Mac,
Below two more articles on U.S. elections. It is not impossible that the long term
trend is a new New Deal of the early 2000's of some type based on California as a
trend state, as it has been in the past. Bush could be a Hoover. In that case, a
strategy similar to the 30's, might be the best bet of the U.S. working class.
Quoting one article : Such a program could help build an emerging liberal majority in
this country. The key elements of this majority would be (1) the Democratic
base--chiefly blacks, Hispanics, and union households but also smaller groups like
Jews with historic ties to the party; (2) socially liberal, upscale, white women,
particularly in areas where the new economy is emerging; and (3) a majority of
midscale-to-downscale white women and a strong minority of their male counterparts,
not particularly socially liberal but attracted to the Democratic Party by its
economic commitments and vision. The results of this election suggest such a majority
is possible, but only with more work on attracting voters from the working middle
class and only with a stronger vision and program for the new economy. If Democrats
can overcome these weaknesses, the general progressive project will be able to make
considerable gains in the next few years. �
Charles
((((((((((((
From: "Ruy Teixeira"
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 20:30:34 -0500
My book, "America's Forgotten Majority: Why the White Working Class Still
Matters", was termed a key influence on the Gore campaign by everyone from
Karl Rove and The Wall Street Journal to Stan Greenberg and The Nation. I
have now written an analysis of the 2000 election and where Gore won and
lost that has just appeared in The American Prospect. It is available
online at:
http://www.americanprospect.org/archives/V11-26/teixeira-r.html
The essay has already been discussed in detail by David Brooks in his essay
"An Emerging Democratic Majority?" which just appeared in The Weekly
Standard.
Lessons for Next Time
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ruy Teixeira
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After trailing for almost all of the last six weeks before the election, Al Gore wound
up the victor in the popular vote on November 7, nosing out George W. Bush 48.6
percent to 48.3 percent. Where did all these Gore voters come from?
First and foremost, they came from the Democratic base. According to the Voter News
Service (VNS) exit poll, blacks supported Gore over Bush by a whopping 90 percent to 8
percent, a margin 10 points larger than the Bill Clinton-Bob Dole margin in 1996.
Hispanics supported Gore 67 percent to 31 percent, and union household members went
for the vice president 59 percent to 37 percent--strong figures, albeit somewhat
smaller margins than in the Clinton-Dole election.
Exit polls suggest that black turnout nationally was about the same as in 1996 (though
certain targeted states like Florida may have had substantial increases). But the
national Hispanic and union turnout was probably higher; poll samples indicate
increased proportions of these voters (7 percent and 26 percent, respectively). It
seems clear that a highly mobilized base was central to Gore's popular-vote victory.
Another area where Gore achieved some success was among highly educated and affluent
white women. Among white women with $75,000 or more in household income, Gore received
8 points more support than Clinton did in 1996, carrying the group 50 percent to 48
percent, whereas Clinton had lost it 42 percent to 51 percent. Remarkably, Gore almost
eliminated the Democratic disadvantage among the most affluent white women--those with
household incomes of $100,000 or more--bringing it down from 18 points in 1996 to a
mere 2 points in 2000. Gore also increased an existing Democratic advantage among
college-educated white women, from 7 points in 1996 to 8 points in 2000. This included
an impressive advantage of 59 percent to 37 percent among white women with a
postgraduate education. Evidently, whatever other problems the Gore campaign may have
had, reaching upscale soccer moms was not one of them.
Finally, Gore managed a mediocre but not disastrous showing among white women from the
working middle class--those of moderate-to-low income and education. Until the
Democratic convention, Gore was running about as poorly among these groups as among
their male counterparts--a showing that would have doomed his presidential candidacy.
Besides mobilizing the Democratic base, the most notable and lasting result of his
postconvention surge [see Ruy Teixeira, "Gore's Tenuous Bond with Working Voters,"
TAP, November 20, 2000] was to elevate his average support among these women to a more
respectable level, roughly from the mid-30s to the mid-40s. Because of this, he
managed to carry the most downscale groups of white women (though with reduced margins
relative to 1996) while keeping it close among midscale white women (though he lost
among these voter groups by varying margins, and the Democrats had won them in 1996).
