Defending Memory Vulnerabilities Latent in Production Software is coming at
04/05/2019 - 2:00pm

KEC 1005
Fri, 04/05/2019 - 2:00pm

Tongping Liu
Assistant Professor, University of Texas at San Antonio

Abstract:
Memory vulnerabilities can be exploited for security attacks, such as data
corruption, control-flow hijacks, and information leakage. The intermittent
reports of security attacks indicate the wide existence of memory
vulnerabilities, and the lack of effective systems to defend such
vulnerabilities in reality. This talk will present two of our research
efforts aiming to defend memory vulnerabilities latent in the production
software.

First, I will present a novel heap allocator--Guarder--that could make
heap-based security attacks harder to succeed. Randomization is the
conventional wisdom to achieve this. However, existing secure allocators face
with two serious issues that prevent their wide adoptions, the significant
performance overhead, and the unstable randomization entropy that can vary on
different execution phases. Due to the second fact, attackers may breach the
system at the weakest point. Guarder ensures the reliable randomization
entropy, and provides an unprecedented level of security guarantee by
providing all security features of existing allocators, but without
compromising the performance, which has an overhead less than 3% on average
comparing to performance-oriented allocators. This project was supported by
Mozilla Company.

Second, I will present an efficient tool--iReplayer--that could report memory
vulnerabilities precisely. The key insight is that it is possible to ensure
that the evidence of memory vulnerabilities remains for the later detection.
Therefore, instead of detecting memory vulnerabilities in the original
execution, which may impose prohibitive performance overhead, the proposed
approach only invokes the detection when the evidence of vulnerabilities is
found. More specifically, it only performs the detection based on the found
evidence, which avoids the significant performance overhead for common cases
that do not have vulnerabilities and makes it applicable for the production
environment. iReplayer further unlocks numerous possibilities in security
forensics, failure diagnosis, and online error remediation.

Bio:

Read more:
http://eecs.oregonstate.edu/colloquium/defending-memory-vulnerabilities-... 
[1]


[1] 
http://eecs.oregonstate.edu/colloquium/defending-memory-vulnerabilities-latent-production-software
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