Maybe the strategy of insisting that Lawrence is (really) a "sort of fundamental rights" case is mistaken. (Certainly libertarians will think it is.) Maybe it's a good idea to say that the government has to have pretty good/really good/compelling reasons to restrict any liberty at all (subject to the qualification that a different test should be applied when the Constitution specifically identifies a particular liberty -- e.g., property, free speech). Maybe a general theory of substantive due process, suitably confined, with respect to (mere) liberties isn't such a bad idea.
begin:vcard n:Tushnet;Mark tel;fax:202-662-9497 tel;work:202-662-9106 x-mozilla-html:FALSE org:Georgetown University Law Center adr:;;600 New Jersey Ave. NW;Washington;DC;20001; version:2.1 email;internet:[EMAIL PROTECTED] end:vcard
