddam Hussein}…”
9-12-01: Bush tells counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke, “I want
you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything. See
if Saddam did this.” Bush asks for “any shred” of evidence that Saddam
was involved.
Nevertheless:
9-21-01: Bush briefed by intelligence community that there is no
evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the 9-11 attacks.
But despite this, the Bush administration proceeded with its plans.
In order to make the subsequent efforts of the Bush administration to
gather and market evidence of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capabilities of Saddam Hussein easier to follow, the following is a
description of overlapping time lines according to subject area:
Efforts to obtain information through torture
January 2002: Captured Al Qaeda operative, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi,
states while being tortured that Al Qaeda has received chemical
weapons from Iraq.
February 2002: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) intelligence summary
says that al-Libi’s statement about Al Qaeda receiving chemical
weapons from Iraq lacks pertinent details and that it is most likely
false and based solely on his desire to stop being tortured. Report
also notes that it is unlikely that Saddam would provide assistance to
Al Qaeda.
4-9-02: Bush speaking to CIA Director George Tenet about captured Al
Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah: “I said he was important, you’re not
going to let me lose face on this are you?.... Do some of those harsh
methods really work?” Zudaydah is then tortured and speaks of several
plots.
Claim that Iraq purchased enriched uranium from Africa
The most serious threat that the Bush administration tried to
establish was that Saddam Hussein was making a concerted effort to
develop a nuclear weapons program. A major component of that effort
was the allegation that he had purchased enriched uranium (often
referred to as “yellowcake”) from Niger. The Bush administration clung
to that claim despite a great deal of evidence against it:
3-5-02: Joe Wilson tells CIA that there is no indication that Iraq is
buying yellowcake.
Summer 2002: The French debunk the theory that Iraq tried to obtain
yellowcake from Niger: “We told the Americans, ‘Bullshit.. It doesn’t
make any sense’”.
October 2002: National Intelligence Estimate report states “claims of
Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium {i.e., yellowcake} in Africa are
highly dubious.”
10-6-02: NSC memo to White House on the claim that Iraq attempted to
obtain uranium from Niger: “The evidence is weak… the Africa story is
over-blown.”
3-3-03: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tells U.S. that the
Niger uranium documents were forgeries.
3-7-03: IAEA: After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to
date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a
nuclear weapons program in Iraq.”
3-8-03: Joe Wilson on CNN: “I think it’s safe to say that the U.S.
government should have or did know that the {Niger documents were}
fake before Dr. ElBaradei mentioned it in his report at the U.N.
yesterday.”
But despite all that, on 12-7-02, the Bush administration discredited
a report by Iraq to the United Nations, documenting all of its
unconventional arms, on the basis that the report didn’t mention the
alleged uranium that it acquired from Niger, and it used that
discredited allegation as one of its major excuses for going to war.
Claim that Iraq intended to use aluminum tubes to produce enriched
uranium for use in a nuclear weapon
The other major alleged evidence pointing to a nuclear weapons program
in Iraq was the Iraqis’ purchase of aluminum tubes, which the Bush
administration claimed was proof that they intended to use them to
enrich uranium for use in a nuclear weapon. In September of 2002, the
Bush administration began to push that bogus claim:
9-7-02: Bush claims a new U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) report states Iraq is six months from developing a nuclear
weapon – though no such report existed...
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