Washington Post
 
India's unease with Obama
As Obama bets on Asia, regional players  hedge
   
By _Jim Hoagland_ (http://projec
ts.washingtonpost.com/staff/articles/jim+hoagland/) 
Tuesday, February 16, 2010 
 
Asia forms the crossroads of success or failure for Barack Obama's grandest 
 foreign policy designs. This impression has crystallized over _a year_ 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/obama-year-one/)  in 
which the president has shown  himself indifferent to Europe, sentimental and 
somewhat conflicted about Africa,  perplexed by the Middle East and largely 
oblivious to Latin America.  
 
Obama's choices about China, India, Japan and Pakistan loom at least as 
large  as the urgent challenges of wars in _Afghanistan_ 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/afghanistan-pakistan/)  and Iraq. 
The president has  
outlined the need for the United States to shed burdens abroad to help 
repair  the badly damaged American economy. That means that Obama must settle 
discarded  U.S. burdens -- and power -- across a range of international 
organizations in  which Asian nations are becoming increasingly influential.  
The president consigned the Group of Eight industrial countries to 
leadership  oblivion in his recent _State of the Union_ 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/state-of-the-union)  message, omitting any 
mention of it  while singling 
out the G-20 forum of developed and developing nations. This was  no 
oversight: His administration hopes to shift climate change negotiations out  
of 
the unmanageable U.N. format that doomed the Copenhagen summit in December  
and place these talks in the G-20 process, according to U.S. officials.  
Asia's giants, India and China, present differing and opposed models of  
international cooperation. A G-20 world needs at its center a dynamic  
U.S.-Indian relationship to help bridge that organization's divides between  
haves 
and have-nots and their different political systems. But here in New  Delhi, 
Indian officials increasingly fear that the Obama team does not see it  
that way.  
 


Indians are flattered that the only _state dinner Obama hosted last year_ 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/artsandliving/obama_state_dinner
.html)  was  given for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, whose remarkable 
intelligence and  gracious manner would make him a welcome guest anywhere. But 
they also detect an  air of ambivalence blowing their way from Washington -- 
and are reacting by  hedging against a quick U.S. pullout from Afghanistan 
that would bring greater  U.S. reliance on China and Pakistan, at India's 
expense.  
Romanced by the Bush administration to balance China's inexorable rise in  
military and economic power, India finds itself out of sync with the Obama  
administration on some key issues. There is no open conflict. But neither is 
 there the air of excitement and innovation about the U.S. relationship 
that I  found on my last trip here 18 months ago.  
Since then, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has explicitly rejected  
balance-of-power politics as a relic of the past. Yet India, Japan and other  
Asian states fear that without a supportive U.S. hand on the scales, they 
will  be swamped by China's growing military capabilities and its increasingly  
aggressive, and effective, diplomacy.  
The somewhat fanciful notion of a G-2 directorate in which the United 
States  and China collude to determine global economic and political direction 
is 
 increasingly colliding with reality. Tensions over Taiwan, trade and Tibet 
make  the G-2 unworkable, as recent events have again shown. But the 
specter lingers  for Asians as well as Europeans that Obama will be tempted to 
try 
-- even though  a failed G-2 would be the worst possible outcome for 
everyone.  
"The G-2 carries the implication that the United States would leave Asia to 
 China to run," says B.J. Panda, a rising young political star here. Adds 
another  Indian strategist: "We have to balance the Chinese, irrespective of 
what the  U.S. and others do."  
Obama's _emphasis on setting an initial date for withdrawal  from 
Afghanistan_ 
(http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/12/obamas-afghan-policy-speech-at.html)
  in his Dec. 1 policy speech, even as he sent  additional U.S. 
troops, stirred doubt here about U.S. strategic patience. So  have the frequent 
U.S. military visits to and overblown praise for Pakistan's  army 
leadership, despite credible evidence of high-level Pakistani involvement  in 
cross-border terrorism directed at India.  
The dominant impression from three days of informal conversations organized 
 here by the Aspen Strategy Group with Indian officials and analysts is 
that  Pakistan has become a second-tier problem for India, even as it 
increasingly  preoccupies Washington. What one Indian analyst described as 
"Obama's 
nuclear  alarmism" also gives Pakistan increased leverage over Washington.  
India has recently moved troops away from the Pakistan frontier while  
increasing deployments into border areas that China is claiming in pugnacious  
and offensive rhetoric. In a break with its past opposition to foreign bases 
in  the region, India has secured military transit and stationing rights at 
an  airbase in Tajikistan. And Singh's government lavishly welcomed Japan's 
new  prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, on a recent three-day visit that 
included  publicity about plans for joint military maneuvers in the Indian 
Ocean.  
These are clear signs of Indian hedging: seeking allies for worst-case  
scenarios while accommodating China on economic matters. The Obama  
administration's failure to reaffirm clearly that India's rise is in U.S.  
strategic 
interests has contributed to this hedging. That is a mistake the  president 
should quickly correct, in the interests of his own vision of a new  world 
order centered on the Pacific and Indian oceans. 
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