Hi Orie, The draft can progress alongside the HPKE specifications. Given that the PQC KEM for JOSE/COSE has already been adopted by the WG, I don’t think the progress of the hybrid scheme draft should be delayed. I agree with your comment on the parametric form, it will be updated to align with the HPKE spec.
Cheers, -Tiru On Wed, 15 Jan 2025 at 19:38, Orie Steele <[email protected]> wrote: > My comments were addressed, however, I wonder if we should finish the base > HPKE specs before taking on new work. > > I noticed the algorithm suite names in this draft are still using the > parametric form. > > Regards, > > OS > > On Wed, Jan 15, 2025 at 7:33 AM Michael Prorock <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I believe my concerns are addressed >> >> On Tue, Jan 14, 2025, 21:28 Michael Jones <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Thanks for updating the draft, Tiru. Ilari, Michael, Michael, Orie, and >>> Sophie, can you please reply-all to this thread saying whether you believe >>> your comments have been addressed or not? >>> >>> >>> >>> Thank >>> you, >>> >>> -- Mike (for the COSE >>> chairs) >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* tirumal reddy <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Thursday, December 12, 2024 5:38 AM >>> *To:* [email protected]; Hannes Tschofenig < >>> [email protected]> >>> *Subject:* Fwd: [COSE] Re: Call for adoption of >>> draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke >>> >>> >>> >>> Hi Chairs, >>> >>> >>> >>> I have addressed all the comments from the WG for >>> draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke. >>> >>> Could you consider making a decision on the adoption call now? >>> >>> >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> -Tiru >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message --------- >>> From: *Orie Steele* <[email protected]> >>> Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2024 at 20:35 >>> Subject: Re: [COSE] Re: Call for adoption of >>> draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke >>> To: tirumal reddy <[email protected]> >>> Cc: Sophie Schmieg <[email protected]>, Michael Jones < >>> [email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]> >>> >>> >>> >>> Thanks for addressing my comments. >>> >>> I am happy to contribute some data model examples for JWE and COSE >>> Encrypt if I can get some time to code them up. >>> >>> Modulo the ongoing conversation regarding short names for HPKE >>> algorithms, this is looking ready to go from my side. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> OS >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Dec 11, 2024 at 12:30 AM tirumal reddy <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Illari, Orie, and Mike P, could you please confirm if your comments have >>> been addressed in the latest version of the draft >>> draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke >>> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke> >>> ? >>> >>> >>> >>> -Tiru >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, 9 Dec 2024 at 15:53, tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> I have published a revised draft ( >>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-05.html), >>> which addresses all comments raised, particularly from Orie and Ilari. The >>> draft appears ready for adoption. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> -Tiru >>> >>> On Fri, 6 Dec 2024 at 15:36, tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Orie, >>> >>> >>> >>> I raised a PR >>> https://github.com/tireddy2/Hybrid-KEM-with-COSE-JOSE/pulls to use >>> "AKP". >>> >>> >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> -Tiru >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, 5 Dec 2024 at 04:05, Orie Steele <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Changing "crv" is indeed not possible at this point.... but we are not >>> required to use "crv" to express pqc or hybrid keys. >>> >>> The document that enables an "alg" to be used in a message can also >>> specify which "kty" and other parameters are required to be present when >>> that alg is expressed in a key. >>> >>> We are comparing: >>> >>> ### Option A >>> >>> const jwk = { >>> kty: "AKP", // mandatory >>> alg: "X-Wing", // mandatory >>> pub: "4iNrNajCSz...tmrrIzQSQQO9lNA", // mandatory >>> priv: "f5wrpOiP...rPpm7yY", // mandatory >>> }; >>> >>> ### Option B >>> >>> const jwk = { >>> kty: "OKP", // mandatory >>> crv: "X-Wing", // mandatory >>> alg: "X-Wing", // optional >>> x: "4iNrNajCSz...tmrrIzQSQQO9lNA", // mandatory >>> d: "f5wrpOiP...rPpm7yY" // mandatory >>> }; >>> >>> I'm saying let's go with Option A. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Dec 4, 2024 at 4:22 PM Sophie Schmieg <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> I would really like to avoid a reality where someone uses the separate >>> parts of an X-Wing key in their own primitives, that way lies madness and >>> vulnerabilities. COSE should treat hybrids just like any other algorithm, >>> and pretend to not know anything about how the opaque blob of bytes >>> operates. >>> >>> As for unfortunate naming decisions, there is some precedent here, with >>> TLS calling everything a group. Kind of unfortunate and "algorithm >>> parameter" or similar would have been the far better term for it, but I >>> somewhat assume that changing this name at this point is infeasible. (An >>> overly pendadic person might point out though, that Z[X]/(X^256+1)^3 is, as >>> a module of a number field order, by definition still a group, and that >>> Z[X](X^256+1) has Dedekind dimension one, which means that it would be fair >>> to say that at least Spec Z[X]/(X^256+1) is a curve, so we are still >>> talking about a vector bundle over a curve) >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Dec 4, 2024 at 6:25 AM tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks Orie for valuable inputs, raise PRs for both the drafts, see >>> https://github.com/tireddy2/Hybrid-KEM-with-COSE-JOSE/pull/4 >>> and https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/pull/11 >>> . >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 at 20:08, Orie Steele <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Sure, but that is a problem for: >>> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-hpke/ >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/ >>> >>> Consider what the example you gave above means in a pre-hpke world: >>> >>> { >>> "kty": "OKP", >>> "crv": "X25519", >>> "algorithms": ["ECDH-ES+A128KW", "ECDH-ES+A256KW"], >>> "x": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs", >>> } >>> >>> The algorithms in the key are for key establishment / key wrapping... >>> not content encryption. >>> >>> HPKE is adding the idea of enabling "direct integrated encryption". >>> ... and in doing so, enabling you to use a key wrapping algorithm which >>> is also a content encryption algorithm and which is an hpke aead. >>> If that's a bad idea, we are not making it better by adding PQ/T hybrids >>> to it, or enabling multiple HPKE suites to be used for the same KEM key. >>> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9180#name-kem-key-reuse >>> >>> So while HPKE might allow the same kem key to be used with multiple >>> AEADs, there is no reason that JOSE and COSE should allow it... >>> *Because this use case is solved for in the 2 layer constructions in >>> JOSE and COSE.* >>> >>> I consider it to be a bad idea to advertise multiple key encryption / >>> key wrapping algorithms for a single kem key pair. >>> >>> Let's look at a complete example of X-Wing in JOSE starting with the >>> recipient public key: >>> >>> { >>> "kty": "AKP", >>> "kid": >>> "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s", >>> "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM", >>> "pub": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs", >>> "priv": "i20zlCBQr0...JsShVkf3q4qUc" >>> } >>> >>> ^ such a key can be used for both integrated encryption and 2 key >>> encryption in both JOSE and COSE. >>> >>> You can encrypt directly to this key using A256GCM, >>> and indirectly by using HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM to encrypt a content >>> encryption key, and then using any of the algorithms registered here: >>> >>> >>> https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-signature-encryption-algorithms >>> ... that support "enc" ... (ChaCha20Poly1305 is not in this registry btw). >>> >>> ## Integrated Encryption (X-Wing HPKE JWT) >>> >>> { >>> "protectedHeader": { >>> "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM", >>> "enc": "dir", >>> "kid": >>> "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s" >>> }, >>> "payload": { >>> "urn:example:claim": true, >>> "iss": "urn:example:issuer", >>> "aud": "urn:example:audience", >>> "iat": 1729785491, >>> "exp": 1729792691 >>> } >>> } >>> >>> ## Key Encryption (Multiple recipients, using the same content >>> encryption algorithm) >>> >>> { >>> "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0", // { "enc" : "A128GCM" } >>> "iv": "ZL0HDvZJizA6vyTV", >>> "ciphertext": "Oq26x9vppULrGNzCn2j...BgQpgJPchg0eWNmgv4Ozi5I", >>> "tag": "ULnlOiJRYfCzM_r5j9sLEQ", >>> "aad": "cGF1bCBhdHJlaWRlcw", >>> "recipients": [ >>> { >>> "encrypted_key": "G3HmlpOgA4H...w7svDwUqvNR", >>> "header": { >>> "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256: >>> cxQC_lWt22BIjH5AWSLHCZk_f-mU3-W4Ztcu5-ZbwTk", >>> "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW", >>> "epk": { >>> "kty": "OKP", >>> "crv": "X25519", >>> "x": "JnGWSQ90hlt0H7..._Dn_CkLzE", >>> } >>> } >>> }, >>> { >>> "encrypted_key": "pn6ED0ijngCiWF8...mRF7QarTVfuWj6dw", >>> "header": { >>> "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM", >>> "kid": >>> "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s", >>> "ek": "BI41YDnhTTI6jSd7T62rLwzC...X9UXDw_3ylbXTiYWmPXl2fNmr4BeQ" >>> } >>> } >>> ] >>> } >>> >>> Some comments on kem key reuse: >>> >>> In the example above, assume the X25519 ECDH-ES+A128KW part is to the >>> x25519 component of the X-Wing key. >>> When a CRQC breaks ECDH-ES, the encrypted content encryption key is >>> broken, and the attacker can ignore x-wing completely, and still recover >>> the plaintext. >>> This remains true when any recipient in a 2 layer uses any of the >>> traditional 2 layer algorithms in the JOSE and COSE