http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n006.shtml
March 7 2003. Just before the invasion.
Here's an executive summary of the report:
Statements of the Director General
7 March 2003 | New York, USA
Statement to the United Nations Security Council
The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the
International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear verification activities
in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other
relevant resolutions.
Inspection Activities
When I reported last to the Council, on 14 February, I explained that
the Agency's inspection activities had moved well beyond the
"reconnaissance phase" - that is, re-establishing our knowledge base
regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities - into the "investigative
phase", which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant
to disarmament: whether Iraq has revived or attempted to revive its
defunct nuclear weapons programme over the last four years.
At the outset, let me state one general observation: namely, that
during the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi sites, industrial
capacity has deteriorated substantially, due to the departure of the
foreign support that was often present in the late 1980s, the
departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past
decade, and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of
sophisticated equipment. At only a few inspected sites involved in
industrial research, development and manufacturing have the facilities
been improved and new personnel been taken on. This overall
deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally of direct relevance
to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme.
Inspections
The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141
sites, including 21 that had not been inspected before. In addition,
IAEA experts have taken part in many joint UNMOVIC-IAEA inspections.
Technical Methods
Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The
three operational air samplers have collected, from key locations in
Iraq, weekly air particulate samples that are being sent to
laboratories for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment,
vegetation and material sample analyses have been received from the
relevant laboratories.
Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2000
kilometres over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to
over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons
factories, truck parks, manufacturing facilities and residential
areas.
Interviews
Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel - at times
with individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of
unannounced inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged
meetings with key scientists and other specialists known to have been
involved with Iraq's past nuclear programme. The IAEA has continued to
conduct interviews even when the conditions were not in accordance
with the IAEA's preferred modalities, with a view to gaining as much
information as possible - information that could be cross-checked for
validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our
assessment of areas under investigation.
As you may recall, when we first began to request private, unescorted
interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews
and keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, upon our insistence,
individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without escort
and without a taped record. The IAEA has conducted two such private
interviews in the last 10 days, and hopes that its ability to conduct
private interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly
interviews outside Iraq.
I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities
for conducting interviews, to ensure that they are conducted freely,
and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by
other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the
best way to ensure that interviews are free. We intend therefore, to
request such interviews shortly. We are also asking other States to
enable us to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now
reside in those States.
Specific Issues
In the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a considerable volume of
documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of
particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminium
tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnet production
capabilities, and its reported attempt to import uranium. I will touch
briefly on the progress made on each of these issues.
Uranium Enrichment
Since my last update to the Council, the primary technical focus of
IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several
outstanding issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by
Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of centrifuges. For that
purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of
international centrifuge manufacturing experts.
Aluminium tubes: The IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of
Iraq's attempts to purchase large quantities of high-strength
aluminium tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that
these aluminium tubes were sought for rocket production. Extensive
field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any
evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81mm tubes for any project
other than the reverse engineering of rockets.
The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these
rockets was well documented. Iraq has provided copies of design
documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and
supporting data and samples. A thorough analysis of this information,
together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi
personnel, has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of
attempted purchases and intended usage of the 81mm aluminium tubes, as
well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerances.
Drawing on this information, the IAEA has learned that the original
tolerances for the 81mm tubes were set prior to 1987, and were based
on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets
in Iraq's possession. Initial attempts to reverse engineer the rockets
met with little success. Tolerances were adjusted during the following
years as part of ongoing efforts to revitalize the project and improve
operational efficiency. The project languished for long periods during
this time and became the subject of several committees, which resulted
in specification and tolerance changes on each occasion.
Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's
efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not likely to have been
related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was
highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable
re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme.
However, this issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated.
Magnets: With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import
high-strength permanent magnets - or to achieve the capability for
producing such magnets - for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme,
I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength
magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of
twelve different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously
acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems,
industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through
visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering
drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with
the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that
none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for
a centrifuge magnetic bearing.
In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line,
for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet
occurred, and Iraqi documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel
indicate that this contract will not be executed. However, the
contract has been evaluated by the IAEA centrifuge enrichment experts.
They have concluded the replacement of foreign procurement with
domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of
view. In addition, the training and experience acquired by Iraq in the
pre-1991 period makes it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to
manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in
enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will continue therefore to monitor
and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets
for enrichment centrifuges.