Of course, Bush practically tied Gore in the popular vote. Where did his support come
from? First, Bush maintained Republican domination among white affluent and highly
educated voters, rolling up a 15 point margin among white voters with $75,000 or more
in household income (matching Dole's margin in 1996) and a 9 point margin among
college-educated whites (somewhat larger than Dole's margin). The key here for Bush
was the overwhelming dominance of men in this group. Affluent white men gave Bush 62
percent of their votes and a margin of 28 points over Gore, up from a 20 point
Republican lead in 1996. Similarly, college-educated white men gave Bush 61 percent
support and a margin of 26 points, up from 17 points in 1996.
But the trends were strongest for Bush among whites of more modest standing. He won
white voters with household incomes under $75,000 by 13 points, compared with Dole,
who lost the same group in 1996 by a point. And he carried noncollege-educated whites
by 17 points, while Dole had lost them by a point. This lead included a strong
performance among white women from the working middle class, despite Gore's comeback
among these voters after the Democratic convention. Among white women with household
incomes below $75,000, Bush held a 2 point lead (up from a 9 point Republican deficit
in 1996), and he carried white women without a four-year degree by 7 points (Dole had
lost the same group by 7 points).
Still, these figures pale in comparison to Bush's most remarkable electoral
achievement: his complete domination of midscale-to-downscale white men. For example,
among white men without a four-year college degree, he received 63 percent support and
a whopping 29 point margin over Gore, up from a mere 7 points for Dole in 1996.
Similarly, Bush carried white men with household incomes under $75,000 by 23 points,
up from an 8 point Republican advantage in 1996. Clearly, Bush was the candidate of
the white working middle class in this election, most especially its male component,
which supported him at landslide levels.
So what explains these patterns? How did Gore do well enough to beat Bush in the
popular vote, but not well enough to prevent Bush from achieving a virtual tie?
Some argue that the election was Gore's to lose and that he was "too much of a
populist," concentrating single-mindedly on programs to help working families. There
are several problems with this line of analysis. First, the timing is wrong. Gore's
best period in the campaign by far was the month after his speech at the Democratic
convention, when his populist profile was sharpest and freshest. And his surge in the
final few days before the election coincided with a renewed emphasis on defending
Social Security against Bush's privatization plan, a key component of his populist
issues package [see Jeffrey Bell and Frank Cannon's instructive article "Gore's
Closing Surge" in the November 27 issue of The Weekly Standard].
Second, "populism"--the mild-mannered Gore version, at least, which consisted chiefly
of attacking a small set of corporate special interests widely detested by the public
and emphasizing Democratic programs to help working families in areas like Social
Security, health, and education--was actually quite popular. A BusinessWeek/Harris
poll taken right after the Democratic convention showed that three-quarters of the
public agreed with Gore's attacks on Big Oil, pharmaceutical companies, and HMOs. And
the VNS exit poll showed Gore winning majorities of the vote on all the issues he
emphasized as part of his populist approach; indeed, among voters who said issues,
rather than "qualities," mattered most, Gore ran up a healthy lead of 55 percent to 40
percent.
A post-election poll conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Research for the Institute for
America's Future fleshes out the picture. The poll shows that core Democratic messages
of investing in Medicare, Social Security, and education rather than a massive tax cut
were more popular among voters than Bush's basic approach. Voters also preferred
Democratic messages of providing prescription drug coverage through Medicare and
standing up to HMOs and drug companies. Further analysis of the poll data reveals that
these Democratic messages were popular not just among the Democratic base, where one
might expect them to be, but also among voters from the white working middle class.
For example, by 60 percent to 32 percent, whites with household incomes under $75,000
preferred the Democratic approach to prescription drug coverage; by 59 percent to 37
percent, they preferred the investment-oriented Democratic plan for the budget
surplus; and by 54 percent to 42 percent, they sympathized with the Democratic message
of standing up to HMOs. Not surprisingly, women from this group were more positive
about these Democratic messages than their male counterparts, but for both men and
women, support for such messages ran 15 to 20 points ahead of their actual support
levels for the Democratic ticket.
Given these data, it seems hard to convict Gore's populist stance and issue focus of
hamstringing his campaign. Rather, his approach clearly helped energize the Democratic
base. It apparently did not turn off the upscale voters, and it had considerable
appeal to midscale-to-downscale white women, whose support was critical to Gore's
electoral chances. One can reasonably argue that the populist themes were not enough
to achieve dominance with these latter voters and, of course, their male counterparts,
among whom Gore was notably unsuccessful despite some sympathy for his issue
positions. But all this suggests that Gore's approach was less wrong than incomplete.
