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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-4348?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12653373#action_12653373
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Arun C Murthy commented on HADOOP-4348:
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Thanks for the review Enis.
bq. Is there any advantage of doing authentication check in RPC rather than
ipc.Server? If this one is better, then shouldn't ipc.Server#authorize() be an
abstract method rather than one with empty body.
There are implementations of IPC which do not need authorization (e.g. test
cases), which is why pulled the check into RPC.Server. I made it a concrete
no-op implementation in ipc.Server to ensure that it isn't a in-compatible
change...
bq.
<name>security.connectionPermission.org.apache.hadoop.mapred.JobSubmissionProtocol</name>
I'm uncomfortable with this approach because it exposes cluster admins to the
actual Java protocols (many of which are package-private e.g.
JobSubmissionProtocol) and as you've pointed out it leads to more complicated
handling (Configuration.getKeys followed by a search for keys starting with a
specific prefix).
I went the route of PolicyProvider to avoid enshrining code (actual protocols)
in config files and exposing admins to them. It got a bit more complicated
(HDFSPolicyProvider and MapReducePolicyProvider) because some protocols aren't
public (JobSubmissionProtocol, TaskUmbilicalProtocol etc.).
bq. In ConfiguredPolicy#refresh() with every reload request conf.resources
arraylist gets appended which is a leak.
Good catch - I'll fix this! (and the logging of course!)
> Adding service-level authorization to Hadoop
> --------------------------------------------
>
> Key: HADOOP-4348
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-4348
> Project: Hadoop Core
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: security
> Reporter: Kan Zhang
> Assignee: Arun C Murthy
> Fix For: 0.20.0
>
> Attachments: HADOOP-4348_0_20081022.patch,
> HADOOP-4348_1_20081201.patch, HADOOP-4348_2_20081202.patch,
> HADOOP-4348_3_20081204.patch, jaas_service_v1.patch, jaas_service_v2.patch,
> jaas_service_v3.patch, ServiceLevelAuthorization.pdf,
> ServiceLevelAuthorization.pdf
>
>
> Service-level authorization is the initial checking done by a Hadoop service
> to find out if a connecting client is a pre-defined user of that service. If
> not, the connection or service request will be declined. This feature allows
> services to limit access to a clearly defined group of users. For example,
> service-level authorization allows "world-readable" files on a HDFS cluster
> to be readable only by the pre-defined users of that cluster, not by anyone
> who can connect to the cluster. It also allows a M/R cluster to define its
> group of users so that only those users can submit jobs to it.
> Here is an initial list of requirements I came up with.
> 1. Users of a cluster is defined by a flat list of usernames and groups.
> A client is a user of the cluster if and only if her username is listed in
> the flat list or one of her groups is explicitly listed in the flat list.
> Nested groups are not supported.
> 2. The flat list is stored in a conf file and pushed to every cluster
> node so that services can access them.
> 3. Services will monitor the modification of the conf file periodically
> (5 mins interval by default) and reload the list if needed.
> 4. Checking against the flat list is done as early as possible and before
> any other authorization checking. Both HDFS and M/R clusters will implement
> this feature.
> 5. This feature can be switched off and is off by default.
> I'm aware of interests in pulling user data from LDAP. For this JIRA, I
> suggest we implement it using a conf file. Additional data sources may be
> supported via new JIRA's.
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