Flow forming capabilities: Iraq has used its relatively low-accuracy
flow forming capability for the production of rocket parts in steel.
Investigations in the field indicate that Iraq has recently started to
flow form its own tubes in aluminium as well.
Based upon Iraqi documentation, experts' observations of Iraq's
industrial capabilities and the IAEA's knowledge of Iraq's industrial
assets - including the availability of raw materials - our assessment
to date is that Iraq still possesses an abundance of high-strength
aluminium materials procured during the 1980s, and has the expertise
needed to produce pre-forms of high quality, but that it currently has
low-quality flow forming equipment. In addition, Iraq's lack of
experience and expertise in this field makes it highly unlikely that
it is currently able to produce aluminium cylinders consistently to
the tolerances required for centrifuge enrichment. Nevertheless, the
IAEA will monitor all potentially capable machines and facilities
using 24-hour camera surveillance, supported by a regime of
unannounced inspections. The IAEA will also continue to assess the
level of centrifuge-related expertise remaining in Iraq.
Uranium Acquisition
The IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq
sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation
was centred on documents provided by a number of States that pointed
to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between
1999 and 2001.
The IAEA has discussed these reports with the Governments of Iraq and
Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took place.
For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive
explanation of its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by
an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including Niger,
in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the
reports. The IAEA was also able to review correspondence coming from
various bodies of the Government of Niger, and to compare the form,
format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of
the alleged procurement-related documentation.
Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the
concurrence of outside experts, that these documents - which formed
the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq
and Niger - are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded
that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will
continue to follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant
to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials.
Procurement Patterns
Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its
nuclear programme have arisen from Iraqi procurement efforts reported
by a number of States. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure
commodities and products, including magnets and aluminium tubes, have
been conducted in contravention of sanction controls specified under
Security Council resolution 661 and other relevant resolutions.
The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation,
and further verification will be forthcoming. An IAEA team of
technical experts, customs investigators and computer forensic
specialists is currently conducting a series of investigations,
through inspections at trading companies and commercial organizations,
aimed at understanding Iraq's patterns of procurement.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear
weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass destruction - inspections in
Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little
over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since
my last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important
progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in
Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to
revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years
since inspections were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following
can be stated:
* There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those
buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as
being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of
nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.
* There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium
since 1990.
* There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import
aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had
Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical
difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes
in question.
* Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and
magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported
magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.
As I stated above, the IAEA will continue further to scrutinize and
investigate all of the above issues.
After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no
evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons
programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities,
making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution
1441 and all additional tools that might be available to us, including
reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope
to continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to
our mandate. I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as
a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community,
Iraq has been forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly with
regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available
evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA
concern. I do hope that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and
accelerate the pace of its co-operation.
The detailed knowledge of Iraq's capabilities that IAEA experts have
accumulated since 1991 - combined with the extended rights provided by
resolution 1441, the active commitment by all States to help us fulfil
our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi co-operation -
should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council
with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related
capabilities. However credible this assessment may be, we will
endeavour - in view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any
verification process, and, particularly in light of Iraq's past record
of co-operation - to evaluate Iraq's capabilities on a continuous
basis as part of our long-term monitoring and verification programme,
in order to provide the international community with ongoing and real
time assurances.
On 3/17/06, Loathe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> When was that report released?
>
>
> --
> Tim Heald
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 703-300-3911
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Larry C. Lyons [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Friday, March 17, 2006 10:42 AM
> To: CF-Community
> Subject: Re: Saddam Pretended to have Weapons to prevent Attack
>
> The final report issued by the IAEA was quite unequivocal, they said no
> WMD's. Given the shrubbery's pervarication, I'd rather trust the IAEA.
>
> On 3/17/06, Nick McClure <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > But those guys weren't given complete access, and they did report it
> > seemed Iraq was hiding or being less than cooperative.
> >
> > Also they never provided proof of the outstand weapons being destroyed.
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Larry C. Lyons [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 9:28 PM
> > > To: CF-Community
> > > Subject: Re: Saddam Pretended to have Weapons to prevent Attack
> > >
> > > Just a reminder the people on the ground, the UN inspectors who were
> > > in Iraq, and the IAEA always said that there were no WMD's.
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
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