I believe my concerns are addressed On Tue, Jan 14, 2025, 21:28 Michael Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
> Thanks for updating the draft, Tiru. Ilari, Michael, Michael, Orie, and > Sophie, can you please reply-all to this thread saying whether you believe > your comments have been addressed or not? > > > > Thank you, > > -- Mike (for the COSE > chairs) > > > > *From:* tirumal reddy <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, December 12, 2024 5:38 AM > *To:* [email protected]; Hannes Tschofenig <[email protected] > > > *Subject:* Fwd: [COSE] Re: Call for adoption of > draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke > > > > Hi Chairs, > > > > I have addressed all the comments from the WG for > draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke. > > Could you consider making a decision on the adoption call now? > > > > Cheers, > > -Tiru > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: *Orie Steele* <[email protected]> > Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2024 at 20:35 > Subject: Re: [COSE] Re: Call for adoption of > draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke > To: tirumal reddy <[email protected]> > Cc: Sophie Schmieg <[email protected]>, Michael Jones < > [email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]> > > > > Thanks for addressing my comments. > > I am happy to contribute some data model examples for JWE and COSE Encrypt > if I can get some time to code them up. > > Modulo the ongoing conversation regarding short names for HPKE algorithms, > this is looking ready to go from my side. > > Regards, > > OS > > > > On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 12:30 AM tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: > > Illari, Orie, and Mike P, could you please confirm if your comments have > been addressed in the latest version of the draft > draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke> > ? > > > > -Tiru > > > > On Mon, 9 Dec 2024 at 15:53, tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi all, > > I have published a revised draft ( > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-05.html), > which addresses all comments raised, particularly from Orie and Ilari. The > draft appears ready for adoption. > > Cheers, > -Tiru > > On Fri, 6 Dec 2024 at 15:36, tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Orie, > > > > I raised a PR https://github.com/tireddy2/Hybrid-KEM-with-COSE-JOSE/pulls > to use "AKP". > > > > Cheers, > > -Tiru > > > > On Thu, 5 Dec 2024 at 04:05, Orie Steele <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Changing "crv" is indeed not possible at this point.... but we are not > required to use "crv" to express pqc or hybrid keys. > > The document that enables an "alg" to be used in a message can also > specify which "kty" and other parameters are required to be present when > that alg is expressed in a key. > > We are comparing: > > ### Option A > > const jwk = { > kty: "AKP", // mandatory > alg: "X-Wing", // mandatory > pub: "4iNrNajCSz...tmrrIzQSQQO9lNA", // mandatory > priv: "f5wrpOiP...rPpm7yY", // mandatory > }; > > ### Option B > > const jwk = { > kty: "OKP", // mandatory > crv: "X-Wing", // mandatory > alg: "X-Wing", // optional > x: "4iNrNajCSz...tmrrIzQSQQO9lNA", // mandatory > d: "f5wrpOiP...rPpm7yY" // mandatory > }; > > I'm saying let's go with Option A. > > > > On Wed, Dec 4, 2024 at 4:22 PM Sophie Schmieg <[email protected]> wrote: > > I would really like to avoid a reality where someone uses the separate > parts of an X-Wing key in their own primitives, that way lies madness and > vulnerabilities. COSE should treat hybrids just like any other algorithm, > and pretend to not know anything about how the opaque blob of bytes > operates. > > As for unfortunate naming decisions, there is some precedent here, with > TLS calling everything a group. Kind of unfortunate and "algorithm > parameter" or similar would have been the far better term for it, but I > somewhat assume that changing this name at this point is infeasible. (An > overly pendadic person might point out though, that Z[X]/(X^256+1)^3 is, as > a module of a number field order, by definition still a group, and that > Z[X](X^256+1) has Dedekind dimension one, which means that it would be fair > to say that at least Spec Z[X]/(X^256+1) is a curve, so we are still > talking about a vector bundle over a curve) > > > > On Wed, Dec 4, 2024 at 6:25 AM tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: > > Thanks Orie for valuable inputs, raise PRs for both the drafts, see > https://github.com/tireddy2/Hybrid-KEM-with-COSE-JOSE/pull/4 > and https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/pull/11. > > > > On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 at 20:08, Orie Steele <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Sure, but that is a problem for: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-hpke/ > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/ > > Consider what the example you gave above means in a pre-hpke world: > > { > "kty": "OKP", > "crv": "X25519", > "algorithms": ["ECDH-ES+A128KW", "ECDH-ES+A256KW"], > "x": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs", > } > > The algorithms in the key are for key establishment / key wrapping... not > content encryption. > > HPKE is adding the idea of enabling "direct integrated encryption". > ... and in doing so, enabling you to use a key wrapping algorithm which is > also a content encryption algorithm and which is an hpke aead. > If that's a bad idea, we are not making it better by adding PQ/T hybrids > to it, or enabling multiple HPKE suites to be used for the same KEM key. > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9180#name-kem-key-reuse > > So while HPKE might allow the same kem key to be used with multiple AEADs, > there is no reason that JOSE and COSE should allow it... > *Because this use case is solved for in the 2 layer constructions in JOSE > and COSE.* > > I consider it to be a bad idea to advertise multiple key encryption / key > wrapping algorithms for a single kem key pair. > > Let's look at a complete example of X-Wing in JOSE starting with the > recipient public key: > > { > "kty": "AKP", > "kid": > "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s", > "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM", > "pub": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs", > "priv": "i20zlCBQr0...JsShVkf3q4qUc" > } > > ^ such a key can be used for both integrated encryption and 2 key > encryption in both JOSE and COSE. > > You can encrypt directly to this key using A256GCM, > and indirectly by using HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM to encrypt a content > encryption key, and then using any of the algorithms registered here: > > > https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-signature-encryption-algorithms > ... that support "enc" ... (ChaCha20Poly1305 is not in this registry btw). > > ## Integrated Encryption (X-Wing HPKE JWT) > > { > "protectedHeader": { > "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM", > "enc": "dir", > "kid": > "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s" > }, > "payload": { > "urn:example:claim": true, > "iss": "urn:example:issuer", > "aud": "urn:example:audience", > "iat": 1729785491, > "exp": 1729792691 > } > } > > ## Key Encryption (Multiple recipients, using the same content > encryption algorithm) > > { > "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0", // { "enc" : "A128GCM" } > "iv": "ZL0HDvZJizA6vyTV", > "ciphertext": "Oq26x9vppULrGNzCn2j...BgQpgJPchg0eWNmgv4Ozi5I", > "tag": "ULnlOiJRYfCzM_r5j9sLEQ", > "aad": "cGF1bCBhdHJlaWRlcw", > "recipients": [ > { > "encrypted_key": "G3HmlpOgA4H...w7svDwUqvNR", > "header": { > "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256: > cxQC_lWt22BIjH5AWSLHCZk_f-mU3-W4Ztcu5-ZbwTk", > "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW", > "epk": { > "kty": "OKP", > "crv": "X25519", > "x": "JnGWSQ90hlt0H7..._Dn_CkLzE", > } > } > }, > { > "encrypted_key": "pn6ED0ijngCiWF8...mRF7QarTVfuWj6dw", > "header": { > "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM", > "kid": > "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s", > "ek": "BI41YDnhTTI6jSd7T62rLwzC...X9UXDw_3ylbXTiYWmPXl2fNmr4BeQ" > } > } > ] > } > > Some comments on kem key reuse: > > In the example above, assume the X25519 ECDH-ES+A128KW part is to the > x25519 component of the X-Wing key. > When a CRQC breaks ECDH-ES, the encrypted content encryption key is > broken, and the attacker can ignore x-wing completely, and still recover > the plaintext. > This remains true when any recipient in a 2 layer uses any of the > traditional 2 layer algorithms in the JOSE and COSE registries today > (except for psk stuff mixed into kdfs). > > In the case of direct encryption to the x25519 component of an x-wing key, > the plaintext is also recovered. > > The only way to protect against both modes is to use X-Wing for both > integrated encryption and key encryption and to always use the full x-wing > algorithm with a given x-wing key, and in the case of multiple recipients, > to ensure that each recipient is using a PQ key encryption / key wrapping > algorithm.... because in 2 layer breaking a single recipient encrypted > content encryption key recovers plaintext. > > OS > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 3, 2024 at 6:57 AM tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: > > Thanks Orie for the detailed explanation. I understand your suggestion to > use "AKP" instead of "OKP," but "AKP" has limitations, particularly with > the HPKE PQ/T scheme. For example, in the HPKE, a single key agreement > mechanism can be paired with multiple AEAD algorithms, resulting in unique > cryptographic algorithm identifiers. For instance: > > - HPKE-XWING-SHA256-ChaCha20Poly1305 > - HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM > > To address this, the key type "AKP" would need to be extended to > accommodate multiple algorithms. A possible JSON representation could look > like this: > > { > > "kty": "AKP", > > "kid": "01", > > "algorithms": [ > > "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-ChaCha20Poly1305", > > "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM" > > ], > > "key_ops": [ > > "deriveBits", > > "wrapKey" > > ] > > } > > > > -Tiru > > > > On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 at 02:25, Orie Steele <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url1=draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-03&url2=draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-04&difftype=--hwdiff > > Further comments: > > X-Wing is not an Elliptic Curve. > > X-Wing keys using OKP and (ab)using the "crv" parameter to mean "curve > with parameters + lattice with parameters"... is something I really hope we > can decide not to do. > > As I said in > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cose/LMh6LpT5aqF5m47dmQ_roWU18eM/ > > It would be nice to agree to use keys for algorithms, and to use AKP for > ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and X-Wing with HPKE, and X-Wing without HPKE... and all > of this is possible with the use of the AKP key type with fully specified > algorithms. > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-04#name-algorithm-key-pair-type > > Obviously I disagree with Ilari on this point. > .... however, I hope we can agree that whatever we do for ML-DSA, it will > work for ML-KEM and X-Wing, and HPKE... or whatever CRFG comes up with next. > > *In summary, it's nice that the HPKE algorithms have been added, but I > object to the key representation using OKP.* > > Motivation for my objection to the use of OKP for ML-KEM keys: > > Consider that OKP is commonly considered reserved for "elliptic curve > points", as noted in > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8152#section-12.4.2 > > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8037.html#section-2 > > Note: Do not assume that there is an underlying elliptic curve, > despite the existence of the "crv" and "x" parameters. (For > instance, this key type could be extended to represent Diffie-Hellman > (DH) algorithms based on hyperelliptic surfaces.) > > It does not matter how many times I read the note above, the normative > MUST says: > > o The parameter "crv" MUST be present and contain the subtype of the > key (from the "JSON Web Elliptic Curve" registry). > > > This means we are required to put things that are not curves in a registry > for curves.... > > If the algorithm param "alg" is not mandatory for an X-Wing key, can I use > the same key for ML-KEM and X25519 and X-Wing? > > Do I have to put "alg" in the key, even though it's optional (in OKP) to > signal a safer use pattern? > If I encrypt with X25519 to an X-Wing key that has no "alg" parameter, > what happens?... is it ok, if I use the X25519 component to decrypt? it > works... is this legal? > > { > "kty": "OKP", > "crv": "X-Wing", // not a curve... just means x and d cannot be > validated... unless you know the intended algorithm > "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW", // HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM > // HPKE-X25519-SHA256-CHACHA20POLY1305 > "x": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs", // 2 public keys > "d": "i20zlCBQr0...JsShVkf3q4qUc" // 2 private keys or a single seed > for both private keys > } > > The thumbprints will be different ... > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-key-thumbprint-06#name-octet-key-pair-okp > > Even if the same private key can decrypt messages to each public key that > contains "somewhere (no validation)" the necessary components.... > > The thumbprint for a hybrid public key should include the algorithm used > to