Another criticism raised of Gore's campaign--generally linked to the antipopulist
criticism--is that he didn't run on the achievements of the Clinton administration,
particularly the strong economic growth and rising incomes. The extreme version of
this criticism, usually buttressed by reference to some well-known election
forecasting models, suggests that the economic situation plus Clinton's high approval
ratings should have made it virtually impossible for Gore to avoid winning by a
landslide. Therefore, Gore should have ignored voters' problems and focused almost
exclusively on cheerleading for the administration's record.
Such a stance is not justified by the strength of the academic models, which are
typically based on only a handful of elections. Indeed, economist Ray Fair--whose
forecasting model includes no job approval ratings but goes back much further than the
other models--predicted that Gore would win only a bare majority of the popular vote,
which, of course, is what happened. As Fair put it, in explaining why his model had
such low expectations for candidate Gore: "The economy, while it has been good, is not
the best it's ever been... . [The growth rate] has been higher in previous elections."
So maybe the economy didn't give Gore such a lock on the election, after all. This
seems especially plausible when one factors in the "vice president effect" (the
tendency of sitting vice presidents to get relatively little credit for an
administration's achievements) and the "Greenspan effect" (the tendency of the public
to credit other factors, like Alan Greenspan, more than they do administration
policies for recent prosperity).
Finally, the idea that the Clinton record should undoubtedly have been a strong suit
ignores the undeniable legacy of the Clinton scandals. Being associated with these
scandals--either indirectly, in the case of the Lewinsky incident, or directly, in the
case of the campaign finance difficulties--made it harder for Gore simply to run on
the Clinton record. In fact, nearly two-fifths of voters who gave Clinton a positive
job evaluation but disapproved of him as a person wound up voting for Bush.
Yet even if the economy didn't give Gore quite the lock many thought it would and even
if Gore probably did need to put some distance between himself and Clinton, there is a
reasonable case that he overdid it. Despite these constraints, surely there were ways
to both advocate for working families and claim some credit for past improvements. But
that happy medium seemed to elude Gore, a candidate whose strengths did not lie in
nuanced message development and the ability to tell a compelling story that linked
voters' pasts with their futures.
If populism did not hurt Gore and failure to run on the past eight years was not his
fatal flaw, what does account for the ceiling on his popular support? Here one needs
to turn to problems of trust, cultural conservatism, generic antigovernment sentiment,
and Gore's personal limitations as a candidate. In the Institute for America's Future
poll, distrust--for example, regarding "[Gore's] exaggerations and
untruthfulness"--was strong among all white voters: This difficulty was rooted in the
Clinton administration's problems but was presumably exacerbated by Gore's campaign
style. Qualms based on cultural conservatism--these were chiefly about gay marriage,
abortion rights, and gun control--were notably stronger among noncollege-educated
whites and among those with household incomes under $75,000. In contrast, generic
antigovernment sentiment--"[Gore's] support for federal big government solutions" and
the like--was weaker among these voters, even the men, and stronger among the affluent
and well-educated.
These findings underscore the brilliance of Bush's strategy. By systematically
blurring differences on crucial policy issues--issues where voters tended to favor the
Democrats--Bush was able to bring more personal reactions to the fore. Since Bush also
offered a prescription drug plan, proposed increases in education and health care
spending, pledged to save Medicare and Social Security, and supported a patients' bill
of rights, confused voters might well have chosen the candidate they felt more
comfortable with from the standpoint of trustworthiness, cultural values, or general
feelings about government. And Bush's advisers well knew this.
The Institute for America's Future poll shows just how successful Bush's
issue-blurring strategy was. While voters who could make a distinction tended to favor
Gore's approach in the areas of education, a patients' bill of rights, and
prescription drugs, about half could not see enough difference between Gore and Bush
to form a judgment. Similarly, over two-fifths of voters could not see enough
difference between the candidates' plans to form a judgment on the Social Security
issue. This pattern is consistent with a variety of pre-election polls that showed
Bush narrowing Gore's issue advantage over the last two months of the campaign as he
rolled out his own versions of Democratic programs and emphasized the broad themes of
trust, values, and big government.
