From: [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: VIETNAM: Military in transition as China looms large To: [email protected] Date: Monday, January 4, 2010, 7:35 AM
VIETNAM: Military in transition as China looms large Thursday, December 31 2009 SUBJECT: Vietnam's security policy. SIGNIFICANCE: The resources available to the Vietnam People's Army are growing in line with the country's strong economic performance. While there is little risk of near-term conflict, a programme of military modernisation is underway in response to strategic concerns over China's military strength and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.Go to conclusion ANALYSIS: The government issued its third Defence White Paper on December 8. It contains considerably greater detail on the structure of the armed forces than the previous two documents, released in 1998 and 2004, and highlights Vietnam's determination to take a higher regional profile: Outlay. Defence expenditure in 2008 was listed as 1.46 billion dollars, or 1.8% of GDP. The military budget has grown by 66% since 2005, with the allocation fluctuating between 2.5% and 1.8% of GDP, generally matching independent forecasts. Strength. The Vietnam People's Army (VPA), which has jurisdiction over all branches of the military, is reported to have 450,000 active personnel and a reserve of five million, making it South-east Asia's largest defence force. The International Institute for Strategic Studies had estimated the VPA's active strength at 412,000. Businesses. Commercial enterprises controlled by the VPA operate 98 separate businesses, according to the White Paper, ranging from aviation and seaport services to telecommunications systems and shipbuilding. All are considered sectors of vital strategic importance. Modernisation. The VPA has been forced into a radical rethink about its capabilities and role since the US pullout from Indochina in 1975. After decades of fighting Japanese, French and then US forces, the military was structured for wartime and struggled to adapt to a traditional defensive function. Although the VPA doubled in size in the following decade, largely due to entrenched security fears, its deficiencies were brutally exposed when Vietnamese forces were unable to expel Chinese troops who crossed the border in February 1979. The Chinese, reacting to Hanoi's growing ties with communist rival Moscow, remained on Vietnamese territory for 29 days. Soviet advisers began restructuring the VPA into a professional military service in the mid-1980s, but the process is incomplete: Structure. For most of its 65 years the VPA had a guerilla orientation that has left it ill-prepared to fight a conventional war. Until the 1990s it lacked strategic planners and an officer corps with the vision and technical training to incorporate new technologies and transform the VPA into a modern force. One handicap is a dual command structure, with responsibility shared between military leaders and the ruling Communist Party. Political commissars are attached to every unit. Although they must defer to commanders, a 1982 resolution reaffirmed that senior officers are still accountable to the party for all actions. Capacity. While political leaders now recognise that the VPA must be capable of fighting orthodox wars and protracted conflicts, it lacks the ability to project forces over long distances. This is a particular handicap in Vietnam's difficult terrain: 40% of the country is mountainous and 75% is covered in forest. Logistics are poorly developed, while air transport capability is limited. There are also doubts that Vietnam has the capacity to defend its offshore territorial waters, despite acquiring a consignment of Soviet vessels in the late 1980s. The navy is light on offensive forces, relying mostly on small patrol boats. Procurement. There is a shortage of modern and reliable equipment, partly because the VPA was until recently structured around light infantry divisions. The technological gap was evident during the 1980s Cambodian conflict, when the Hanoi-backed government in Phnom Penh was outgunned by US-supplied resistance groups. Earlier this month, Vietnam agreed to buy six Russian submarines and confirmed an earlier deal for the supply of 8-12 jet fighters. It is also believed to be discussing possible equipment purchases from the United States, after Washington said it would lift a ban on sales of non-lethal arms. Security challenges. Vietnam's vexed relationship with China, which embraces 2,000 years of patronage and subjugation, is at the core of its security policy and influences economic and diplomatic ties with third states. Hanoi's unwillingness since the 1970s to show deference has long been a sore point with China and inflames their territorial disputes. The White Paper acknowledges that these issues have become "more complicated" and "have been on the rise" since the last assessment in 2005 (see VIETNAM/CHINA: Relations firm amidst problems - December 21, 2005). However, Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh insisted after an official visit to Washington last week that his government would work for a peaceful solution at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. Nevertheless, there are signs that Vietnam is courting US support as part of a strategy of isolating China that first became apparent in 1995, when it joined the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see US/VIETNAM: China concern promotes security ties - April 16, 2009). Many of ASEAN's ten members have a shared fear of Chinese diplomatic and economic dominance in East Asia. Thanh confirmed that Vietnam, which is a temporary member of the UN Security Council, would take a more visible stance at both the regional and international levels. This would include the country's first participation in global peace-keeping operations. Strategic concerns. Since the end of the Indochina war, Vietnamese strategic planners have been preoccupied with three complex security issues: Balancing China. The ideological split between Moscow and Beijing in the 1960s shaped Vietnam's defence and foreign policies in subsequent decades. While the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s diluted Russian influence in Indochina, it did not alter Hanoi's acceptance of a client relationship with Moscow. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung's visit to Moscow last week appears to have restored the relationship to 1990s levels. A spate of new defence and economic agreements were signed, including cooperation in building Vietnam's first nuclear reactor. Exposed flanks. VPA leaders have long been worried about the potential flanking threat from Vietnam's two Indochina neighbours, Cambodia and Laos, due to the country's long borders and extraordinarily narrow archipelago. This is only 40 kilometres (km) wide at the most narrow point, but has a frontier of 8,000 km. While Hanoi fosters close ties with Cambodia and Laos, it is concerned that any anti-communist forces in these countries could easily cut Vietnam in half with an amphibious landing. China has long realised this vulnerability and is vying with Vietnam for economic and political ascendancy in Indochina. Offshore tensions. Vietnam is contesting claims by China and several other countries to the Spratly group of South China Sea atolls, which are thought to contain oil and mineral deposits (see ASIA/CHINA: Law could defuse Spratly rivalries - September 15, 2009). In May, Hanoi applied to the UN to extend its maritime boundaries 200 nautical miles into this territory. Thanh said that while territorial talks were continuing, maritime security would remain a "top priority" with the VPA. Despite joint sea patrols with neighbouring countries, low-level clashes are frequent. Earlier this year Vietnam accused Chinese forces of seizing some of its fishing boats. CONCLUSION: The White Paper highlights Vietnam's determination to protect its territorial claims and build security relationships, even at the risk of antagonising China. Russia will remain the key military and diplomatic partner as Hanoi progressively lifts its international profile and begins to assert itself more forcefully in regional affairs. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Cambodia Discussion (CAMDISC) - www.cambodia.org" group. This is an unmoderated forum. Please refrain from using foul language. Thank you for your understanding. Peace among us and in Cambodia. 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