construct the hybrid, not just the public keys used with any component > algorithms or the hybrid. > > Either we should scrap the AKP concept and use OKP as Ilari suggested. > ... or we should not use OKP for new "subtype"s... and especially not for > hybrids. > > I don't know if this comment should gate working group adoption, but it > certainly seems it should gate a WGLC for either document that references > ML-KEM / ML-DSA . > Thanks to Russ, Neil and others who gave WGLC feedback on AKP and ML-DSA > for JOSE and COSE, I am tracking your comments here: > https://github.com/cose-wg/draft-ietf-cose-dilithium/issues but have not > yet addressed them. > > Ilari, Hannes and Tiru, please feel free to file a WGLC comment on the use > of AKP in ML-DSA. > > Whatever the outcome, there should be alignment on seeds, private keys, > public keys and algorithms for lattice and hybrid PQC (ML-DSA / ML-KEM / > X-Wing) > > "pub" is better than "x" > > "priv" is better than "d" > > "alg" should have been mandatory in keys, > ... and forbidden in headers ( a ship that has sailed, and can't be fixed > for EC2 / OKP keys, or JWE / COSE Encrypt envelopes )... > > *...things that are not elliptic curves do not belong in a registry for > elliptic curves...* > > > I will die on these hills. If I'm in the rough, it would be good to know. > > OS > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 11:11 AM Michael Jones <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Ilari, Orie, and Mike P., do you believe that your comments on the > previous draft have been addressed in this one? If not, what further > changes would you suggest? > > > > Thanks all, > > -- Mike > > > > *From:* tirumal reddy <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, December 2, 2024 5:29 AM > *To:* Michael Jones <[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [COSE] Re: Call for adoption of > draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke > > > > The revised draft > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-04.html > addresses all the comments raised during the WG adoption call. Regarding > Michael's comment on the terms 'traditional' and 'Post-Quantum,' this issue > has been discussed in the PQUIP WG. However, no decision has been made to > change the terminology, and this issue is beyond the scope of this > document > > > > -Tiru > > > > On Sat, 30 Nov 2024 at 22:42, Michael Jones <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Only two replies to the call for adoption clearly stated that they favored > adoption. Whereas more messages were sent than that with critiques of the > draft. Therefore, the draft is not adopted in its present form. > > > > The chairs suggest that the authors update the specification to address > the feedback from Ilari, Orie, Mike P., and Michael R. and publish a new > draft, and then ask for feedback on the revised draft on the mailing list. > Following that, we can consider a call for adoption of the revised draft. > > > > For the > chairs, > > -- Mike > > > > *From:* Michael Jones > *Sent:* Friday, November 8, 2024 7:04 AM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* Call for adoption of draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke > > > > Per discussions at the IETF 121 COSE working group meeting, this note > starts a two-week call for adoption of the PQ/T Hybrid KEM: HPKE with > JOSE/COSE specification. Please let us know whether you are in favor of > adoption or not by Friday, November 22, 2024. > > > > Thank you, > > -- Mike & > Ivo > > > > _______________________________________________ > COSE mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] > > _______________________________________________ > COSE mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] > > > > > -- > > > > > *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer > www.transmute.industries > > <https://transmute.industries/> > > > > > -- > > > > > *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer > www.transmute.industries > > <https://transmute.industries/> > > _______________________________________________ > COSE mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] > > > > > -- > > > Sophie Schmieg | Information Security Engineer | ISE Crypto | > [email protected] > > > > > > > -- > > > > > *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer > www.transmute.industries > > <https://transmute.industries/> > > > > > -- > > > > > *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer > www.transmute.industries > > <https://transmute.industries/> >
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