A VIETNAMESE AS KHMER KILLER : GENERAL VAN TIEN DUNG.
THIS IS THE MAN Gen. Van Tien Dung WHO Led
an INVASION OF CAMBODIA DECEMBER 25 ,1978.
Gen. Van Tien Dung, launch an invasion of Cambodia.
Dec. 25, 1978 Invasion of Cambodia. Some 100,000 Vietnamese with 20,000 KUFNS
troops, under the direction of Gen. Van Tien Dung, launch an invasion of
Cambodia.
IT WAS CONDEMNED BY THE UNITED NATIONS.
Oct. 21, 1986 The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution A/RES/41/6, by vote
of 116-21 with 13 abstentions, calling for a withdrawal of Vietnamese
WHO RUNS THE POLICE AND INTERPOL IN CAMBODIA.
LIKE THIS MAN .
WHAT RIGHTS DO THESE VIETNAMESE INVADERS HAVE TO RUN CAMBODIA IN VIOLATION OF
THE 10 UN RESOLUTION?
THE VIETNAMESE TRICKS IN CAMBODIA OCCUPIED BY VIETNAM.THIS VIETNAMESE WEARING
THE LABEL "CAMBODIAN"
Khieu Kanharith,(A VIETNAMESE ) the minister of Information, during a press
conference held on 04 January 2009. KHIEU KANHARITH , A VIETNAMESE WEARING THE
LABEL"CAMBODIAN"
HOR NAM HONG , A VIETNAMESE ,APPOINTED AS FOREIGN MINISTER OF CAMBODIA TO
NEGOTIATE AND TALK ON BEHALF OF THE KHMER PEOPLE HERE.
IT'S SIMPLE. LOOK AND READ HERE THE FACTS.
FOR CAMBODIA Strong Resolution on Cambodia Human Rights Abuses
Feb. 27, 1982 : UN Commission on Human Rights meeting in Geneva adopted a
resolution condemning Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia as a violation of
Cambodian human rights. The vote was 28 in favor, 8 against, and 5 abstentions.
Oct. 21, 1986 The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution A/RES/41/6, by vote
of 116-21 with 13 abstentions, calling for a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces
from Cambodia.
10 UN RESOLUTIONS,(1979-1988) VOTED BY 116 UN MEMBER COUNTRIES ,CALL VIETNAM TO
CEASE HER OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA & REMOVE ALL HER TROOPS FROM THE COUNTRY, ARE
NOT RESPECTED AS OF TODAY.
President Reagan's address to the 43d Session of the United Nations General
Assembly in New York, New York,September 26, 1988.
"Mr. Secretary-General, there are new hopes for Cambodia, a nation whose
freedom and independence we seek just as avidly as we sought the freedom and
independence of Afghanistan. We urge the rapid removal of all Vietnamese troops
...."
As of today,Cambodia is still occupied by the Vietnamese troops despite the
call from the US president to Vietnam to cease her occupation of Cambodia since
1988.
Cambodia needs Independence from Vietnam and the Vietnamese invaders.
Vietnam must cease her occupation of Cambodia at once.
THE MOMENT , KING SIHAMONI STOPS COLLABORATING WITH THE CAMBODIAN ENEMIES(THE
VIETNAMESE OCCUPIERS) ALL KHMER COULD FIND INSTANTLY PEACE & JUSTICE.
On April 28, 1984, Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, meets U.S. President Ronald
Reagan in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. (Photo: fmprc.gov.cn)
Photo Gallery>>>
President Reagan's address to the 43d Session of the United Nations General
Assembly in New York, New York . September 26, 1988.
"Mr. Secretary-General, there are new hopes for Cambodia, a nation whose
freedom and independence we seek just as avidly as we sought the freedom and
independence of Afghanistan. We urge the rapid removal of all Vietnamese troops
...."
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2010 22:21:43 -0800
Subject: VIETNAM: Military in transition as China looms large
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
From: [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: VIETNAM: Military in transition as China looms large
To: [email protected]
Date: Monday, January 4, 2010, 7:35 AM
VIETNAM: Military in transition as China looms large
Thursday, December 31 2009
SUBJECT: Vietnam's security policy.
SIGNIFICANCE: The resources available to the Vietnam People's Army are growing
in line with the country's strong economic performance. While there is little
risk of near-term conflict, a programme of military modernisation is underway
in response to strategic concerns over China's military strength and
territorial disputes in the South China Sea.Go to conclusion
ANALYSIS: The government issued its third Defence White Paper on December 8. It
contains considerably greater detail on the structure of the armed forces than
the previous two documents, released in 1998 and 2004, and highlights Vietnam's
determination to take a higher regional profile:
Outlay. Defence expenditure in 2008 was listed as 1.46 billion dollars, or 1.8%
of GDP. The military budget has grown by 66% since 2005, with the allocation
fluctuating between 2.5% and 1.8% of GDP, generally matching independent
forecasts.
Strength. The Vietnam People's Army (VPA), which has jurisdiction over all
branches of the military, is reported to have 450,000 active personnel and a
reserve of five million, making it South-east Asia's largest defence force. The
International Institute for Strategic Studies had estimated the VPA's active
strength at 412,000.
Businesses. Commercial enterprises controlled by the VPA operate 98 separate
businesses, according to the White Paper, ranging from aviation and seaport
services to telecommunications systems and shipbuilding. All are considered
sectors of vital strategic importance.
