PSI
________________________________________________________________
Jaime Forero
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NASA VITT
Siempre adelante !!
> ----------
> From: Mahan[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Tuesday, March 02, 1999 8:23 PM
> To: FORERO, JAIME E. (JSC-CA); Deakins, Sue and Terry
> Subject: Colombia
>
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>
> Global Intelligence Update
> Red Alert
> March 3, 1999
>
> Doctrinal Change Indicates Serious Evolution in Colombian War
>
> Summary:
>
> After suffering several major losses to guerrilla forces last
> year, the Colombian military leaders promised to overhaul the
> armed forces. The Chief of the Colombian Armed Forces announced
> plans as far back as last August to reorganize and revamp the
> military. Last Friday he announced that the Army would begin
> using artillery in counter-insurgency operations. It is our view
> that this represents a doctrinal shift in the Colombian
> military's strategy, a shift based on its perception that it is
> no longer chasing a rag-tag band of rebels through the jungles of
> Caqueta.
>
> Analysis:
>
> In August 1998 Colombian Armed Forces Commander General Fernando
> Tapias Stahelin told reporters that he planned to change the way
> the Armed Forces waged war against the country's guerrilla
> armies. In a speech on February 26, 1999 General Tapias said
> that the Army would begin using heavy artillery against
> guerrillas. According to an article published in El Tiempo last
> Friday, Tapias announced this decision during a forum at the
> Army's artillery school in Bogota. This decision was reportedly
> made as part of the General's plan to reorganize the Armed
> Forces. Of particular significance was his justification for
> employing artillery in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations: he
> cited the fact that guerrillas are now operating in groups of
> 200-300 men.
>
> Throughout last year, the largest of Colombia's guerrilla groups,
> the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), engaged
> the military in company-sized elements and handed the Army
> several devastating defeats. Almost one year ago to the day the
> Southern Bloc of the FARC annihilated the 3rd Mobile Brigade in
> Caqueta. The FARC has proven that, operating in large units,
> they are capable of engaging and defeating the Colombian
> military. This is extremely important in that it shows the
> evolution of the FARC as a military force. From a tactical
> standpoint there is a huge difference between commanding one or
> two squads of men in, say, a raid on a local police station and
> commanding one or two companies in combat. Furthermore, such
> large units also require a much more sophisticated support
> infrastructure to ensure that troops are fed and supplied with
> ammunition and weapons.
>
> Over the course of last year, the FARC has shown that they have
> evolved into a major military force, capable of defeating the
> Colombian Army in open combat. Speaking about Colombia's drug
> and insurgent problem, the director of the Office of National
> Drug Control Policy in Washington DC, Barry McCaffrey told the
> Colombian weekly Semana that "Pastrana and his team have a
> problem. And if they're not careful when they leave office (in
> 2002), Colombia will be just a step away from losing its
> democracy to criminal drug organizations." Before retiring from
> the U.S. Army, General McCaffrey commanded the U.S. Southern
> Command, which included Colombia in its Area of Responsibility
> (AOR). McCaffrey also told Semana that the U.S. would seek to
> increase aid to the Colombia police and military this year, with
> the total estimated to be $230 million. McCaffrey also called
> for the Colombian military to overhaul the way it operates,
> echoing Tapias' promise of last August.
>
> The Colombian military has begun to address the issue of
> combating the FARC and the smaller Ejercito de Liberacion
> Nacional (ELN) by employing heavy weapons. It remains to be seen
> how effective this will be given the following facts: Tapias
> promised not to use artillery in areas occupied by civilians, and
> hauling M-101's and M-40A1's through the jungle is not an easy
> task. In August Tapias also called for more coordination between
> the Army, Navy, and Air Force in COIN operations. Given the
> sophistication of the guerrillas and their ability to operate as
> a traditional military unit, joint operations appear to be an
> essential element in combating the insurgents. The Colombian
> military appears to have made a doctrinal change in the way it
> conducts COIN operations. Armed Forces commanders recognize that
> they are not exchanging fire with malnourished, poorly equipped
> "freedom fighters." As the battles at El Billar, Miraflores, and
> Mitu have demonstrated, the FARC is an army that is now fully
> capable of inflicting severe loses on the Colombian military.
>
> The question then becomes, as the military prepares to change the
> way that it fights, what will the guerrillas do? One possibility
> is to go back to operating in smaller units. Heavy artillery is
> not as effective against 10 or 20 men as it is against 100 or 200
> men. However, we believe that this will be regarded as a step
> backwards in the FARC's evolution, so such a response seems
> unlikely. The guerrillas could attempt to marginalize Tapias'
> plan to use artillery by moving their bases into urban areas.
> This also presents a problem since it is much more difficult to
> hide a company of soldiers in an urban area than in the jungle.
> Although officials estimate that the FARC and ELN control almost
> half of the country, the rebels don't have the safe houses in
> urban centers to use as the equivalent of command posts or
> barracks.
>
> In our estimation, it is more likely that the guerrillas will
> seek to even the playing field by acquiring heavy weapons of its
> own. Many U.S. and Colombian officials believe the FARC earns
> several hundred million dollars per year through their
> involvement in the drug trade. Although there is no way of
> knowing exactly how much of their income is derived from drugs,
> overall the FARC is able to equip, train, and field an army of
> 15,000 men. Thus far a good deal of FARC's resource acquisition
> seems to have been carried out at lower levels, through foraging
> and extortion, rather than through centralized financing and
> logistics. Likewise, a great deal of the FARC's weaponry has
> been improvised. In fact it was reported on March 1 that police
> discovered a FARC weapon factory in Cali. Two milling machines
> were found that police believed were used for producing parts
> various weapons. Significantly, the police found machine guns,
> grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons, and assorted ammunition.
> If, in its transition to larger unit operations, FARC moves from
> firing propane cylinders at the army to using modern mortars and
> rocket propelled grenades, it would indicate a shift in their
> financing, either through foreign sponsorship or greater domestic
> fund-raising -- i.e. greater involvement in the drug trade.
>
> In negotiations with the government, the FARC and ELN have shown
> no signs of backing down, nor have they given any indication that
> they are unwilling to continue fighting. In fact, both groups
> ignored calls for a truce during negotiations, saying that they
> would not stop fighting until a lasting peace agreement was
> achieved. We expect the coming year to bring several bloody
> confrontations between the guerrillas and the Colombian military.
> What will be interesting is the U.S. response if fighting in
> Colombia escalates. The U.S. has repeatedly said that it will
> not take an active role in Colombia's insurgent problem. Instead
> it has walked a fine line by supplying the counter-narcotics
> effort, while arguing that the guerrillas are deeply involved in
> the drug trade.
>
> However, now that official U.S. policy links cocaine in New
> Jersey with FARC insurgents in Colombia, the question becomes,
> what happens when a reorganized FARC begins scoring repeated
> serious victories against the Colombian army? If additional
> money and equipment rushed to the Colombian army proves
> ineffective, when do U.S. Army "Search and Rescue" forces
> assisting the State Department-contracted drug eradication pilot
> instructors take on a greater, and much more dangerous, role in
> Colombia?
>
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