On Thu, Aug 12, 2004 at 06:29:13PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote: > Others argue that by pretending that we can't censor our nodes, we avoid > responsibility for failing to do so. Well, I regard copyright > infringement (by an individual in the privacy of his home) as a civil > matter and will not attempt to censor infringing content and will go to > trial if necessary.
It is a criminal matter under the DMCA. Even if it's usually enforced by corporations, technically it's a criminal matter, it's just that the police have better things to do with their time most of the time. > > But permitting KP to be distributed without making a reasonable effort > to prevent it may be a criminal matter, and it is beside the point of > freenet, IMHO, and not worth going to trial over. So I point out how to > censor the easily accessible KP from your node. I also argue that the > law enforcement people who run freenet nodes ought to publish lists of > KP CHKs that deserve censorship. I am not going to delete files from my node just because some idiot says its KP. I will only delete files from my node if I KNOW they are illegal. And since I am a law-abiding citizen, I am not going to either attempt to verify other people's lists, or go looking for it myself! > > On Sat, 2004-08-07 at 08:51, Toad wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 06, 2004 at 11:25:46PM -0400, Edward J. Huff wrote: > > > Kiddie porn is a minor issue compared to the copyright problem. > > > For that, I think there will be a technological solution which > > > will make it less easy to find on Freenet, so that no one without an ax > > > to grind will think node operators are liable. Regarding the copyright > > > problem, come and get us. We aren't going to give up without a fight. > > > > Uh, like what? > > I think everyone agrees it's not hard to convert a base 64 CHK key to > the hex representation used in filenames, and to delete matching files > from the datastore. (I don't see why SSK's would be any more difficult > but I haven't actually looked at the details there). > > It is not hard to find out the "well known" kiddie porn CHK's. Monitor > the KP Frost boards; also pick out KP from the descriptions in TFE. You would have to spider. And if it's well known that all files linked from some board are deleted from everyone stores, there will be countermeasures: - New boards - Images pointing to new boards or SSKs - Links Some of these can be dealt with by spidering. But it is likely that KP sites occasionally link to mainstream sites. YOU WILL HAVE TO VERIFY THE CONTENT AND THAT IS NOT ONLY NAUSEATING BUT ILLEGAL ! Furthermore, spidering itself propagates such filth. And if Mallory, who works for, for example, the Church of $cientology, discovers that all content linked from board X or key Y is deleted automatically from a large fraction of Freenet nodes, then he will simply post all the content HE wants to delete. The ONLY way to find the child porn on freenet reliably, and not to find the content which is not child porn, is for some section of the police to search for it and publish a list. There must be human involvement. And I would have some problems with that, as there would probably be virtually no oversight of it, and it might well expand to "all illegal content" - with corporations getting court orders to add files to the list. And then they use INDUCE to force us to add code to delete anything on the list... > > In order to avoid decrypting actual KP, use freenet.client.cli.Main > with --noredirect and use /dev/null as the output filename. The > metadata comes out on stdout, and includes the CHK's of any splitfile > blocks. No. See above. There must be human verification of the nature of the material. This cannot legally be done by civilians. > > So, without any help from developers, users could set up scripts which > delete all "well known" KP CHK's from their datastores. Also, given > patches and scripts, they could compile a version of fred (or distribute > a jar which goes ahead of freenet.jar on classpath) which gives > immediate RNF to such keys. > > If they at least delete KP CHK's, I think no jury would find such a node > operator criminally liable for carrying KP which he could not find out > about without devoting large amounts of time looking for the keys. > Hopefully, no prosecutor would go after such node operators, since being > dragged into court is a considerable inconvenience even if the verdict > is innocent. (The police rarely offer apologies, let alone > compensation). We would be obliged to block ALL illegal content. I quote from a paper by Fred von Lohmann, senior intellectual property attorney for the EFF, which is available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2p_copyright_wp.php : "Your two options: total control or total anarchy. In the wake of recent decisions on indirect copyright liability, it appears that copyright law has foisted a binary choice on P2P developers: either build a system that allows for thorough monitoring and control over end-user activities, or build one that makes such monitoring and control impossible. Contributory infringement arises when you have "knowledge" of, and "materially contribute" to, someone else's infringing activity. The chief battleground for contributory infringement in the P2P cases so far has been the "knowledge" issue. The applicable legal standards on this question are still very much in dispute ?especially as relates to the "Betamax defense." The Napster court's analysis suggests that once you receive notice that your system is being used for infringing activity (e.g., a "cease and desist" letter from a copyright owner), you have a duty to "do something" to stop it. The MGM v. Grokster opinion suggests that if there is nothing you can do to stop the infringing activities when the notice arrives (because the software enables you to control neither access to the network nor end-user activities, for example), then the likelihood of contributory infringement liability may diminish. (After all, merely notifying Xerox that one of its photocopiers is being misused at a neighborhood Kinko's would not suddenly make Xerox a contributory infringer?Xerox has no ability to disable, repossess, or remotely control its photocopiers once they have been sold.)" He goes on at some length. Even if our attempts at control are not directed at copyright, we are obliged to go to whole hog and block everything. > > On the other hand, investigators running freenet nodes themselves can > easily find nodes which fail to censor well known KP CHK's. There is no > need to "break" freenet to be able to do this. > > If the investigators are decent people, they will give such node > operators a chance to voluntarily censor the KP, and even provide a list > of CHK's which should be censored. The investigators themselves are > able to look at the actual content and decide if it is KP without risk > of illegal possession of decrypted KP. Which it is illegal for us to verify. Nice. We can deal with that when we come to it. As I have explained above, any and all efforts by us to do it ourselves will be disastrous, and either result in significant collateral censorship or will in themselves be illegal. -- Matthew J Toseland - [EMAIL PROTECTED] Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
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