These findings on the 2000 election suggest several lessons for the political future.
First, some key Democratic difficulties seem episodic, so the Republicans may not be
able to take advantage of them next time. Will the stars align in the future so the
Republicans can cash in on past Democratic scandals and on a flawed candidate who has
such difficulty handling the trust issue? It seems unlikely.
Second, social issues--gun control, gay rights, abortion--are a problem for the
Democrats. Yet it would be unwise for them to back away from their basic positions on
these issues, which are not only fundamental commitments but are also surely
responsible for a good part of the party's recent success with upscale white women. As
the recent campaign suggests, soft-pedaling these issues, as Gore did in some ways, is
not particularly effective in reaching culturally conservative midscale-to-downscale
white voters, especially men. It's more plausible that these voters need a compelling
reason to overlook their cultural conservatism, a reason this past campaign did not
supply.
Third, there is no good reason for the Democrats to back away from their basic focus
on working families and the economic issues that concern them. This is still where
Democrats need to generate the biggest increment in support--mainly among white
voters--and their approach to education, retirement, and health care appears to be
quite attractive to these voters and, of course, to the Democratic base. What is
needed is not to abandon core Democratic issues but rather to clarify the very real
differences from the Republicans on these issues.
Fourth, while the Democrats should not back away from their core issues, it may be
time to rethink how these issues are approached and emphasized. For example, education
was the issue most cited by voters during the campaign as their chief concern, yet the
Democrats had only a modest advantage of 52 percent to 44 percent on the issue in the
VNS exit poll. Education was also the economic issue (aside from taxes) on which
voters most consistently failed to give Gore's approach much, or any, preference over
that of Bush. So defending and extending social insurance, the Democrats' chief
emphasis in the 2000 campaign, may not be the way to go in the future. While social
insurance must remain a bedrock commitment of the party, it is difficult to argue that
this commitment constitutes a convincing approach to the unfolding problems of the new
economy. For precisely this reason, the Democratic approach may have failed to appeal
to many working families. It may take a more forward-looking approach--one that
focuses on the new economy in critical areas like education, training, child care,
work/family stress, scientific research, and, of course, health and pension
coverage--to convince these voters that Democrats really have a vision for the future
and their families.
Such a program could help build an emerging liberal majority in this country. The key
elements of this majority would be (1) the Democratic base--chiefly blacks, Hispanics,
and union households but also smaller groups like Jews with historic ties to the
party; (2) socially liberal, upscale, white women, particularly in areas where the new
economy is emerging; and (3) a majority of midscale-to-downscale white women and a
strong minority of their male counterparts, not particularly socially liberal but
attracted to the Democratic Party by its economic commitments and vision. The results
of this election suggest such a majority is possible, but only with more work on
attracting voters from the working middle class and only with a stronger vision and
program for the new economy. If Democrats can overcome these weaknesses, the general
progressive project will be able to make considerable gains in the next few years. �
(((((((((((((
Calif. coalitions key to dumping right wing
By Evelina Alarcon
This article is based on a report to the Communist Party USA National Committee Nov.
18.
LOS ANGELES * Republican governors ruled California for 16 years and they gave working
families, racial minorities, women, seniors and youth hell. At the polls, Nov. 7,
Californians gave it back to them.
Gov. George W. Bush used to say, "Don't mess with Texas." On Election Day,
Californians said back to him, "You son of a Bush, don't mess with California."
What occurred in our state was even at a higher level than the labor-led defeat of
Proposition 226, the 1998 paycheck deception measure. Organizing and coalition
building outdid even the work to elect Democrat Gov. Gray Davis.
Working families led the way. Gore beat Bush by 12 points, 53.5 percent to 41.7
percent. In Los Angeles, Gore won 65 percent of the vote.
The day after the election a headline on the front page of The Los Angeles Times said,
"California Elections Profile: Shift toward the left takes firm hold."
It is understandable that they said that because, right down the line, the people of
California kicked the extreme right Republicans up one side and down the other. From
the presidential race, to the Congress, to the state legislature, to the propositions
* California voters stuck it to the extreme right.
A page-three Times headline after the election read, "State Republicans find waking up
is hard to do." The article leads off by saying that "the Republican Party has gotten
many wake-up calls from California voters in recent elections, but last week's should
have bounced it out of bed. Out of bed with the religious right, the gun worshipers
and the polluters."
