The Supremacy clause says that the judges of each state shall be bound by the federal constitution and laws, but it doesn't say anything about being bound by interpretations of them by "inferior" federal courts. True, Congress has the authority to establish inferior courts (and does not have the authority to establish state courts), but once established, the inferior federal court judges take the same Art. VI cl. 3 oath to support the Constitution as state court judges. I don't see how, textually, that extends the holding of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee to allow inferior federal courts to review the judgments of state supreme courts. Or is Rooker-Feldman simply wrong?
John C. Eastman Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence -----Original Message----- From: Eric M. Freedman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2003 6:19 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Cooper Redux? (Re: Marshall & Upholding Federal Statutes) This would seem to be an easy one for textualists (particularly those who would be inclined to be sympathetic to congressional efforts to strip the federal courts of certain classes of cases defined by subject matter). "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to a few cases of no relevance here. Hence, if Congress were to create a federal court of specialized jurisdiction to hear all attacks on state violations of the federal constitution, and then provide that there would be no appeals to the U.S. S.Ct., this would not only be well within its power, but, as a federalism matter, an unremarkable implementation of the mandate that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Any attack on this straightforward chain of reasoning would seem to require the most liberal use of penumbras, emanations, and background assumptions. Less polemically, as a policy matter, deciding the nature of the caseload of a court of limited size in a growing country would seem to be a matter appropriately left to Congressional judgment over time, and to invent new mandatory requirements that only the Supreme Court hear constitutional attacks on rulings of State Supreme Courts would create a logistical nightmare with no logical stopping point. After all, since the Supremacy Clause applies to statutes as well as to the constitution, one could assert with equal force that once the state courts had ruled that a certain state practice (whether it be in pollution regulation, or provision of educational aid to handicapped children, or any other field) did not constitute a federal statutory violation, only the Supreme Court could declare otherwise. This is just why the constitution sets up a system in which Congress can provide needed judicial capacity by creating inferior federal courts. -E. *************** Prof. Eric M. Freedman Hofstra University School of Law Hempstead, N.Y. 11550 Tel. 516-463-5167 Fax 516-463-5129 Home Office: Tel. 212-665-2713 Fax 212-665-2714 [EMAIL PROTECTED] **************** >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 08/16/03 02:15AM >>> Let's make the Alabama case a more appropriate hypothetical. Suppose that the Alabama Supreme Court had ruled (rather than Chief Justice Moore simply asserting) that the monument was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. Marbury simply holds that it is the province of the courts to say what the law is, but that applies as much to state courts as to federal courts. Cooper v. Aaron stands only for the added proposition that federal courts can so say to state executive officials. But can a lower federal court tell a state supreme court what the law is, or is that privilege reserved to the U.S. Supreme Court? I am mindful, of course, of my own recent argument to the contrary (perhaps) in the Nevada cases (Angle v. Legislature), but I am very interested in what others on this list think about the federalism issues here, wholly apart from the merits of the Establishment Clause claim. John C. Eastman Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law Director, The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence -----Original Message----- From: Parry, John [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, August 15, 2003 9:23 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Cooper Redux? (Re: Marshall & Upholding Federal Statutes) With all of this discussion of the difference between nullifying a statute and refusing to give effect to it, I wonder how list members analyze Alabama Chief Justice Moore's announcement that he will not obey a federal court order requiring removal of a ten commandments monument? The federal courts have engaged in judicial review (of an essentially administrative order or regulation, not a statute) but are unable to "nullify" Judge Moore's conduct on their own. (Anyone expect President Bush to offer assistance?) John T. Parry Associate Professor of Law University of Pittsburgh School of Law 3900 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15260 412-648-7006
