Full disclosure, I haven't read the referenced papers yet. That said, am I correctly understanding that you're proposing a two-phase KEX, starting with ECDH for efficient setup of the encryption key but ultimately using that with ML-KEM for the final encrypted communication? If my understanding is correct, can you please summarize how your proposal avoids risk from that initial exchange being captured and the ECDH being successfully factored once a CRQC is available to do so?
If the HNDL+CRQC risk vector that ML-KEM is meant to fix relies upon the collection of initial key exchange packets and the subsequent successful factoring of values with a QC, my gut reaction is that any scheme which relies upon ECDH to exchange any of the values used for subsequent ML-KEM transactions will be subject to the same risks as simply using ECDH alone. In other words, if I can capture and decipher the initial ECDH with my CRQC then I will also be capable of capturing the subsequent ML-KEM exchange that uses them. In other word, the weakness of ECDH will entirely undermine the final use of ML-KEM. Again, I haven't read the referenced papers and apologize to all if this combination has been covered in archived threads that I've overlooked. If this two-part use has been proven, I guess I need to find the time to read up on how it's proven safe. It just doesn't seem logical to me at first glance. Bobby From: 赵运磊 <[email protected]> Date: Thursday, September 17, 2026 at 3:27 AM To: Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <[email protected]> Cc: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>; Renzo Navas <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; lake <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; cose <[email protected]>; ace <[email protected]> Subject: [Pqc] Re: [Lake] Re: [EXT] [COSE] Re: Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG) This Message Is From an External Sender This email originated outside of Lumen Technologies. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Report Suspicious<https://us-phishalarm-ewt.proofpoint.com/EWT/v1/CdLFVIQ!5-am7rGqx-kOcQBNwwFe80abdHC9P5PhvIdeS2BCgbrfxwj-k29JrVd07XSEIR3fNedaIoYSO3OuanNyAwpg6AZAxFrW8CcciMS7dPIZleXW7g$> Dear Uri: Thanks for kind references. We indeed didn’t know the related work, will make study and provide feedback soon. As a sidenote, AFS-KEX was indeed designed for identity hiding. Unlike ECDH where Initiator (Alice) and Responder (Bob) use the same group and generator, for ML-KEM Alice and Bot use independent public-key matrix generated from random seeds \rho_A and \rho_B respectively. If \rho_A=\rho_B,then AFS-KEX already supports identity hiding. For identity hiding of AFS-KEX based IKE, only \rho_A and \rho_B need to be encrypted with the encryption key $EK$. Best regards Yunlei -----原始郵件----- 發件人: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <[email protected]> 發送時間: 2026-09-17 12:01:18 (星期四) 收件人: 赵运磊 <[email protected]>, "Renzo Navas" <[email protected]> 抄送: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, lake <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, cose <[email protected]>, ace <[email protected]> 主題: [Lake] Re: [EXT] [COSE] Re: Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG) Have you seen https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-uri-lake-pquake/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-uri-lake-pquake/__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLok8hgKGI$>, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uri-cfrg-pquake-00<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-uri-cfrg-pquake-00__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLor580r3H$>, and https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1749<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1749__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLovG4MrPi$> (first publication without formal proofs in 2023)? Having said that — I support the approach (obviously 😉). Thanks! -- V/R, Uri From: 赵运磊 <[email protected]> Date: Wednesday, September 16, 2026 at 23:46 To: Renzo Navas <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; lake <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>; cose <[email protected]>; ace <[email protected]> Subject: [EXT] [COSE] Re: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG) This Message Is From an External Sender This message came from outside the Laboratory. Dear All: I am Yunlei from Fudan university, Shanghai. I would draw your kind attention on our recently published paper:Post-Quantum Internet Key Exchange via Authenticated Forward-Secure KEM (named AFS-KEX), which is available from: https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1581<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1581__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLotWWfuOg$> In this work, we present a novel AKE construction from KEM without using signature: more compact, more efficient, more secure against state exposure. We hope this work is applicable to LAKE and post-quantum IKE. With a brief study, a suggested solution is as follows: First, using ECDH to setup communication encryption key $EK$, due to the MTU limitation of the first two rounds of IKE. Then, using $EK$ to protect the first two rounds of AFS-KEX. Compared to using ML-KEM and MS-DSA, this could reduce about 80% communication bandwidth. Best regards Yunlei -----原始郵件----- 發件人: "Renzo Navas" <[email protected]> 發送時間: 2026-09-13 17:52:46 (星期日) 收件人: [email protected] 抄送: lake <[email protected]>, [email protected], cose <[email protected]>, ace <[email protected]> 主題: [Lake] Request for standardized lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange (on behalf LAKE WG) Dear CFRG, The LAKE working group is chartered to work on a lightweight mutually authenticated key exchange protocol targeting constrained network environments such as NB-IoT, 6TiSCH, LoRaWAN, IEEE 802.15.4, and BLE. The base LAKE/EDHOC protocol (RFC 9528) is now being updated for the post-quantum setting [1]. In March 2026, the LAKE working group formed a post-quantum Design Team (DT) scoped to evaluate the constrained network scenarios where a quantum-resistant variant of LAKE is realistically deployable. DT identified that the resulting large message sizes due to current PQC algorithms are not well suited for the most constrained IoT environments [2]. At the same time, constrained IoT systems also need to migrate to post-quantum cryptography. LAKE kindly requests CFRG to consider research and specification of lightweight quantum-resistant key exchange algorithms. 1. As shown in the analysis [2], a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE)-based approach to quantum-resistant LAKE could reduce the message size of a mutually authenticated AKE compared to KEM-based approaches, which is particularly beneficial for constrained IoT deployments. In particular, the specification of a lightweight NIKE, such as CTIDH and MIKE, would allow, for example, the deployment of quantum-resistant LAKE in network environments with Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of up to 127 bytes (classes S1/S2 [3]). 2. The specification of more optimized KEMs, such as lattice-based KEMs (e.g., BAT and DAWN) would also reduce the message sizes, making quantum-resistant LAKE more efficiently deployable in these constrained settings. LAKE would be happy to provide further input on this topic and to evaluate candidate proposals from a performance point of view. Kind regards, Renzo Navas on behalf of the LAKE WG P.S.: I cross-post this to some WGs that might be interested in this information. [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-pqsuites/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lake-pqsuites/__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLorinWV0f$> [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-lake-08-pq-edhoc-dt-summary-ietf126presentation-00<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-lake-08-pq-edhoc-dt-summary-ietf126presentation-00__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLotFFIyzJ$> [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-7228bis/<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-iotops-7228bis/__;!!CdLFVIQ!T5EgSD3o3qVsoKUNEONwY6DJt1HiQFaCouQsPUtTCgYIQglH-kAKawM8GYmvXUwQkcmLyXhNrT-U86gDFK-uIJxLosi4nhfq$> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- This communication is the property of Lumen Technologies and may contain confidential or privileged information. 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