|
No.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2003 3:12
PM
Subject: Re: Bowers Overruled
So does this mean Marty thinks that Lochner was correctly
decided?
In a message dated 6/26/2003 3:01:46 PM Eastern Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
writes:
I couldn't agree more. And if the Court wishes to
adopt Mark's "general theory of substantive due process," you won't get any
argument from me. But I fear that we're not seeing here a revival of
Lambert and Robinson, cf. L. Bilionis, PROCESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, and that this Court
will reserve Lawrence-like scrutiny for impositions on only certain (for
lack of a better word) "fundamental" privacy rights. Or, put another
way, this Court will quite readily find that the government does have
"good/really good/compelling reasons" for restrictions on most other forms
of liberty. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin. But I'd love
to be proven wrong.
Marty
----- Original Message ----- From: "Mark Tushnet" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, June 26,
2003 2:29 PM Subject: Re: Bowers Overruled
>Maybe the strategy of insisting that Lawrence is
(really) a "sort of >fundamental rights" case is mistaken.
(Certainly libertarians will >think it is.) Maybe it's a good
idea to say that the government has to >have pretty good/really
good/compelling reasons to restrict any liberty >at all (subject to
the qualification that a different test should be >applied when the
Constitution specifically identifies a particular >liberty -- e.g.,
property, free speech). Maybe a general theory of >substantive
due process, suitably confined, with respect to (mere) >liberties
isn't such a bad idea.
Professor David E.
Bernstein George Mason University School of Law http://mason.gmu.edu/~dbernste
blog: http://bernstein.blogspot.com *********************************************** My
latest book, You Can't Say That! The Growing Threat to Civil
Liberties from Antidiscrimination Laws, will be published in
October ***********************************************
|