could you quote the sentence from the page for us to read ? We are not to know like you .
--- On Fri, 10/10/08, Ông-thu N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Ông-thu N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: The 3,500 bombing sorties resulted in 600,000 Khmer deaths! To: [email protected] Date: Friday, October 10, 2008, 1:51 AM Page 140 in this book! --- On Fri, 10/10/08, Sarin Nou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Sarin Nou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: The 3,500 bombing sorties resulted in 600,000 Khmer deaths! To: [email protected] Date: Friday, October 10, 2008, 12:46 PM Why ? Can you show us the page number on 600,000 Khmer deaths --- On Fri, 10/10/08, Ông-thu N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Ông-thu N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: The 3,500 bombing sorties resulted in 600,000 Khmer deaths! To: [email protected] Date: Friday, October 10, 2008, 1:43 AM Read this book: Lying for Empire How to Commit War Crimes With A Straight Face by David Model --- On Fri, 10/10/08, Sarin Nou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Sarin Nou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: The 3,500 bombing sorties resulted in 600,000 Khmer deaths! To: [email protected] Date: Friday, October 10, 2008, 12:40 PM WHAT LINE FROM THE BELOW TEXT DOES IT SHOW 600,000 Khmer deaths? i CANNOT FIND IT --- On Fri, 10/10/08, Ông-thu N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Ông-thu N <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: The 3,500 bombing sorties resulted in 600,000 Khmer deaths! To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [email protected], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Friday, October 10, 2008, 1:23 AM The bombing began on the night of 18 March, 1969 with a raid by 60 B-52 Stratofortress bombers, based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. The target was Base Area 353, the supposed location of COSVN in the Fishhook. Although the aircrews were briefed that their mission was to take place in the South Vietnam , 48 of the bombers were diverted across the Cambodian border and dropped 2,400 tons of bombs. The mission was designated Breakfast, after the morning Pentagon planning session at which it was devised. Breakfast was so successful that General Abrams provided a list of 15 more known Base Areas for targeting. During the next 14 months the operation continued. The five remaining missions that made up the operation and their targets were: Lunch (Base Area 609), Snack (Base Area 351), Dinner (Base Area 352), Supper (Base Area 740), and Dessert (Base Area 350). SAC flew 3,800 B-52 sorties against these targets, and dropped 108,823 tons of ordnance during the missions. Due to the continued reference to gastronomic situations in the codenames, the entire series of missions was referred to as Operation Menu. Assessment of bomb damage to the targets was difficult to obtain, due to the covert nature of the operation. Instead of utilizing Air Force aircraft for the missions, SOG forward air controllers were tasked with obtaining intelligence on target damage. Nixon and Kissinger went to great lengths to keep the missions secret. The expansion of the American effort into "neutral" Cambodia was sure to cause serious debate in Congress, negative criticism in the media, and were sure to spark anti-war protests on American college campuses. In order to prevent this, an elaborate dual reporting system covering the missions had been formulated during the Brussels meeting between Nixon, Haig, and Colonel Sitton. First, the number of individuals who had complete knowledge of the operation was kept to a bare minimum.. All communications concerning the missions was split along two paths - one route was overt, ordering typical B-52 missions that were to take place within South Vietnam near the Cambodian border - the second route was covert, utilizing back-channel messages between commanders ordering the classified missions. For example: General Abrams would request a Menu strike. His request went to Admiral John McCain, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), in Honolulu . McCain forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs in Washington, who, after reviewing it, passed it on to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (who might consult with the president). The Joint Chiefs then passed the command for the strike to General Bruce K. Holloway, Commander of SAC, who then notified Lieutenant General Alvin C. Gillem, Commander of the 3rd Air Division on Guam . During this time Air Force Major Hal Knight was supervising an MSQ-77 Combat Skyspot radar site at Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN. "Skyspot" was a ground directed bombing system which directed B-52 strikes to targets in Vietnam . Each day a courier plane would arrive from SAC's Advanced Echelon Office at Tan Son Nhut Air Base near Saigon ... Knight was given a revised list of target coordinates for the next day's missions. That evening, the coordinates were fed into Olivetti Programma 101 computers and then relayed to the aircraft as they came on station. Only the pilots and navigators of the aircraft (who had been personally briefed by General Gillem and sworn to secrecy) knew of the true location of the targets. The bombers then flew on to their targets and delivered their payloads. After the air strikes, Knight gathered the mission paperwork, computer tapes etc, destroying them in an incinerator. He then called a special phone number in Saigon and reported that "The ball game is over." The aircrews filled out routine reports of hours flown, fuel burned, and ordnance dropped. This dual system maintained secrecy and provided Air Force logistics and personnel administrators with information that they needed to replace air crews or aircraft and replenish stocks of fuel and munitions. Although Sihanouk was not informed by the U.S. about the operation, he did remain quiet about the illegal bombing of his country. His silent acquiescence may have been prompted by a desire to see PAVN/NLF forces out of Cambodia , since he himself was precluded from pressing them too hard. After the event, it was claimed by Nixon and Kissinger that Sihanouk had given his tacit approval for the raids, but this claim has since been disproved. On 9 May 1969, an inaccurate article by military reporter William Beecher describing the bombing was run in the New York Times. Beecher claimed that an unnamed source within the administration had provided the information. Nixon was furious when he heard the news and ordered Dr. Kissinger to obtain the assistance of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and discover the source of the leak. Hoover suspected Kissinger's own NSC aide, Mortin Halperin, of the deed and so informed Kissinger. Halperin's phone was then illegally tapped for 21 months. This was the first in a series of illegal surveillance activities authorized by Nixon in the name of national security. The administration was relieved when no other significant press reports concerning the operation appeared. By the summer, five members of the United States Congress had been informed of the operation. They were: Senators John C. Stennis (MS) and Richard B. Russell, Jr. (GA) and Representatives Lucius Mendel Rivers (SC), Gerald R.. Ford (MI), and Leslie C. Arends (IL). Arends and Ford were leaders of the Republican minority and the other three were Democrats on either the Armed Services or Appropriations committees. For those in Washington who were cognizant of the Menu raids, the silence of one participant came as a surprise. The Hanoi government made no protest concerning the bombings. It neither denounced the raids for propaganda purposes, nor, according to Dr. Kissinger, did its negotiators "raise the matter during formal or secret negotiations....." North Vietnam had no wish to either void Cambodia 's neutrality or to acknowledge the presence of their forces there. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Cambodia Discussion (CAMDISC) - www.cambodia.org" group. This is an unmoderated forum. Please refrain from using foul language. Thank you for your understanding. Peace among us and in Cambodia. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/camdisc Learn more - http://www.cambodia.org -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