Modernisation. The VPA has been forced into a radical rethink about its
capabilities and role since the US pullout from Indochina in 1975. After
decades of fighting Japanese, French and then US forces, the military was
structured for wartime and struggled to adapt to a traditional defensive
function.
Although the VPA doubled in size in the following decade, largely due to
entrenched security fears, its deficiencies were brutally exposed when
Vietnamese forces were unable to expel Chinese troops who crossed the border in
February 1979. The Chinese, reacting to Hanoi's growing ties with communist
rival Moscow, remained on Vietnamese territory for 29 days.
Soviet advisers began restructuring the VPA into a professional military
service in the mid-1980s, but the process is incomplete:
Structure. For most of its 65 years the VPA had a guerilla orientation that has
left it ill-prepared to fight a conventional war. Until the 1990s it lacked
strategic planners and an officer corps with the vision and technical training
to incorporate new technologies and transform the VPA into a modern force.
One handicap is a dual command structure, with responsibility shared between
military leaders and the ruling Communist Party. Political commissars are
attached to every unit. Although they must defer to commanders, a 1982
resolution reaffirmed that senior officers are still accountable to the party
for all actions.
Capacity. While political leaders now recognise that the VPA must be capable of
fighting orthodox wars and protracted conflicts, it lacks the ability to
project forces over long distances. This is a particular handicap in Vietnam's
difficult terrain: 40% of the country is mountainous and 75% is covered in
forest.
Logistics are poorly developed, while air transport capability is limited.
There are also doubts that Vietnam has the capacity to defend its offshore
territorial waters, despite acquiring a consignment of Soviet vessels in the
late 1980s. The navy is light on offensive forces, relying mostly on small
patrol boats.
Procurement. There is a shortage of modern and reliable equipment, partly
because the VPA was until recently structured around light infantry divisions.
The technological gap was evident during the 1980s Cambodian conflict, when the
Hanoi-backed government in Phnom Penh was outgunned by US-supplied resistance
groups.
Earlier this month, Vietnam agreed to buy six Russian submarines and confirmed
an earlier deal for the supply of 8-12 jet fighters. It is also believed to be
discussing possible equipment purchases from the United States, after
Washington said it would lift a ban on sales of non-lethal arms.
Security challenges. Vietnam's vexed relationship with China, which embraces
2,000 years of patronage and subjugation, is at the core of its security policy
and influences economic and diplomatic ties with third states. Hanoi's
unwillingness since the 1970s to show deference has long been a sore point with
China and inflames their territorial disputes.
The White Paper acknowledges that these issues have become "more complicated"
and "have been on the rise" since the last assessment in 2005 (see
VIETNAM/CHINA: Relations firm amidst problems - December 21, 2005). However,
Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh insisted after an official visit to
Washington last week that his government would work for a peaceful solution at
both the bilateral and multilateral levels.
Nevertheless, there are signs that Vietnam is courting US support as part of a
strategy of isolating China that first became apparent in 1995, when it joined
the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see US/VIETNAM: China
concern promotes security ties - April 16, 2009). Many of ASEAN's ten members
have a shared fear of Chinese diplomatic and economic dominance in East Asia.
Thanh confirmed that Vietnam, which is a temporary member of the UN Security
Council, would take a more visible stance at both the regional and
international levels. This would include the country's first participation in
global peace-keeping operations.
Strategic concerns. Since the end of the Indochina war, Vietnamese strategic
planners have been preoccupied with three complex security issues:
Balancing China. The ideological split between Moscow and Beijing in the 1960s
shaped Vietnam's defence and foreign policies in subsequent decades. While the
end of the Cold War in the early 1990s diluted Russian influence in Indochina,
it did not alter Hanoi's acceptance of a client relationship with Moscow.
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung's visit to Moscow last week appears to have
restored the relationship to 1990s levels. A spate of new defence and economic
agreements were signed, including cooperation in building Vietnam's first
nuclear reactor.
Exposed flanks. VPA leaders have long been worried about the potential flanking
threat from Vietnam's two Indochina neighbours, Cambodia and Laos, due to the
country's long borders and extraordinarily narrow archipelago. This is only 40
kilometres (km) wide at the most narrow point, but has a frontier of 8,000 km.
While Hanoi fosters close ties with Cambodia and Laos, it is concerned that any
anti-communist forces in these countries could easily cut Vietnam in half with
an amphibious landing. China has long realised this vulnerability and is vying
with Vietnam for economic and political ascendancy in Indochina.
Offshore tensions. Vietnam is contesting claims by China and several other
countries to the Spratly group of South China Sea atolls, which are thought to
contain oil and mineral deposits (see ASIA/CHINA: Law could defuse Spratly
rivalries - September 15, 2009). In May, Hanoi applied to the UN to extend its
maritime boundaries 200 nautical miles into this territory.
Thanh said that while territorial talks were continuing, maritime security
would remain a "top priority" with the VPA. Despite joint sea patrols with
neighbouring countries, low-level clashes are frequent. Earlier this year
Vietnam accused Chinese forces of seizing some of its fishing boats.
CONCLUSION: The White Paper highlights Vietnam's determination to protect its
territorial claims and build security relationships, even at the risk of
antagonising China. Russia will remain the key military and diplomatic partner
as Hanoi progressively lifts its international profile and begins to assert
itself more forcefully in regional affairs.
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