registries today >>> (except for psk stuff mixed into kdfs). >>> >>> In the case of direct encryption to the x25519 component of an x-wing >>> key, the plaintext is also recovered. >>> >>> The only way to protect against both modes is to use X-Wing for both >>> integrated encryption and key encryption and to always use the full x-wing >>> algorithm with a given x-wing key, and in the case of multiple recipients, >>> to ensure that each recipient is using a PQ key encryption / key wrapping >>> algorithm.... because in 2 layer breaking a single recipient encrypted >>> content encryption key recovers plaintext. >>> >>> OS >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 3, 2024 at 6:57 AM tirumal reddy <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks Orie for the detailed explanation. I understand your suggestion >>> to use "AKP" instead of "OKP," but "AKP" has limitations, particularly with >>> the HPKE PQ/T scheme. For example, in the HPKE, a single key agreement >>> mechanism can be paired with multiple AEAD algorithms, resulting in unique >>> cryptographic algorithm identifiers. For instance: >>> >>> - HPKE-XWING-SHA256-ChaCha20Poly1305 >>> - HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM >>> >>> To address this, the key type "AKP" would need to be extended to >>> accommodate multiple algorithms. A possible JSON representation could look >>> like this: >>> >>> { >>> >>> "kty": "AKP", >>> >>> "kid": "01", >>> >>> "algorithms": [ >>> >>> "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-ChaCha20Poly1305", >>> >>> "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM" >>> >>> ], >>> >>> "key_ops": [ >>> >>> "deriveBits", >>> >>> "wrapKey" >>> >>> ] >>> >>> } >>> >>> >>> >>> -Tiru >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 at 02:25, Orie Steele <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url1=draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-03&url2=draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-04&difftype=--hwdiff >>> >>> Further comments: >>> >>> X-Wing is not an Elliptic Curve. >>> >>> X-Wing keys using OKP and (ab)using the "crv" parameter to mean "curve >>> with parameters + lattice with parameters"... is something I really hope we >>> can decide not to do. >>> >>> As I said in >>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cose/LMh6LpT5aqF5m47dmQ_roWU18eM/ >>> >>> It would be nice to agree to use keys for algorithms, and to use AKP for >>> ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and X-Wing with HPKE, and X-Wing without HPKE... and all >>> of this is possible with the use of the AKP key type with fully specified >>> algorithms. >>> >>> >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-04#name-algorithm-key-pair-type >>> >>> Obviously I disagree with Ilari on this point. >>> .... however, I hope we can agree that whatever we do for ML-DSA, it >>> will work for ML-KEM and X-Wing, and HPKE... or whatever CRFG comes up with >>> next. >>> >>> *In summary, it's nice that the HPKE algorithms have been added, but I >>> object to the key representation using OKP.* >>> >>> Motivation for my objection to the use of OKP for ML-KEM keys: >>> >>> Consider that OKP is commonly considered reserved for "elliptic curve >>> points", as noted in >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8152#section-12.4.2 >>> >>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8037.html#section-2 >>> >>> Note: Do not assume that there is an underlying elliptic curve, >>> despite the existence of the "crv" and "x" parameters. (For >>> instance, this key type could be extended to represent Diffie-Hellman >>> (DH) algorithms based on hyperelliptic surfaces.) >>> >>> It does not matter how many times I read the note above, the normative >>> MUST says: >>> >>> o The parameter "crv" MUST be present and contain the subtype of the >>> key (from the "JSON Web Elliptic Curve" registry). >>> >>> >>> This means we are required to put things that are not curves in a >>> registry for curves.... >>> >>> If the algorithm param "alg" is not mandatory for an X-Wing key, can I >>> use the same key for ML-KEM and X25519 and X-Wing? >>> >>> Do I have to put "alg" in the key, even though it's optional (in OKP) to >>> signal a safer use pattern? >>> If I encrypt with X25519 to an X-Wing key that has no "alg" parameter, >>> what happens?... is it ok, if I use the X25519 component to decrypt? it >>> works... is this legal? >>> >>> { >>> "kty": "OKP", >>> "crv": "X-Wing", // not a curve... just means x and d cannot be >>> validated... unless you know the intended algorithm >>> "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW", // HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM >>> // HPKE-X25519-SHA256-CHACHA20POLY1305 >>> "x": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs", // 2 public keys >>> "d": "i20zlCBQr0...JsShVkf3q4qUc" // 2 private keys or a single >>> seed for both private keys >>> } >>> >>> The thumbprints will be different ... >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-key-thumbprint-06#name-octet-key-pair-okp >>> >>> Even if the same private key can decrypt messages to each public key >>> that contains "somewhere (no validation)" the