Dear Uri:
Thanks for kind references. We indeed didn’t know the related work, will make
study and provide feedback soon.
As a sidenote, AFS-KEX was indeed designed for identity hiding. Unlike ECDH
where Initiator (Alice) and Responder (Bob) use the same group and generator,
for ML-KEM Alice and Bot use independent public-key matrix generated from
random seeds \rho_A and \rho_B respectively. If \rho_A=\rho_B,then AFS-KEX
already supports identity hiding.
For identity hiding of AFS-KEX based IKE, only \rho_A and \rho_B need to be
encrypted with the encryption key $EK$.
Best regards
Yunlei
-----原始郵件-----
發件人:"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[email protected]>
發送時間:2026-09-17 12:01:18 (星期四)
收件人: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>, "Renzo Navas"
<[email protected]>
抄送: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, lake <[email protected]>, "[email protected]"
<[email protected]>, cose <[email protected]>, ace <[email protected]>
主題: [Lake] Re: [EXT] [COSE] Re: Request for standardized lightweight
quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG)
Have you seen https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-uri-lake-pquake/,
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uri-cfrg-pquake-00, and
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1749 (first publication without formal proofs in
2023)?
Having said that — I support the approach (obviously 😉).
Thanks!
--
V/R,
Uri
From: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>
Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2026 at 23:46
To: Renzo Navas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; lake <[email protected]>; [email protected]
<[email protected]>; cose <[email protected]>; ace <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXT] [COSE] Re: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight
quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG)
This Message Is From an External Sender
This message came from outside the Laboratory.
Dear All:
I am Yunlei from Fudan university, Shanghai. I would draw your kind attention
on our recently published paper:Post-Quantum Internet Key Exchange via
Authenticated Forward-Secure KEM (named AFS-KEX), which is available from:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1581
In this work, we present a novel AKE construction from KEM without using
signature: more compact, more efficient, more secure against state exposure.
We hope this work is applicable to LAKE and post-quantum IKE.
With a brief study, a suggested solution is as follows: First, using ECDH to
setup communication encryption key $EK$, due to the MTU limitation of the first
two rounds of IKE. Then, using $EK$ to protect the first two rounds of AFS-KEX.
Compared to using ML-KEM and MS-DSA, this could reduce about 80% communication
bandwidth.
Best regards
Yunlei
-----原始郵件-----
發件人: "Renzo Navas" <[email protected]>
發送時間: 2026-09-13 17:52:46 (星期日)
收件人: [email protected]
抄送: lake <[email protected]>, [email protected], cose <[email protected]>, ace
<[email protected]>
主題: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange
(on behalf LAKE WG)
Dear CFRG,
The LAKE working group is chartered to work on a lightweight mutually
authenticated key exchange protocol targeting constrained network environments
such as NB-IoT, 6TiSCH, LoRaWAN, IEEE 802.15.4, and BLE. The base LAKE/EDHOC
protocol (RFC 9528) is now being updated for the post-quantum setting [1].
In March 2026, the LAKE working group formed a post-quantum Design Team (DT)
scoped to evaluate the constrained network scenarios where a quantum-resistant
variant of LAKE is realistically deployable. DT identified that the resulting
large message sizes due to current PQC algorithms are not well suited for the
most constrained IoT environments [2]. At the same time, constrained IoT
systems also need to migrate to post-quantum cryptography.
LAKE kindly requests CFRG to consider research and specification of lightweight
quantum-resistant key exchange algorithms.
1. As shown in the analysis [2], a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)-based
approach to quantum-resistant LAKE could reduce the message size of a mutually
authenticated AKE compared to KEM-based approaches, which is particularly
beneficial for constrained IoT deployments. In particular, the specification of
a lightweight NIKE, such as CTIDH and MIKE, would allow, for example, the
deployment of quantum-resistant LAKE in network environments with Maximum
Transmission Unit (MTU) of up to 127 bytes (classes S1/S2 [3]).
2. The specification of more optimized KEMs, such as lattice-based KEMs (e.g.,
BAT and DAWN) would also reduce the message sizes, making quantum-resistant
LAKE more efficiently deployable in these constrained settings.
LAKE would be happy to provide further input on this topic and to evaluate
candidate proposals from a performance point of view.
Kind regards,
Renzo Navas on behalf of the LAKE WG
P.S.: I cross-post this to some WGs that might be interested in this
information.
[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-pqsuites/
[2]
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-lake-08-pq-edhoc-dt-summary-ietf126presentation-00
[3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-7228bis/
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