They used to say those words on Saturday Night Live. And people used to laugh cause the jokes were funny.
will ----- Original Message ----- From: "Heald, Tim" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 12:30 PM Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > I know the words he really meant. I would think that in a free society we > would be able to get beyond it. As far as I know you are allowed to use > those words in this country if you want to. > > Tim > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Kevin Graeme [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 3:36 PM > > To: CF-Community > > Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > Kite and Nutter? How dare you! > > > > -Kevin > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Larry C. Lyons [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:05 PM > > > To: CF-Community > > > Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > That is a load of crap. I see this all to often when someone > > > with an agenda > > > (usually an extreme one) decides that he or she cannot > > > adequately respond > > > to the other's argument. By Tim's logic then its alright to > > > use such words > > > as (pardon me for offending people here) K**e, N****r etc. > > > > > > You could try to adequately answer Dana rather than screaming > > > censorship. > > > > > > larry > > > > > > At 01:13 PM 6/6/2003 -0400, John Stanley wrote: > > > >...spark it up, dude.... > > > > > > > >-----Original Message----- > > > >From: Heald, Tim [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > >Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:03 PM > > > >To: CF-Community > > > >Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > > > >Come one Dana. There have been bunches of times where > > > various people, > > > >yourself included, have tried to censor the list. Usually > > > you will use > > > >the "offended" label so prevalent today, but your still > > > attempting to > > > >stop a discussion. He didn't even go that far. Just made a comment. > > > > > > > >I think everyone needs to get laid, or have a drink or toke > > > or whatever > > > >your into. > > > > > > > >Tim > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: Dana Tierney [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:41 AM > > > > > To: CF-Community > > > > > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > > John, why are you complaining about the WMD posts? I read > > > them, so > > > > > there. Several other people seem interested in the topic. > > > Do I tell > > > > > you not to post about the Dixie Chicks having a wet > > > T-shirt contest? > > > > > > > > > > Dana > > > > > > > > > > John Stanley writes: > > > > > > > > > > > yet another exciting post on WMD's.... > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > > From: Angel Stewart [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM > > > > > > To: CF-Community > > > > > > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This is the most logical and well defined view on the situation > > > > > > that I have read so far. It explains why the war was > > > never about > > > > > > WMD (which we all now know), the result of the war is > > > the United > > > > > > States is now the major power in the Middle East, and > > > focussing on > > > > > > WMD instead of the true strategy of the Bush Administration in > > > > > > this war was a grave miscalculation: > > > > > > ----- > > > > > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY > > > > > > 5 June 2003 > > > > > > > > > > > > by Dr. George Friedman > > > > > > > > > > > > WMD > > > > > > > > > > > > Summary > > > > > > > > > > > > The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction > > > in Iraq has > > > > > > created a political crisis in the United States and Britain. > > > > > > Within the two governments, there are recriminations and brutal > > > > > > political infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in > > > > > > February that the unwillingness of the U.S. government to > > > > > > articulate its real, strategic reasons for the war -- choosing > > > > > > instead to lean on WMD as the justification -- would lead to a > > > > > > deep crisis at some point. That moment seems to be here. > > > > > > > > > > > > Analysis > > > > > > > > > > > > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its > > > > > > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction > > > of senior > > > > > > British and American officials who used concerns about > > > WMD in Iraq > > > > > > as the primary, public justification for going to war. > > > The simple > > > > > > fact is that no one has found any weapons of mass > > > destruction in > > > > > > Iraq and -- except for some vans which may have been used for > > > > > > biological weapons -- no evidence that Iraq was working > > > to develop > > > > > > such weapons. Since finding WMD is a priority for U.S. military > > > > > > forces, which have occupied Iraq for more than a month, the > > > > > > failure to find weapons of mass destruction not only > > > has become an > > > > > > embarrassment, it also has the potential to mushroom > > > into a major > > > > > > political crisis in the United States and Britain. Not > > > only is the > > > > > > political opposition exploiting the paucity of Iraqi > > > WMD, but the > > > > > > various bureaucracies are using the issue to try to > > > discredit each > > > > > > other. It's a mess. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled > > > Smoke and > > > > > > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, which made the > > > > > > following points: > > > > > > > > > > > > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was > > > strategic > > > > > > and not about weapons of mass destruction. > > > > > > > > > > > > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily to > > > > > > justify the attack to its coalition partners. > > > > > > > > > > > > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for > > > > > > the war would ultimately create massive confusion as to > > > the nature > > > > > > of the war the United States was fighting. > > > > > > > > > > > > As we put it: > > > > > > > > > > > > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic > > > > > > interests as the justification for war has created a crisis in > > > > > > U.S. strategy. Deception campaigns are designed to protect > > > > > > strategies, not to trap them. Ultimately, the > > > foundation of U.S. > > > > > > grand strategy, coalitions and the need for clarity in military > > > > > > strategy have collided. The discovery of weapons of mass > > > > > > destruction in Iraq will not solve the problem, nor > > > will a coup in > > > > > > Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic extremists] that > > > will last for > > > > > > years, maintaining one's conceptual footing is > > > critical. If that > > > > > > footing cannot be maintained -- if the requirements of > > > the war and > > > > > > the requirements of strategic clarity are incompatible -- there > > > > > > are more serious issues involved than the future of Iraq." > > > > > > > > > > > > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the > > > invasion of > > > > > > Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous > > > justification--has now come > > > > > > home to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, > > > the inability > > > > > > to locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the credibility of > > > the United > > > > > > States and is tearing the government apart in an orgy of > > > > > > finger-pointing. > > > > > > > > > > > > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important > > > to start at > > > > > > the beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 attacks, al > > > > > > Qaeda was regarded as an extraordinarily competent global > > > > > > organization. Sheer logic argued that the network would want to > > > > > > top the Sept. 11 strikes with something even more > > > impressive. This > > > > > > led to a very reasonable fear that al Qaeda possessed or was in > > > > > > the process of obtaining WMD. > > > > > > > > > > > > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to hyper- > > > > > > sensitive mode, began putting together bits of > > > intelligence that > > > > > > tended to show that what appeared to be logical actually was > > > > > > happening. The U.S. intelligence apparatus now was > > > operating in a > > > > > > worst-case scenario mode, as is reasonable when dealing > > > with WMD. > > > > > > Lower-grade intelligence was regarded as significant. Two things > > > > > > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass > > > > > > destruction expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al > > > > > > Qaeda's ability to obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along > > > > > > with a range of less public events -- was the "axis of > > > evil" State > > > > > > of the Union speech, which identified three countries as having > > > > > > WMD and likely to give it to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of these > > > > > > countries. > > > > > > > > > > > > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. policy, > > > > > > then it is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it used > > > them in the > > > > > > past. It was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq > > > continued to > > > > > > possess WMD. Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials > > > believed there > > > > > > was a parallel program in biological weapons, and also > > > that Iraqi > > > > > > leaders had the ability and the intent to restart their nuclear > > > > > > program, if they had not already done so. Running on the > > > > > > worst-case basis that was now hard-wired by al Qaeda into U.S. > > > > > > intelligence, Iraq was identified as a country with WMD > > > and likely > > > > > > to pass them on to al Qaeda. > > > > > > > > > > > > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this > > > class. There are > > > > > > other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond the > > > "axis of evil" > > > > > > countries. Simply invading Iraq would not solve the fundamental > > > > > > problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has always > > > > > > argued, the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and > > > strategic > > > > > > purpose: Psychologically, it was designed to demonstrate to the > > > > > > Islamic world the enormous power and ferocity of the United > > > > > > States; strategically, it was designed to position the United > > > > > > States to coerce countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran > > > > > > into changing their policies toward suppressing al Qaeda > > > > > > operations in their countries. Both of these missions were > > > > > > achieved. > > > > > > > > > > > > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. It > > > > > > became, however, the publicly stated moral, legal and political > > > > > > justification for the war. It was understood that > > > countries like > > > > > > France and Russia had no interest in collaborating with > > > Washington > > > > > > in a policy that would make the United States the > > > arbiter of the > > > > > > Middle East. Washington had to find a justification for the war > > > > > > that these allies would find irresistible. > > > > > > > > > > > > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass > > > destruction. > > > > > > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this belief became a > > > > > > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical > > > weapons, and no > > > > > > reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally > > > > > > destroyed them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush > > > > > > administration that they were on safe ground. Moreover, it was > > > > > > assumed that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's > > > > > > hands as unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept > > > > > > the idea of a war in which the stated goal -- and the > > > real outcome > > > > > > -- would be the destruction of Iraq's weapons. > > > > > > > > > > > > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. > > > The public > > > > > > justification for the war did not compel France, > > > Germany or Russia > > > > > > to endorse military action. They continued to resist > > > because they > > > > > > fully understood the outcome -- intended or not -- > > > would be U.S. > > > > > > domination of the Middle East, and they did not want to > > > see that > > > > > > come about. Paris, Berlin and Moscow turned the WMD > > > issue on its > > > > > > head, arguing that if that was the real issue, then > > > inspections by > > > > > > the United Nations would be the way to solve the problem. > > > > > > Interestingly, they never denied that Iraq had WMD; > > > what they did > > > > > > deny was that proof of WMD had been found. They also > > > argued that > > > > > > over time, as proof accumulated, the inspection process would > > > > > > either force the Iraqis to destroy their WMD or justify an > > > > > > invasion at that point. What is important here is that > > > French and > > > > > > Russian leaders shared with the United States the > > > conviction that > > > > > > Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, they thought weapons of mass > > > > > > destruction -- particularly if they were primarily > > > chemical -- was > > > > > > a side issue; the core issue was U.S. power in the Middle East. > > > > > > > > > > > > In short, all sides were working from the same set of > > > assumptions. > > > > > > There was not much dispute that the Baathist regime > > > probably had > > > > > > WMD. The issue between the United States and its allies was > > > > > > strategic. After the war, the United States would become the > > > > > > dominant power in the region, and it would use this > > > power to force > > > > > > regional governments to strike at al Qaeda. Germany, France and > > > > > > Russia, fearing the growth of U.S. power, opposed the > > > war. Rather > > > > > > than clarifying the chasm in the alliance, the Bush > > > administration > > > > > > permitted the arguments over WMD to supplant a discussion of > > > > > > strategy and left the American public believing the > > > > > > administration's public statements -- smoke and mirrors > > > -- rather > > > > > > than its private view. > > > > > > > > > > > > The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- all > > > > > > assumed that this problem would disappear when the U.S. > > > military > > > > > > got into Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public > > > justification > > > > > > would be vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved > > > and no one > > > > > > would be the wiser. What they did not count on -- what is > > > > > > difficult to believe even now -- is that Hussein actually might > > > > > > not have WMD or, weirder still, that he hid them or > > > destroyed them > > > > > > so efficiently that no one could find them. That was the kicker > > > > > > the Bush administration never counted on. > > > > > > > > > > > > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. > > > Answers could > > > > > > range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has WMD, being > > > > > > held in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the point > > > here is that > > > > > > the WMD question was not the reason the United States > > > went to war. > > > > > > The war was waged in order to obtain a strategic base > > > from which > > > > > > to coerce countries such as Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia into > > > > > > using their resources to destroy al Qaeda within their borders. > > > > > > From that standpoint, the strategy seems to be working. > > > > > > > > > > > > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the United > > > > > > States walked into a trap. The question of the location > > > of WMD is > > > > > > important. The question of whether it was the CIA or Defense > > > > > > Department that skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's > > > > > > WMD is also important. But these questions are > > > ultimately trivial > > > > > > compared to the use of smoke and mirrors to justify a > > > war in which > > > > > > Iraq was simply a single campaign. Ultimately, the > > > problem is that > > > > > > it created a situation in which the American public had one > > > > > > perception of the reason for the war while the war's > > > planners had > > > > > > another. In a democratic society engaged in a war that > > > will last > > > > > > for many years, this is a dangerous situation to have created. > > > > > > > > > ................................................................... > > > > > > > > > > > > ------ > > > > > > > > > > > > -Gel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?forumid=5 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?method=subscribe&forumid=5 Your ad could be here. Monies from ads go to support these lists and provide more resources for the community. http://www.fusionauthority.com/ads.cfm Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
