I think Demi's riding it..... -----Original Message----- From: jon hall [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:20 PM To: CF-Community Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
dude.........where's my wmd? -- jon mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Friday, June 6, 2003, 1:13:02 PM, you wrote: JS> ...spark it up, dude.... JS> -----Original Message----- JS> From: Heald, Tim [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] JS> Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:03 PM JS> To: CF-Community JS> Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. JS> Come one Dana. There have been bunches of times where various people, JS> yourself included, have tried to censor the list. Usually you will use the JS> "offended" label so prevalent today, but your still attempting to stop a JS> discussion. He didn't even go that far. Just made a comment. JS> I think everyone needs to get laid, or have a drink or toke or whatever your JS> into. JS> Tim >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Dana Tierney [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:41 AM >> To: CF-Community >> Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. >> >> John, why are you complaining about the WMD posts? I read them, so there. >> Several other people seem interested in the topic. Do I tell you not to >> post about the Dixie Chicks having a wet T-shirt contest? >> >> Dana >> >> John Stanley writes: >> >> > yet another exciting post on WMD's.... >> > >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: Angel Stewart [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM >> > To: CF-Community >> > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. >> > >> > >> > This is the most logical and well defined view on the situation that I >> > have read so far. >> > It explains why the war was never about WMD (which we all now know), the >> > result of the war is the United States is now the major power in the >> > Middle East, and focussing on WMD instead of the true strategy of the >> > Bush Administration in this war was a grave miscalculation: >> > ----- >> > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY >> > 5 June 2003 >> > >> > by Dr. George Friedman >> > >> > WMD >> > >> > Summary >> > >> > The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has >> > created a political crisis in the United States and Britain. >> > Within the two governments, there are recriminations and brutal >> > political infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in >> > February that the unwillingness of the U.S. government to >> > articulate its real, strategic reasons for the war -- choosing >> > instead to lean on WMD as the justification -- would lead to a >> > deep crisis at some point. That moment seems to be here. >> > >> > Analysis >> > >> > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its >> > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction of senior >> > British and American officials who used concerns about WMD in >> > Iraq as the primary, public justification for going to war. The >> > simple fact is that no one has found any weapons of mass >> > destruction in Iraq and -- except for some vans which may have >> > been used for biological weapons -- no evidence that Iraq was >> > working to develop such weapons. Since finding WMD is a priority >> > for U.S. military forces, which have occupied Iraq for more than >> > a month, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction not only >> > has become an embarrassment, it also has the potential to >> > mushroom into a major political crisis in the United States and >> > Britain. Not only is the political opposition exploiting the >> > paucity of Iraqi WMD, but the various bureaucracies are using the >> > issue to try to discredit each other. It's a mess. >> > >> > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled Smoke and >> > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, which made the >> > following points: >> > >> > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was strategic >> > and not about weapons of mass destruction. >> > >> > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily to >> > justify the attack to its coalition partners. >> > >> > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for >> > the war would ultimately create massive confusion as to the >> > nature of the war the United States was fighting. >> > >> > As we put it: >> > >> > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic >> > interests as the justification for war has created a crisis in >> > U.S. strategy. Deception campaigns are designed to protect >> > strategies, not to trap them. Ultimately, the foundation of U.S. >> > grand strategy, coalitions and the need for clarity in military >> > strategy have collided. The discovery of weapons of mass >> > destruction in Iraq will not solve the problem, nor will a coup >> > in Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic extremists] that will last >> > for years, maintaining one's conceptual footing is critical. If >> > that footing cannot be maintained -- if the requirements of the >> > war and the requirements of strategic clarity are incompatible -- >> > there are more serious issues involved than the future of Iraq." >> > >> > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the invasion >> > of Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous justification--has now >> > come home to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, the >> > inability to locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the credibility of >> > the United States and is tearing the government apart in an orgy >> > of finger-pointing. >> > >> > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important to start >> > at the beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 attacks, al >> > Qaeda was regarded as an extraordinarily competent global >> > organization. Sheer logic argued that the network would want to >> > top the Sept. 11 strikes with something even more impressive. >> > This led to a very reasonable fear that al Qaeda possessed or was >> > in the process of obtaining WMD. >> > >> > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to hyper- sensitive >> > mode, began putting together bits of intelligence that >> > tended to show that what appeared to be logical actually was >> > happening. The U.S. intelligence apparatus now was operating in a >> > worst-case scenario mode, as is reasonable when dealing with WMD. >> > Lower-grade intelligence was regarded as significant. Two things >> > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass >> > destruction expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al >> > Qaeda's ability to obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along >> > with a range of less public events -- was the "axis of evil" >> > State of the Union speech, which identified three countries as >> > having WMD and likely to give it to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of >> > these countries. >> > >> > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. policy, >> > then it is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it used them in >> > the past. It was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq >> > continued to possess WMD. Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials >> > believed there was a parallel program in biological weapons, and >> > also that Iraqi leaders had the ability and the intent to restart >> > their nuclear program, if they had not already done so. Running >> > on the worst-case basis that was now hard-wired by al Qaeda into >> > U.S. intelligence, Iraq was identified as a country with WMD and >> > likely to pass them on to al Qaeda. >> > >> > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this class. There >> > are other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond the "axis of >> > evil" countries. Simply invading Iraq would not solve the >> > fundamental problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has >> > always argued, the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and >> > strategic purpose: Psychologically, it was designed to >> > demonstrate to the Islamic world the enormous power and ferocity >> > of the United States; strategically, it was designed to position >> > the United States to coerce countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria >> > and Iran into changing their policies toward suppressing al Qaeda >> > operations in their countries. Both of these missions were >> > achieved. >> > >> > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. It >> > became, however, the publicly stated moral, legal and political >> > justification for the war. It was understood that countries like >> > France and Russia had no interest in collaborating with >> > Washington in a policy that would make the United States the >> > arbiter of the Middle East. Washington had to find a >> > justification for the war that these allies would find >> > irresistible. >> > >> > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. >> > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this belief became a >> > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical weapons, and no >> > reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally >> > destroyed them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush >> > administration that they were on safe ground. Moreover, it was >> > assumed that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's >> > hands as unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept >> > the idea of a war in which the stated goal -- and the real >> > outcome -- would be the destruction of Iraq's weapons. >> > >> > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. The public >> > justification for the war did not compel France, Germany or >> > Russia to endorse military action. They continued to resist >> > because they fully understood the outcome -- intended or not -- >> > would be U.S. domination of the Middle East, and they did not >> > want to see that come about. Paris, Berlin and Moscow turned the >> > WMD issue on its head, arguing that if that was the real issue, >> > then inspections by the United Nations would be the way to solve >> > the problem. Interestingly, they never denied that Iraq had WMD; >> > what they did deny was that proof of WMD had been found. They >> > also argued that over time, as proof accumulated, the inspection >> > process would either force the Iraqis to destroy their WMD or >> > justify an invasion at that point. What is important here is that >> > French and Russian leaders shared with the United States the >> > conviction that Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, they thought >> > weapons of mass destruction -- particularly if they were >> > primarily chemical -- was a side issue; the core issue was U.S. >> > power in the Middle East. >> > >> > In short, all sides were working from the same set of >> > assumptions. There was not much dispute that the Baathist regime >> > probably had WMD. The issue between the United States and its >> > allies was strategic. After the war, the United States would >> > become the dominant power in the region, and it would use this >> > power to force regional governments to strike at al Qaeda. >> > Germany, France and Russia, fearing the growth of U.S. power, >> > opposed the war. Rather than clarifying the chasm in the >> > alliance, the Bush administration permitted the arguments over >> > WMD to supplant a discussion of strategy and left the American >> > public believing the administration's public statements -- smoke >> > and mirrors -- rather than its private view. >> > >> > The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- all >> > assumed that this problem would disappear when the U.S. military >> > got into Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public justification >> > would be vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved and no one >> > would be the wiser. What they did not count on -- what is >> > difficult to believe even now -- is that Hussein actually might >> > not have WMD or, weirder still, that he hid them or destroyed >> > them so efficiently that no one could find them. That was the >> > kicker the Bush administration never counted on. >> > >> > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. Answers >> > could range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has WMD, >> > being held in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the point here >> > is that the WMD question was not the reason the United States >> > went to war. The war was waged in order to obtain a strategic >> > base from which to coerce countries such as Syria, Iran and Saudi >> > Arabia into using their resources to destroy al Qaeda within >> > their borders. From that standpoint, the strategy seems to be >> > working. >> > >> > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the United >> > States walked into a trap. The question of the location of WMD is >> > important. The question of whether it was the CIA or Defense >> > Department that skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's >> > WMD is also important. But these questions are ultimately trivial >> > compared to the use of smoke and mirrors to justify a war in >> > which Iraq was simply a single campaign. Ultimately, the problem >> > is that it created a situation in which the American public had >> > one perception of the reason for the war while the war's planners >> > had another. In a democratic society engaged in a war that will >> > last for many years, this is a dangerous situation to have >> > created. >> > ................................................................... >> > >> > ------ >> > >> > -Gel >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> JS> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?forumid=5 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?method=subscribe&forumid=5 Host with the leader in ColdFusion hosting. Voted #1 ColdFusion host by CF Developers. Offering shared and dedicated hosting options. www.cfxhosting.com/default.cfm?redirect=10481 Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
