Some people laughed. If you're a white anglo-saxon protestant type - they have little meaning, if you're of one of the groups that those words have been directed, they hurt and are very offensive. I am not advocating censorship, just respect for others, and so a bit of discretion is needed.
larry >They used to say those words on Saturday Night Live. And people used to >laugh cause the jokes were funny. > >will > > >----- Original Message ----- >From: "Heald, Tim" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: "CF-Community" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 12:30 PM >Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. > > >> I know the words he really meant. I would think that in a free society we >> would be able to get beyond it. As far as I know you are allowed to use >> those words in this country if you want to. >> >> Tim >> >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: Kevin Graeme [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 3:36 PM >> > To: CF-Community >> > Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. >> > >> > Kite and Nutter? How dare you! >> > >> > -Kevin >> > >> > > -----Original Message----- >> > > From: Larry C. Lyons [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:05 PM >> > > To: CF-Community >> > > Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. >> > > >> > > >> > > That is a load of crap. I see this all to often when someone >> > > with an agenda >> > > (usually an extreme one) decides that he or she cannot >> > > adequately respond >> > > to the other's argument. By Tim's logic then its alright to >> > > use such words >> > > as (pardon me for offending people here) K**e, N****r etc. >> > > >> > > You could try to adequately answer Dana rather than screaming >> > > censorship. >> > > >> > > larry >> > > >> > > At 01:13 PM 6/6/2003 -0400, John Stanley wrote: >> > > >...spark it up, dude.... >> > > > >> > > >-----Original Message----- >> > > >From: Heald, Tim [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > > >Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 1:03 PM >> > > >To: CF-Community >> > > >Subject: RE: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >Come one Dana. There have been bunches of times where >> > > various people, >> > > >yourself included, have tried to censor the list. Usually >> > > you will use >> > > >the "offended" label so prevalent today, but your still >> > > attempting to >> > > >stop a discussion. He didn't even go that far. Just made a comment. >> > > > >> > > >I think everyone needs to get laid, or have a drink or toke >> > > or whatever >> > > >your into. >> > > > >> > > >Tim >> > > > >> > > > > -----Original Message----- >> > > > > From: Dana Tierney [SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 11:41 AM >> > > > > To: CF-Community >> > > > > Subject: Re: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. >> > > > > >> > > > > John, why are you complaining about the WMD posts? I read >> > > them, so >> > > > > there. Several other people seem interested in the topic. >> > > Do I tell >> > > > > you not to post about the Dixie Chicks having a wet > > > > T-shirt contest? > > > > > > > > > > > > Dana > > > > > > > > > > > > John Stanley writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > > yet another exciting post on WMD's.... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- >> > > > > > From: Angel Stewart [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> > > > > > Sent: Friday, June 06, 2003 10:32 AM >> > > > > > To: CF-Community >> > > > > > Subject: Stratfor: WMD in Iraq. The issues involved. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > This is the most logical and well defined view on the situation >> > > > > > that I have read so far. It explains why the war was >> > > never about >> > > > > > WMD (which we all now know), the result of the war is >> > > the United >> > > > > > States is now the major power in the Middle East, and >> > > focussing on >> > > > > > WMD instead of the true strategy of the Bush Administration in >> > > > > > this war was a grave miscalculation: >> > > > > > ----- > > > > > > > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY >> > > > > > 5 June 2003 >> > > > > > >> > > > > > by Dr. George Friedman >> > > > > > >> > > > > > WMD >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Summary >> > > > > > >> > > > > > The inability to discover weapons of mass destruction > > > > in Iraq has >> > > > > > created a political crisis in the United States and Britain. >> > > > > > Within the two governments, there are recriminations and brutal >> > > > > > political infighting over responsibility. Stratfor warned in >> > > > > > February that the unwillingness of the U.S. government to >> > > > > > articulate its real, strategic reasons for the war -- choosing >> > > > > > instead to lean on WMD as the justification -- would lead to a >> > > > > > deep crisis at some point. That moment seems to be here. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Analysis >> > > > > > >> > > > > > "Weapons of mass destruction" is promising to live up to its >> > > > > > name: The issue may well result in the mass destruction >> > > of senior >> > > > > > British and American officials who used concerns about >> > > WMD in Iraq >> > > > > > as the primary, public justification for going to war. >> > > The simple >> > > > > > fact is that no one has found any weapons of mass >> > > destruction in >> > > > > > Iraq and -- except for some vans which may have been used for >> > > > > > biological weapons -- no evidence that Iraq was working >> > > to develop >> > > > > > such weapons. Since finding WMD is a priority for U.S. military >> > > > > > forces, which have occupied Iraq for more than a month, the >> > > > > > failure to find weapons of mass destruction not only >> > > has become an >> > > > > > embarrassment, it also has the potential to mushroom >> > > into a major >> > > > > > political crisis in the United States and Britain. Not >> > > only is the >> > > > > > political opposition exploiting the paucity of Iraqi >> > > WMD, but the >> > > > > > various bureaucracies are using the issue to try to >> > > discredit each >> > > > > > other. It's a mess. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > On Jan. 21, 2003, Stratfor published an analysis titled >> > > Smoke and >> > > > > > Mirrors: The United States, Iraq and Deception, which made the >> > > > > > following points: >> > > > > > >> > > > > > 1. The primary reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was >> > > strategic >> > > > > > and not about weapons of mass destruction. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > 2. The United States was using the WMD argument primarily to >> > > > > > justify the attack to its coalition partners. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > 3. The use of WMD rather than strategy as the justification for >> > > > > > the war would ultimately create massive confusion as to >> > > the nature >> > > > > > of the war the United States was fighting. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > As we put it: >> > > > > > >> > > > > > "To have allowed the WMD issue to supplant U.S. strategic >> > > > > > interests as the justification for war has created a crisis in >> > > > > > U.S. strategy. Deception campaigns are designed to protect >> > > > > > strategies, not to trap them. Ultimately, the >> > > foundation of U.S. >> > > > > > grand strategy, coalitions and the need for clarity in military >> > > > > > strategy have collided. The discovery of weapons of mass >> > > > > > destruction in Iraq will not solve the problem, nor >> > > will a coup in >> > > > > > Baghdad. In a war [against Islamic extremists] that >> > > will last for >> > > > > > years, maintaining one's conceptual footing is >> > > critical. If that >> > > > > > footing cannot be maintained -- if the requirements of >> > > the war and >> > > > > > the requirements of strategic clarity are incompatible -- there >> > > > > > are more serious issues involved than the future of Iraq." >> > > > > > >> > > > > > The failure to enunciate the strategic reasons for the >> > > invasion of >> > > > > > Iraq--of cloaking it in an extraneous >> > > justification--has now come >> > > > > > home to roost. Having used WMD as the justification, >> > > the inability >> > > > > > to locate WMD in Iraq has undermined the credibility of >> > > the United >> > > > > > States and is tearing the government apart in an orgy of > > > > > > > finger-pointing. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > To make sense of this impending chaos, it is important >> > > to start at >> > > > > > the beginning -- with al Qaeda. After the Sept. 11 attacks, al >> > > > > > Qaeda was regarded as an extraordinarily competent global > > > > > > > organization. Sheer logic argued that the network would want to >> > > > > > top the Sept. 11 strikes with something even more >> > > impressive. This >> > > > > > led to a very reasonable fear that al Qaeda possessed or was in >> > > > > > the process of obtaining WMD. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > U.S. intelligence, shifting from its sub-sensitive to hyper- >> > > > > > sensitive mode, began putting together bits of >> > > intelligence that >> > > > > > tended to show that what appeared to be logical actually was >> > > > > > happening. The U.S. intelligence apparatus now was >> > > operating in a >> > > > > > worst-case scenario mode, as is reasonable when dealing >> > > with WMD. >> > > > > > Lower-grade intelligence was regarded as significant. Two things >> > > > > > resulted: The map of who was developing weapons of mass >> > > > > > destruction expanded, as did the probabilities assigned to al >> > > > > > Qaeda's ability to obtain WMD. The very public outcome -- along >> > > > > > with a range of less public events -- was the "axis of >> > > evil" State >> > > > > > of the Union speech, which identified three countries as having >> > > > > > WMD and likely to give it to al Qaeda. Iraq was one of these >> > > > > > countries. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > If we regard chemical weapons as WMD, as has been U.S. policy, >> > > > > > then it is well known that Iraq had WMD, since it used >> > > them in the >> > > > > > past. It was a core assumption, therefore, that Iraq >> > > continued to >> > > > > > possess WMD. Moreover, U.S. intelligence officials >> > > believed there >> > > > > > was a parallel program in biological weapons, and also >> > > that Iraqi >> > > > > > leaders had the ability and the intent to restart their nuclear >> > > > > > program, if they had not already done so. Running on the >> > > > > > worst-case basis that was now hard-wired by al Qaeda into U.S. >> > > > > > intelligence, Iraq was identified as a country with WMD >> > > and likely >> > > > > > to pass them on to al Qaeda. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Iraq, of course, was not the only country in this >> > > class. There are >> > > > > > other sources of WMD in the world, even beyond the >> > > "axis of evil" >> > > > > > countries. Simply invading Iraq would not solve the fundamental >> > > > > > problem of the threat from al Qaeda. As Stratfor has always >> > > > > > argued, the invasion of Iraq served a psychological and >> > > strategic >> > > > > > purpose: Psychologically, it was designed to demonstrate to the >> > > > > > Islamic world the enormous power and ferocity of the United >> > > > > > States; strategically, it was designed to position the United >> > > > > > States to coerce countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran >> > > > > > into changing their policies toward suppressing al Qaeda >> > > > > > operations in their countries. Both of these missions were >> > > > > > achieved. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > WMD was always a side issue in terms of strategic planning. It >> > > > > > became, however, the publicly stated moral, legal and political >> > > > > > justification for the war. It was understood that >> > > countries like >> > > > > > France and Russia had no interest in collaborating with >> > > Washington >> > > > > > in a policy that would make the United States the >> > > arbiter of the >> > > > > > Middle East. Washington had to find a justification for the war >> > > > > > that these allies would find irresistible. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > That justification was that Iraq had weapons of mass >> > > destruction. >> > > > > > >From the standpoint of U.S. intelligence, this belief became a >> > > > > > given. Everyone knew that Iraq once had chemical >> > > weapons, and no >> > > > > > reasonable person believed that Saddam Hussein had unilaterally >> > > > > > destroyed them. So it appeared to planners within the Bush > > > > > > > administration that they were on safe ground. Moreover, it was >> > > > > > assumed that other major powers would regard WMD in Hussein's >> > > > > > hands as unacceptable and that therefore, everyone would accept >> > > > > > the idea of a war in which the stated goal -- and the > > > > real outcome >> > > > > > -- would be the destruction of Iraq's weapons. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > This was the point on which Washington miscalculated. >> > > The public >> > > > > > justification for the war did not compel France, >> > > Germany or Russia >> > > > > > to endorse military action. They continued to resist >> > > because they >> > > > > > fully understood the outcome -- intended or not -- >> > > would be U.S. >> > > > > > domination of the Middle East, and they did not want to >> > > see that >> > > > > > come about. Paris, Berlin and Moscow turned the WMD >> > > issue on its >> > > > > > head, arguing that if that was the real issue, then >> > > inspections by >> > > > > > the United Nations would be the way to solve the problem. >> > > > > > Interestingly, they never denied that Iraq had WMD; >> > > what they did >> > > > > > deny was that proof of WMD had been found. They also >> > > argued that >> > > > > > over time, as proof accumulated, the inspection process would >> > > > > > either force the Iraqis to destroy their WMD or justify an >> > > > > > invasion at that point. What is important here is that >> > > French and >> > > > > > Russian leaders shared with the United States the >> > > conviction that >> > > > > > Iraq had WMD. Like the Americans, they thought weapons of mass >> > > > > > destruction -- particularly if they were primarily >> > > chemical -- was >> > > > > > a side issue; the core issue was U.S. power in the Middle East. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > In short, all sides were working from the same set of >> > > assumptions. >> > > > > > There was not much dispute that the Baathist regime >> > > probably had >> > > > > > WMD. The issue between the United States and its allies was >> > > > > > strategic. After the war, the United States would become the >> > > > > > dominant power in the region, and it would use this >> > > power to force >> > > > > > regional governments to strike at al Qaeda. Germany, France and >> > > > > > Russia, fearing the growth of U.S. power, opposed the >> > > war. Rather >> > > > > > than clarifying the chasm in the alliance, the Bush >> > > administration >> > > > > > permitted the arguments over WMD to supplant a discussion of >> > > > > > strategy and left the American public believing the >> > > > > > administration's public statements -- smoke and mirrors >> > > -- rather >> > > > > > than its private view. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > The Bush administration -- and France, for that matter -- all >> > > > > > assumed that this problem would disappear when the U.S. >> > > military >> > > > > > got into Iraq. WMD would be discovered, the public >> > > justification >> > > > > > would be vindicated, the secret goal would be achieved >> > > and no one >> > > > > > would be the wiser. What they did not count on -- what is >> > > > > > difficult to believe even now -- is that Hussein actually might >> > > > > > not have WMD or, weirder still, that he hid them or >> > > destroyed them >> > > > > > so efficiently that no one could find them. That was the kicker >> > > > > > the Bush administration never counted on. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > The matter of whether Hussein had WMD is still open. >> > > Answers could >> > > > > > range to the extremes: He had no WMD or he still has WMD, being >> > > > > > held in reserve for his guerrilla war. But the point >> > > here is that >> > > > > > the WMD question was not the reason the United States >> > > went to war. >> > > > > > The war was waged in order to obtain a strategic base >> > > from which >> > > > > > to coerce countries such as Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia into >> > > > > > using their resources to destroy al Qaeda within their borders. >> > > > > > From that standpoint, the strategy seems to be working. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > However, by using WMD as the justification for war, the United >> > > > > > States walked into a trap. The question of the location > > > > of WMD is >> > > > > > important. The question of whether it was the CIA or Defense >> > > > > > Department that skewed its reports about the location of Iraq's >> > > > > > WMD is also important. But these questions are >> > > ultimately trivial > > > > > > > compared to the use of smoke and mirrors to justify a >> > > war in which >> > > > > > Iraq was simply a single campaign. Ultimately, the >> > > problem is that >> > > > > > it created a situation in which the American public had one >> > > > > > perception of the reason for the war while the war's >> > > planners had >> > > > > > another. In a democratic society engaged in a war that >> > > will last >> > > > > > for many years, this is a dangerous situation to have created. >> > > > > > >> > > ................................................................... >> > > > > > >> > > > > > ------ >> > > > > > >> > > > > > -Gel >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > >> > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~| Archives: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?forumid=5 Subscription: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/index.cfm?method=subscribe&forumid=5 Host with the leader in ColdFusion hosting. Voted #1 ColdFusion host by CF Developers. Offering shared and dedicated hosting options. www.cfxhosting.com/default.cfm?redirect=10481 Unsubscribe: http://www.houseoffusion.com/cf_lists/unsubscribe.cfm?user=89.70.5
