Dear Uri:

Thanks for kind references. We indeed didn’t know the related work, will make 
study  and provide feedback soon.

 

As a sidenote, AFS-KEX was indeed designed for identity hiding. Unlike ECDH 
where Initiator (Alice) and Responder (Bob) use the same group and generator, 
for ML-KEM Alice and Bot use independent public-key matrix generated from 
random seeds \rho_A and \rho_B respectively.  If \rho_A=\rho_B,then AFS-KEX 
already supports identity hiding.

 

For identity hiding of AFS-KEX based IKE, only \rho_A and \rho_B need to be 
encrypted with the encryption key $EK$.

 

Best regards

Yunlei










-----原始郵件-----
發件人:"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[email protected]>
發送時間:2026-09-17 12:01:18 (星期四)

收件人: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>, "Renzo Navas" 
<[email protected]>
抄送: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, lake <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" 
<[email protected]>, cose <[email protected]>, ace <[email protected]>
主題: [Lake] Re: [EXT] [COSE] Re: Request for standardized lightweight 
quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG)



Have you seen https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-uri-lake-pquake/, 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uri-cfrg-pquake-00, and 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1749 (first publication without formal proofs in 
2023)?


Having said that — I support the approach (obviously 😉).


Thanks!
--
V/R,
Uri


From: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>
Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2026 at 23:46
To: Renzo Navas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; lake <[email protected]>; [email protected] 
<[email protected]>; cose <[email protected]>; ace <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXT] [COSE] Re: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight 
quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG)


This Message Is From an External Sender
This message came from outside the Laboratory.
 

Dear All:

I am Yunlei from Fudan university, Shanghai. I would draw your kind  attention 
on our recently published paper:Post-Quantum Internet Key Exchange via 
Authenticated Forward-Secure KEM (named AFS-KEX), which is available from: 
https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1581




In this work, we present a novel AKE construction from KEM without using 
signature: more compact, more efficient,  more secure against state exposure. 
We hope this work is applicable to LAKE and post-quantum IKE. 




With a brief study, a suggested solution is as follows: First, using ECDH to 
setup communication encryption key $EK$, due to the MTU limitation of the first 
two rounds of IKE. Then, using $EK$ to protect the first two rounds of AFS-KEX. 
Compared to using ML-KEM and MS-DSA, this could reduce about 80% communication 
bandwidth.




Best regards

Yunlei 




-----原始郵件-----
發件人: "Renzo Navas" <[email protected]>
發送時間: 2026-09-13 17:52:46 (星期日)
收件人: [email protected]
抄送: lake <[email protected]>, [email protected], cose <[email protected]>, ace 
<[email protected]>
主題: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange 
(on behalf LAKE WG)




Dear CFRG,


The LAKE working group is chartered to work on a lightweight mutually 
authenticated key exchange protocol targeting constrained network environments 
such as NB-IoT, 6TiSCH, LoRaWAN, IEEE 802.15.4, and BLE. The base LAKE/EDHOC 
protocol (RFC 9528) is now being updated for the post-quantum setting [1].

In March 2026, the LAKE working group formed a post-quantum Design Team (DT) 
scoped to evaluate the constrained network scenarios where a quantum-resistant 
variant of LAKE is realistically deployable. DT identified that the resulting 
large message sizes due to current PQC algorithms are not well suited for the 
most constrained IoT environments [2]. At the same time, constrained IoT 
systems also need to migrate to post-quantum cryptography.

LAKE kindly requests CFRG to consider research and specification of lightweight 
quantum-resistant key exchange algorithms.


1. As shown in the analysis [2], a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)-based 
approach to quantum-resistant LAKE could reduce the message size of a mutually 
authenticated AKE compared to KEM-based approaches, which is particularly 
beneficial for constrained IoT deployments. In particular, the specification of 
a lightweight NIKE, such as CTIDH and MIKE, would allow, for example, the 
deployment of quantum-resistant LAKE in network environments with Maximum 
Transmission Unit (MTU) of up to 127 bytes (classes S1/S2 [3]).

2. The specification of more optimized KEMs, such as lattice-based KEMs (e.g., 
BAT and DAWN) would also reduce the message sizes, making quantum-resistant 
LAKE more efficiently deployable in these constrained settings.

 

LAKE would be happy to provide further input on this topic and to evaluate 
candidate proposals from a performance point of view. 




Kind regards,




Renzo Navas on behalf of the LAKE WG




P.S.: I cross-post this to some WGs that might be interested in this 
information.

 

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-pqsuites/

[2] 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-lake-08-pq-edhoc-dt-summary-ietf126presentation-00

[3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-7228bis/
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