Cheers for the replies - Just to clarify, these templates were for purely PE->RR (Not for transit), we do run key-chain auth on OSPF, and I was hoping to do likewise for iBGP -> RR's, but I dont *think* key-chains are supported in XE (Yet?)...I need to do some more reading, but I believe XR supports it, but not XE? Regarding TTL....(In both OSPF and BGP)....hop count can be arbitrary, if we encounter a link failure...do we just use worse case scenario hops ? Is there anything you'd add/remove from the templates that Ive sent through? (Obviously soft-reconfig inbound chews memory, and can be removed, but things like max-prefix .....have it currently set at warning only...recommend killing the session for x minutes if it's exceed?)....any other suggestions are greatly appreciated....thanks.
________________________________ From: Saku Ytti <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, 23 May 2017 7:10 PM To: [email protected] Cc: CiscoNSP List; [email protected] Subject: Re: [c-nsp] Best practise/security design for BGP and OSPF On 23 May 2017 at 12:00, <[email protected]> wrote: Hey, > Regarding OSPF, > Best security is to use it solely for routing PE loopbacks (i.e. no > connectivity outside the core). But because it's IP, you might receive spooffed packet further down the line and believe you received it from far-end. So OP's question about TTL-security is valid one, and I'd support that. I'd also run MD5 auth. But of course if you have good iACL, stopping internet from sending other than ICMP, UDP highports to links and loops, you should be pretty safe. ISIS and OSPF have quite interesting properties, ISIS is more secure out-of-the-box, but in many cases you cannot stop box from punting CLNS packets, so any edge-interface may reach control-plane by crafted CLNS packets (without ISIS being configured on the interface). Where-as OSPF out-of-the-box is less secure due to IP, but pretty much every box supports ACLs, allowing you to consistently protect box.' -- ++ytti _______________________________________________ cisco-nsp mailing list [email protected] https://puck.nether.net/mailman/listinfo/cisco-nsp archive at http://puck.nether.net/pipermail/cisco-nsp/
