The meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee held on 16 October 1917 was to prove decisive. The committee had agreed six days earlier to stage an insurrection, after much acrimonious wrangling. But only now were the wheels of revolt set in motion. Krylenko's argument that the second revolution had in effect begun seems to have stiffened resolve. According to Krylenko, what had catalysed the situation was the government's planned evacuation of the garrison, citing the threat of a German advance on the capital. This, Krylenko thought, had suddenly resolved the question which had hung over the revolution since February -- how to end the war. Lenin's 'defeatism' was based on the reality that Russia was already defeated. But there was still no guarantee that the Bolsheviks would be able to achieve peace. The question remained of the German attitude to a Bolshevik government. Without an armistice, either the Germans would march unopposed into Russia, or the new government would have to fight, in which case its position might seem scarcely different to the Provisional Government it had overthrown. This argument had been a major drawback for Bolshevik 'defeatism'. Lenin had hoped for war exhaustion to stifle Germany. 'The chances are a hundred to one that the Germans will at least give us an armistice. And to get an armistice would in itself mean to win the whole world.' He also thought that a government which gave land to the tiller and the factories to the workers, might be worth fighting for. If Germany refused an armistice the Bolsheviks themselves could become defencists and would wage 'a truly revolutionary war'. But now the issue had moved from speculation to practicality. General Cheremisov (Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front) had called a conference of soldiers' committees to persuade them to withdraw from Petrograd, claiming this was needed to forestall a German advance. The decision was referred to the Petrosoviet, which decided against transfers. In the CC debate, Krylenko anticipated this outcome, and pointed to its significance: 'It will be argued at the Cheremisov conference that it is necessary for the troops to retreat; we will not be able to make an answer to this but must reply that even if it is necessary, it will not be done because there is no faith in the generals: thus the (German) offensive against us is already a fact and it can be used.' In other words: for the first time, continued hostilities with Germany had become a reason for the Bolsheviks to take power rather than an argument for postponement. For the garrison would no longer defend Petrograd under the command of the Provisional Government, which in any case was more concerned to smash the revolution than the Germans, and which would use the German advance as a cover to ship rebellious troops out of the capital (the army command and the government justified this seeming dereliction on the grounds that the collapse of transport and supply systems was such as to make even an orderly demobilisation a virtual impossibility, let alone continuing the war). By an irony of history, it was now left to the Bolsheviks, those legendary 'defeatists', to save the nation, because the troops would no longer fight for anyone else. Once the crucial decision had been taken, another obstacle appeared, this time a psychological one, as the members of the Central Committee (whose lives for the most part had been a wasteland of police wanted lists) for the first time faced the enormity of what they were about to do: arrest the government. These minutes make poignant reading, and it is easy enough to identify with the anguish of the Central Committee, at a moment when Russia was poised on the cusp of a second, gigantic revolutionary wave. The Minutes of the Bolshevik Central Committee 16 October 1917 continued at: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base/ccmin1.htm _______________________________________________ CrashList website: http://website.lineone.net/~resource_base
