On my way Dana, can I drag you by the hair too? -----Original Message----- From: Dana Tierney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:32 PM To: CF-Community Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved.
Hey John, lend me your club? Or at least come over here with it :) Dana John Stanley writes: > When I'm down, > When I'm blue, > I just do the happy dance > You can too... > > Everybody smile...it's almost the weekend... > > -----Original Message----- > From: Dana Tierney [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:22 PM > To: CF-Community > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > I remember one time saying that I was offended by people making jokes abot > France getting hit by a meteor. Started a long thread as I recall. I also > remember Ben Braver being offended when I picked up Kevin Schmidt's use of > the term "car gestapo." I apologized and stopped :) I think you need to > take things a little less seriously yourself. And maybe finish reading the > thread :) > > Dana > > John Stanley writes: > > > ...spark it up, dude.... > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Heald, Tim [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:03 PM > > To: CF-Community > > Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > Come one Dana. There have been bunches of times where various people, > > yourself included, have tried to censor the list. Usually you will use > the > > "offended" label so prevalent today, but your still attempting to stop a > > discussion. He didn't even go that far. Just made a comment. > > > > I think everyone needs to get laid, or have a drink or toke or whatever > your > > into. > > > > Tim > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Dana Tierney [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:41 AM > > > To: CF-Community > > > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > John, why are you complaining about the WMD posts? I read them, so > there. > > > Several other people seem interested in the topic. Do I tell you not to > > > post about the Dixie Chicks having a wet T-shirt contest? > > > > > > Dana > > > > > > John Stanley writes: > > > > > > > yet another exciting post on WMD's.... > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: Angel Stewart [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM > > > > To: CF-Community > > > > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > > > > This is the most logical and well defined view on the situation that I > > > > have read so far. > > > > It explains why the war was never about WMD (which we all now know), > the > > > > result of the war is the United States is now the major power in the > > > > Middle East, and focussing on WMD instead of the true strategy of the > > > > Bush Administration in this war was a grave miscalculation: > > > > ----- > > > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY > > > > 5 June 2003 > > > > > > > > by Dr. George Friedman > > > > > > > > WMD > > > > > > > > Summary > > > > > > > > The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has > > > > created a political crisis in the United States and Britain. > > > > Within the two governments, there are recriminations and brutal > > > > political infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in > > > > February that the unwillingness of the U.S. government to > > > > articulate its real, strategic reasons for the war -- choosing > > > > instead to lean on WMD as the justification -- would lead to a > > > > deep crisis at some point. That moment seems to be here. > > > > > > > > Analysis > > > > > > > > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its > > > > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction of senior > > > > British and American officials who used concerns about WMD in > > > > Iraq as the primary, public justification for going to war. The > > > > simple fact is that no one has found any weapons of mass > > > > destruction in Iraq and -- except for some vans which may have > > > > been used for biological weapons -- no evidence that Iraq was > > > > working to develop such weapons. Since finding WMD is a priority > > > > for U.S. military forces, which have occupied Iraq for more than > > > > a month, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction not only > > > > has become an embarrassment, it also has the potential to > > > > mushroom into a major political crisis in the United States and > > > > Britain. Not only is the political opposition exploiting the > > > > paucity of Iraqi WMD, but the various bureaucracies are using the > > > > issue to try to discredit each other. It's a mess. > > > > > > > > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled Smoke and > > > > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, which made the > > > > following points: > > > > > > > > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was strategic > > > > and not about weapons of mass destruction. > > > > > > > > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily to > > > > justify the attack to its coalition partners. > > > > > > > > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for > > > > the war would ultimately create massive confusion as to the > > > > nature of the war the United States was fighting. > > > > > > > > As we put it: > > > > > > > > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic > > > > interests as the justification for war has created a crisis in > > > > U.S. strategy. Deception campaigns are designed to protect > > > > strategies, not to trap them. Ultimately, the foundation of U.S. > > > > grand strategy, coalitions and the need for clarity in military > > > > strategy have collided. The discovery of weapons of mass > > > > destruction in Iraq will not solve the problem, nor will a coup > > > > in Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic extremists] that will last > > > > for years, maintaining one's conceptual footing is critical. If > > > > that footing cannot be maintained -- if the requirements of the > > > > war and the requirements of strategic clarity are incompatible -- > > > > there are more serious issues involved than the future of Iraq." > > > > > > > > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the invasion > > > > of Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous justification--has now > > > > come home to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, the > > > > inability to locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the credibility of > > > > the United States and is tearing the government apart in an orgy > > > > of finger-pointing. > > > > > > > > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important to start > > > > at the beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 attacks, al > > > > Qaeda was regarded as an extraordinarily competent global > > > > organization. Sheer logic argued that the network would want to > > > > top the Sept. 11 strikes with something even more impressive. > > > > This led to a very reasonable fear that al Qaeda possessed or was > > > > in the process of obtaining WMD. > > > > > > > > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to hyper- sensitive > > > > mode, began putting together bits of intelligence that > > > > tended to show that what appeared to be logical actually was > > > > happening. The U.S. intelligence apparatus now was operating in a > > > > worst-case scenario mode, as is reasonable when dealing with WMD. > > > > Lower-grade intelligence was regarded as significant. Two things > > > > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass > > > > destruction expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al > > > > Qaeda's ability to obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along > > > > with a range of less public events -- was the "axis of evil" > > > > State of the Union speech, which identified three countries as > > > > having WMD and likely to give it to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of > > > > these countries. > > > > > > > > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. policy, > > > > then it is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it used them in > > > > the past. It was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq > > > > continued to possess WMD. Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials > > > > believed there was a parallel program in biological weapons, and > > > > also that Iraqi leaders had the ability and the intent to restart > > > > their nuclear program, if they had not already done so. Running > > > > on the worst-case basis that was now hard-wired by al Qaeda into > > > > U.S. intelligence, Iraq was identified as a country with WMD and > > > > likely to pass them on to al Qaeda. > > > > > > > > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this class. There > > > > are other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond the "axis of > > > > evil" countries. Simply invading Iraq would not solve the > > > > fundamental problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has > > > > always argued, the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and > > > > strategic purpose: Psychologically, it was designed to > > > > demonstrate to the Islamic world the enormous power and ferocity > > > > of the United States; strategically, it was designed to position > > > > the United States to coerce countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria > > > > and Iran into changing their policies toward suppressing al Qaeda > > > > operations in their countries. Both of these missions were > > > > achieved. > > > > > > > > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. It > > > > became, however, the publicly stated moral, legal and political > > > > justification for the war. It was understood that countries like > > > > France and Russia had no interest in collaborating with > > > > Washington in a policy that would make the United States the > > > > arbiter of the Middle East. Washington had to find a > > > > justification for the war that these allies would find > > > > irresistible. > > > > > > > > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. > > > > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this belief became a > > > > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical weapons, and no > > > > reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally > > > > destroyed them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush > > > > administration that they were on safe ground. Moreover, it was > > > > assumed that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's > > > > hands as unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept > > > > the idea of a war in which the stated goal -- and the real > > > > outcome -- would be the destruction of Iraq's weapons. > > > > > > > > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. The public > > > > justification for the war did not compel France, Germany or > > > > Russia to endorse military action. They continued to resist > > > > because they fully understood the outcome -- intended or not -- > > > > would be U.S. domination of the Middle East, and they did not > > > > want to see that come about. Paris, Berlin and Moscow turned the > > > > WMD issue on its head, arguing that if that was the real issue, > > > > then inspections by the United Nations would be the way to solve > > > > the problem. Interestingly, they never denied that Iraq had WMD; > > > > what they did deny was that proof of WMD had been found. They > > > > also argued that over time, as proof accumulated, the inspection > > > > process would either force the Iraqis to destroy their WMD or > > > > justify an invasion at that point. What is important here is that > > > > French and Russian leaders shared with the United States the > > > > conviction that Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, they thought > > > > weapons of mass destruction -- particularly if they were > > > > primarily chemical -- was a side issue; the core issue was U.S. > > > > power in the Middle East. > > > > > > > > In short, all sides were working from the same set of > > > > assumptions. There was not much dispute that the Baathist regime > > > > probably had WMD. The issue between the United States and its > > > > allies was strategic. After the war, the United States would > > > > become the dominant power in the region, and it would use this > > > > power to force regional governments to strike at al Qaeda. > > > > Germany, France and Russia, fearing the growth of U.S. power, > > > > opposed the war. Rather than clarifying the chasm in the > > > > alliance, the Bush administration permitted the arguments over > > > > WMD to supplant a discussion of strategy and left the American > > > > public believing the administration's public statements -- smoke > > > > and mirrors -- rather than its private view. > > > > > > > > The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- all > > > > assumed that this problem would disappear when the U.S. military > > > > got into Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public justification > > > > would be vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved and no one > > > > would be the wiser. What they did not count on -- what is > > > > difficult to believe even now -- is that Hussein actually might > > > > not have WMD or, weirder still, that he hid them or destroyed > > > > them so efficiently that no one could find them. That was the > > > > kicker the Bush administration never counted on. > > > > > > > > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. Answers > > > > could range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has WMD, > > > > being held in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the point here > > > > is that the WMD question was not the reason the United States > > > > went to war. The war was waged in order to obtain a strategic > > > > base from which to coerce countries such as Syria, Iran and Saudi > > > > Arabia into using their resources to destroy al Qaeda within > > > > their borders. From that standpoint, the strategy seems to be > > > > working. > > > > > > > > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the United > > > > States walked into a trap. The question of the location of WMD is > > > > important. The question of whether it was the CIA or Defense > > > > Department that skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's > > > > WMD is also important. But these questions are ultimately trivial > > > > compared to the use of smoke and mirrors to justify a war in > > > > which Iraq was simply a single campaign. Ultimately, the problem > > > > is that it created a situation in which the American public had > > > > one perception of the reason for the war while the war's planners > > > > had another. In a democratic society engaged in a war that will > > > > last for many years, this is a dangerous situation to have > > > > created. > > > > ................................................................... > > > > > > > > ------ > > > > > > > > -Gel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?forumid=5 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?method=subscribe&forumid=5 Signup for the Fusion Authority news alert and keep up with the latest news in ColdFusion and related topics. http://www.fusionauthority.com/signup.cfm Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
