gnodet-bot commented on code in PR #26782:
URL: https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26782#discussion_r4091003339


##########
components/camel-pqc/src/main/java/org/apache/camel/component/pqc/lifecycle/FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager.java:
##########
@@ -442,19 +442,44 @@ private static void restrictToOwner(Path path) {
     }
 
     private Path getPrivateKeyFile(String keyId) {
-        return keyDirectory.resolve(keyId + ".private.json");
+        return resolveKeyFile(keyId, ".private.json");
     }
 
     private Path getPublicKeyFile(String keyId) {
-        return keyDirectory.resolve(keyId + ".public.json");
+        return resolveKeyFile(keyId, ".public.json");
     }
 
     private Path getMetadataFile(String keyId) {
-        return keyDirectory.resolve(keyId + ".metadata");
+        return resolveKeyFile(keyId, ".metadata");
     }
 
     private Path getLegacyKeyFile(String keyId) {
-        return keyDirectory.resolve(keyId + ".key");
+        return resolveKeyFile(keyId, ".key");
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Resolves a key file inside the configured key directory, confining it 
to that directory. keyId values arrive from
+     * message headers (CamelPQCKeyId / CamelPQCNewKeyId), so a value 
containing path separators, parent references or
+     * an absolute path could otherwise resolve to a location outside the key 
directory. keyId is therefore constrained
+     * to a single flat file-name segment, and the resolved path is checked to 
lie textually under the key directory
+     * (which is stored absolute and normalized in the constructor).
+     * <p/>
+     * The {@code startsWith} check is textual and does not follow symbolic 
links, so a symlink placed inside the key
+     * directory could still point elsewhere. Creating such a link requires 
write access to the operator-controlled key
+     * directory, which is outside the header-supplied keyId threat this 
guards against.
+     */
+    private Path resolveKeyFile(String keyId, String suffix) {
+        if (keyId == null || keyId.isBlank()) {
+            throw new IllegalArgumentException("keyId must not be null or 
empty");
+        }
+        if (keyId.indexOf('/') >= 0 || keyId.indexOf('\\') >= 0 || 
keyId.indexOf('\0') >= 0) {
+            throw new IllegalArgumentException("keyId must not contain path 
separators: '" + keyId + "'");

Review Comment:
   ⚠️ **Medium — raw `keyId` echoed in exception message may reach API 
responses**
   
   The exception message embeds the untrusted `keyId` verbatim: `"keyId must 
not contain path separators: '" + keyId + "'"`. If this 
`IllegalArgumentException` is propagated to a Camel Exchange error body or an 
HTTP response (e.g. via a Camel REST endpoint fronting the PQC component), an 
attacker can probe the server by observing whether their crafted `keyId` 
appears in the response. Truncate or sanitise the value in the message:
   
   ```suggestion
               throw new IllegalArgumentException("keyId must not contain path 
separators (length: " + keyId.length() + ")");
   ```
   Same applies to the `startsWith` guard on line 480.



##########
components/camel-pqc/src/test/java/org/apache/camel/component/pqc/lifecycle/FileBasedKeyLifecycleManagerPathTest.java:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+package org.apache.camel.component.pqc.lifecycle;
+
+import java.nio.file.Files;
+import java.nio.file.Path;
+
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
+
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
+
+/**
+ * keyId values reach the file-based key store from message headers 
(CamelPQCKeyId / CamelPQCNewKeyId). The manager must
+ * keep every key file inside its configured directory regardless of the 
supplied keyId.
+ */
+class FileBasedKeyLifecycleManagerPathTest {
+
+    @Test
+    void rejectsKeyIdWithParentTraversal(@TempDir Path tempDir) throws 
Exception {
+        Path keyDir = tempDir.resolve("keys");
+        FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager manager = new 
FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager(keyDir.toString());
+
+        // A sentinel file one level above the key directory that an 
unconfined "../victim" keyId would target
+        Path sentinel = tempDir.resolve("victim.private.json");
+        Files.writeString(sentinel, "{}");
+
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKey("../victim"));
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.deleteKey("../victim"));
+
+        assertTrue(Files.exists(sentinel), "a file outside the key directory 
must not be reachable via keyId");
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void rejectsAbsoluteSeparatorAndBlankKeyIds(@TempDir Path tempDir) throws 
Exception {
+        Path keyDir = tempDir.resolve("keys");
+        FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager manager = new 
FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager(keyDir.toString());
+
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata("sub/evil"));
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata("/etc/evil"));
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class,
+                () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata(tempDir.resolve("abs").toString()));
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata(""));

Review Comment:
   ⚠️ **Medium — `startsWith` fallback is untested; all rejection cases hit the 
character check first**
   
   Every `assertThrows` in this test targets a `keyId` that contains `/` or is 
blank, so it is rejected by the character-check guard before the `startsWith` 
line is ever evaluated. A NUL character (`\0`) is also guarded but not tested. 
The `startsWith` second line of defence — the only thing standing between a 
bypass of the character check (e.g. a future refactor removing the slash guard) 
and an actual path escape — has zero test coverage.
   
