I agree that Coleman, although alive, has been pushed into a corner by
Raines.  And I acknowledge that it may be still further narrowed to
situations involving US Supreme Court review of state court judgments where
the state court has recognized legislative standing -- and therefore not
applicable to the case filed in federal district court.

Why, then, do I call legislators the best plaintiffs (apart from the Rooker
Feldman problem)?  It isn't because I think that they have an easy case,
but rather that I don't see how the other plaintiffs are in a better
position.   In your view, who is a better plaintiff?

The claim by voters seems more attenuated than the claim by legislators --
indeed, if seems derivative of the legislator's claims.  Isn't the essence
of  the voters' claim that their own votes have been diluted because the
votes of their representatives in the legislature have been nullified by an
illegal vote-counting rule?  (There is also a claim that those who voted
for the constitutional amendment imposing the 2/3 voting requirement have
had their votes diluted and nullified; are they the best plaintiffs?)

The claim by taxpayers seems premature, at least until the bill is passed
by both Houses and signed by the Governor.  And even then, wouldn't the Tax
Injunction Act bar the federal district court's jurisdiction over their
claim, at least so long as Nevada allows them either to resist a state tax
enforcement action or to pay the tax and file for a refund on the ground
that the tax has been illegally imposed?

Am I missing something?

The more I think about the Nevada Court's decision, the more troubled I am.
Suppose the political positions in the state government were reversed, and
the legislature kept passing tax bills that were vetoed by the Governor,
but lacked the supermajority required to overcome the veto.  See Nevada
Constitution, Art. IV, section 35.  Should the procedural obstacle of a
gubernatorial veto or a supermajority requirement to overcome it give way
to the substantive obligation to fund a particular government expense?  How
about if the House and the Governor supported a bill, but the impediment
was the Senate?  Should the procedural requirement of bicameralism be
dispensed with?     None of this necessarily means that there is a
violation of the federal constitution afoot, but is anyone willing to
defend the decision as a matter of state constitutional law?

As Congressman John Dingell once said, "I'll let you write the substance .
. . and you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you every time."

Ed Hartnett
Seton Hall

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