Prof. Scarberry writes: > When the issue to be decided by a US court involves international law, as in > the maritime case from which Jack quotes, then decisions of foreign nations' > courts may be analogous to decisions of sister circuits. The foreign courts > are interpreting and attempting to apply the same body of law, and > uniformity is an important goal. This does not justify giving similar > 'strongly persuasive' weight to decisions of foreign courts as to domestic > legal matters.
COMMENT: What we now call "international law" is not exactly the same as the "law of nations" (jus gentium). "International law" was a phrase first coined by Jeremy Bentham in 1780, and it referred only to jus inter gentes (i.e., "law between nations"). See Jeremy Bentham, Principles and Morals of Legislation (published not until 1789). Strictly speaking, "international law" is only a subset of the law of nations. The Constitution uses the phrase "the law of nations." It refers not only to law governing relations between nations (or states) but also to nation's own domestic legal affairs. James Wilson was very clear about the application of the law of nations to domestic affairs. See James Wilson, Lectures on Law, Of the Law of Nations, ¶ 1 (1791) ("Some seem to have thought, that [the law of nations] respects and regulates the conduct of nations only in their intercourse with each other. A very important branch of this law 'that containing the duties which a nation owes itself' seems to have escaped their attention. 'The general principle . . . of the law of nations, is nothing more than the general law of sociability, which obliges nations to the same duties as are prescribed to individuals.'") (Wilson may have been referring to Bentham in this passage when he says "Some seem to have thought . . . .") A perfect example of this is the lex mercatoria that is a subset of the law of nations governing private transnational commercial affairs. As I have mentioned in an earlier posting, the Interstate Commerce Clause (which is misnomer -- the clause addresses commerce "among the several states") is governed by the law of nations -- specifically -- but not exclusively -- by the lex mercatoria. This is consistent with the whole Commerce Clause addressing commerce with foreign states and Indian tribes that was also governed by the law of nations. Therefore, the law of nations "as ascertained . . . by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law" does govern the U.S. own domestic affairs. United States v. Smith, 5 U.S. (Wheat.) 153 (1820). The law of nations as ascertained by foreign state practice and foreign judicial decisions is controlling on U.S. domestic legal matters insofar as (i) the U.S. has acquiesced to the customary international legal norm (i.e., not expressly objected to it when it was emerging) and (i) the facts involved in a particular case are sufficiently analogous to an instant case -- as is the case in any use of case precedent. Francisco Forrest Martin