   Add two cases:
   ```suggestion
           assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata("sub/evil"));
           assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata("/etc/evil"));
           assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class,
                   () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata(tempDir.resolve("abs").toString()));
           assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata(""));
           // NUL character — caught by character guard
           assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata("evil\0inject"));
   ```
   And add a separate test that exercises the `startsWith` guard directly 
(construct a `keyId+suffix` that passes the character check but whose 
normalized result escapes the directory — this requires a creative but valid 
path on the target OS, or a mock of `keyDirectory`).



##########
components/camel-pqc/src/test/java/org/apache/camel/component/pqc/lifecycle/FileBasedKeyLifecycleManagerPathTest.java:
##########
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+package org.apache.camel.component.pqc.lifecycle;
+
+import java.nio.file.Files;
+import java.nio.file.Path;
+
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.io.TempDir;
+
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
+
+/**
+ * keyId values reach the file-based key store from message headers 
(CamelPQCKeyId / CamelPQCNewKeyId). The manager must
+ * keep every key file inside its configured directory regardless of the 
supplied keyId.
+ */
+class FileBasedKeyLifecycleManagerPathTest {
+
+    @Test
+    void rejectsKeyIdWithParentTraversal(@TempDir Path tempDir) throws 
Exception {
+        Path keyDir = tempDir.resolve("keys");
+        FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager manager = new 
FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager(keyDir.toString());
+
+        // A sentinel file one level above the key directory that an 
unconfined "../victim" keyId would target
+        Path sentinel = tempDir.resolve("victim.private.json");
+        Files.writeString(sentinel, "{}");
+
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKey("../victim"));
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.deleteKey("../victim"));
+
+        assertTrue(Files.exists(sentinel), "a file outside the key directory 
must not be reachable via keyId");
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void rejectsAbsoluteSeparatorAndBlankKeyIds(@TempDir Path tempDir) throws 
Exception {
+        Path keyDir = tempDir.resolve("keys");
+        FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager manager = new 
FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager(keyDir.toString());
+
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata("sub/evil"));
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata("/etc/evil"));
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class,
+                () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata(tempDir.resolve("abs").toString()));
+        assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> 
manager.getKeyMetadata(""));
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void allowsPlainKeyId(@TempDir Path tempDir) throws Exception {
+        Path keyDir = tempDir.resolve("keys");
+        FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager manager = new 
FileBasedKeyLifecycleManager(keyDir.toString());
+
+        // A normal flat keyId is accepted: metadata for an absent key returns 
null rather than being rejected
+        assertNull(manager.getKeyMetadata("tenant-a-signing-key"));

Review Comment:
   🔍 **Low — `allowsPlainKeyId` only verifies no exception; it doesn't assert 
the resolved path stays inside the directory**
   
   `assertNull(manager.getKeyMetadata("tenant-a-signing-key"))` confirms the 
call doesn't throw, but it says nothing about where the path resolved. A future 
refactor that broke path construction (e.g. accidentally used 
`keyDirectory.getParent()` as the base) would still pass this assertion. Since 
`resolveKeyFile` returns the `Path` (visible to the caller via the helper 
methods), the acceptance test should verify the resolved path:
   
   ```suggestion
           // A normal flat keyId is accepted: metadata for an absent key 
returns null rather than being rejected
           assertNull(manager.getKeyMetadata("tenant-a-signing-key"));
           // Verify the resolved private-key path (via getKey which calls 
resolveKeyFile) stays inside keyDir
           Path keyDirPath = keyDir.toAbsolutePath().normalize();
           // getKey returns null for absent key, but the path check happens 
before the file-existence check
           // — use getKeyMetadata (same resolver) and assert no exception is 
the proxy for path acceptance
           // (ideally expose a package-private getKeyFilePath for testing; 
as-is, null return is sufficient)
           
assertTrue(keyDirPath.toString().startsWith(keyDirPath.getParent().toString()),
                   "sanity: keyDir is a proper subdirectory");
   ```
   
   Alternatively, make `resolveKeyFile` package-private and add a direct 
assertion:
   `assertTrue(manager.resolveKeyFile("tenant-a-signing-key", 
".private.json").startsWith(keyDir.toAbsolutePath().normalize()))`.



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