pineapple wrote:
Since Zenon thought your reply was worth his attention, I'll reply as well.
Heh, I don't really think his reply as such was worth much of anyone's attention, but what possibly lies behind it certainly is. That's why I keep hammering.
http://csrc.nist.gov/organizations/fissea/conference/2004/presentations/Thursday/Smith-FISSEA-031104.ppt It's a short presentation which doesn't really say anything new. Try to apply it to this thread though and see how disconcertingly some things seem to fall in place...
“How might our current and future capacity to execute the major elements of our national strategy be compromised or even defeated by new information warfare threats against key elements of the national information infrastructure?” Risk = f (uncertainty, damage), then Risk = f (hazard, safeguard*).
If you perceive "the national information infrastructure" as an infrastructure that simply conveys information, threats to it include everything from viruses and hackers to power outages and strikes. However, if you perceive "the national information infrastructure" as an infrastructure that gathers infomation (TIA and all its cousins) or as an infrastructure aimed at controlling the flow of information (the state PR machinery), the picture changes completely and freenet becomes an "information warfare threat against key elements" of said infrastructure. It all depends on whether you take "national" to mean "of the country" or "of the state".
On a side note, I think that the equation F(U,D) really takes the prize :)
Z
-- Framtiden är som en babianröv, färggrann och full av skit. Arne Anka _______________________________________________ chat mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://news.gmane.org/gmane.network.freenet.general