necessary components.... >>> >>> The thumbprint for a hybrid public key should include the algorithm used >>> to construct the hybrid, not just the public keys used with any component >>> algorithms or the hybrid. >>> >>> Either we should scrap the AKP concept and use OKP as Ilari suggested. >>> ... or we should not use OKP for new "subtype"s... and especially not >>> for hybrids. >>> >>> I don't know if this comment should gate working group adoption, but it >>> certainly seems it should gate a WGLC for either document that references >>> ML-KEM / ML-DSA . >>> Thanks to Russ, Neil and others who gave WGLC feedback on AKP and ML-DSA >>> for JOSE and COSE, I am tracking your comments here: >>> https://github.com/cose-wg/draft-ietf-cose-dilithium/issues but have >>> not yet addressed them. >>> >>> Ilari, Hannes and Tiru, please feel free to file a WGLC comment on the >>> use of AKP in ML-DSA. >>> >>> Whatever the outcome, there should be alignment on seeds, private keys, >>> public keys and algorithms for lattice and hybrid PQC (ML-DSA / ML-KEM / >>> X-Wing) >>> >>> "pub" is better than "x" >>> >>> "priv" is better than "d" >>> >>> "alg" should have been mandatory in keys, >>> ... and forbidden in headers ( a ship that has sailed, and can't be >>> fixed for EC2 / OKP keys, or JWE / COSE Encrypt envelopes )... >>> >>> *...things that are not elliptic curves do not belong in a registry for >>> elliptic curves...* >>> >>> >>> I will die on these hills. If I'm in the rough, it would be good to know. >>> >>> OS >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 11:11 AM Michael Jones < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Ilari, Orie, and Mike P., do you believe that your comments on the >>> previous draft have been addressed in this one? If not, what further >>> changes would you suggest? >>> >>> >>> >>> Thanks >>> all, >>> >>> -- Mike >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* tirumal reddy <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Monday, December 2, 2024 5:29 AM >>> *To:* Michael Jones <[email protected]> >>> *Cc:* [email protected] >>> *Subject:* Re: [COSE] Re: Call for adoption of >>> draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke >>> >>> >>> >>> The revised draft >>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-04.html >>> addresses all the comments raised during the WG adoption call. Regarding >>> Michael's comment on the terms 'traditional' and 'Post-Quantum,' this issue >>> has been discussed in the PQUIP WG. However, no decision has been made to >>> change the terminology, and this issue is beyond the scope of this >>> document >>> >>> >>> >>> -Tiru >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, 30 Nov 2024 at 22:42, Michael Jones <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Only two replies to the call for adoption clearly stated that they >>> favored adoption. Whereas more messages were sent than that with critiques >>> of the draft. Therefore, the draft is not adopted in its present form. >>> >>> >>> >>> The chairs suggest that the authors update the specification to address >>> the feedback from Ilari, Orie, Mike P., and Michael R. and publish a new >>> draft, and then ask for feedback on the revised draft on the mailing list. >>> Following that, we can consider a call for adoption of the revised draft. >>> >>> >>> >>> For the >>> chairs, >>> >>> -- Mike >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Michael Jones >>> *Sent:* Friday, November 8, 2024 7:04 AM >>> *To:* [email protected] >>> *Subject:* Call for adoption of draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke >>> >>> >>> >>> Per discussions at the IETF 121 COSE working group meeting, this note >>> starts a two-week call for adoption of the PQ/T Hybrid KEM: HPKE with >>> JOSE/COSE specification. Please let us know whether you are in favor of >>> adoption or not by Friday, November 22, 2024. >>> >>> >>> >>> Thank >>> you, >>> >>> -- Mike >>> & Ivo >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> COSE mailing list -- [email protected] >>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> COSE mailing list -- [email protected] >>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer >>> www.transmute.industries >>> >>> <https://transmute.industries/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer >>> www.transmute.industries >>> >>> <https://transmute.industries/> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> COSE mailing list -- [email protected] >>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> Sophie Schmieg | Information Security Engineer | ISE Crypto | >>> [email protected] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer >>> www.transmute.industries >>> >>> <https://transmute.industries/> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *ORIE STEELE *Chief Technology Officer >>> www.transmute.industries >>> >>> <https://transmute.industries/> >>> >> > > -- > > > ORIE STEELE > Chief Technology Officer > www.transmute.industries > > <https://transmute.industries> > _______________________________________________ > COSE mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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