In the battle for Congress, Southern California had more labor targeted seats than
anywhere in the country. Out of four targeted congressional races with Republican
incumbents, labor and community efforts succeeded in defeating three.
Reps. James Rogan and Steven T. Kuykendahl in Los Angeles and Brian Bilbray in San
Diego bit the dust. Two of the three victors are women.
The Rogan race was an all-out battle to take away a seat in a long-standing Republican
district whose demographics now includes more racial minorities. Rogan couldn't
believe what hit him. He refused to concede election night even though he had lost to
Democrat Adam Schiff by 9 points, 53 percent to 44 percent.
Bilbray's defeat by Assemblywoman Susan Davis in conservative San Diego was also
unexpected. The primary had indicated that Bilbray was vulnerable but only a
tremendous mobilization could topple this well entrenched Republican. This marks a
real turning point for the San Diego labor movement in electoral struggle.
Democrat Jane Harman's narrow victory in the Los Angeles harbor area was a
cliffhanger, but once again labor power made the difference.
On Election Day, the president and executive secretary-treasurer of the State
Federation of Labor, the top leaders of the Los Angeles County federation and a huge
mobilization of local labor leaders and members were in the district because it was so
close. These efforts pushed Harman over the top.
Trade unionist Gerrie Schipske, in the Long Beach area, lost her race against
Republican Congressman Steve Horn by only 1 percent * a little over 1,200 votes. Had
the Democratic Party not pulled out of this race, she certainly would of won. It was
Labor and Latino mobilization that worked a miracle in bringing it this close.
State Senator Mike Honda, a trade unionist, won a congressional seat from San Jose.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein also squashed her opponent, GOP Congressman Tom Campbell.
Democrats gained four seats in the Assembly and now lead the GOP with 33 seats to 19.
In the senate, Democrats gained one seat, just one vote shy of a supermajority, which
can override a governor's veto. This means that Democrats call the shots on
reapportionment in the state with the largest congressional delegation.
A proposition backing school vouchers was overwhelmingly defeated * by 71 percent.
Proposition 36, a measure to provide non-violent drug offenders with drug treatment
and probation rather than prison, passed by 61 percent.
In Santa Monica, a labor-community coalition helped defeat a so-called living wage
measure, which in reality would have restricted the living wage ordinance to 60
workers and prevented the majority of low-income workers from getting it.
Labor, Latinos, African Americans and women were the real champions in California.
They stepped in when the Democratic Party didn't play its role. California women voted
for Gore by an 18 percent margin.
In the three targeted congressional districts in Los Angeles, Latino get-out-the-vote
(GOTV) organizations had a parallel operation to what the labor movement was doing to
turn out the union household vote. African-American organizations had special GOTV
efforts in the inner city and in other African-American communities in the county.
The recent monumental electoral and workplace victories in Los Angeles are because of
the coalition building that the labor movement is doing with the Latino and
African-American community.
In Los Angeles, the Labor Federation not only targeted three congressional districts
but it organized 250 volunteers to help State Sen. Hilda Solis win her congressional
seat by turning out the union household and Latino vote.
SEIU built a labor/community coalition targeting 36,000 Latino immigrant voters. They
also worked in coalition to turn out the African-American vote. The teachers unions
worked day and night to defeat the voucher measure, including involving parents and
the community.
The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor has joined with faith-based leaders and
organizations, with civil rights and immigrant rights group. This brought out over
20,000 people at a rally for amnesty for undocumented workers earlier this year.
The result of labor's coalition efforts is that Gore won Los Angeles County with 65
percent of the vote. Vouchers bit the dust in Los Angeles by 73 percent. Labor
accomplished this while thousands of workers were on strike or engaged in contract
battles. The transit strike, Screen Actors Guild strike and the earlier janitors'
strike helped forge coalitions.
County workers conducted rolling work stoppages all over Los Angeles in their
negotiations. Hotel and restaurant workers fought in downtown L.A. and in Santa Monica.
In the midst of all of this, an official state holiday was won for farm worker leader
Cesar Chavez. While California cannot rest on its laurels, the fight to stop Bush from
stealing the election continues. The labor and people's movement can certainly
celebrate a stupendous job well done in our state.
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