Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2001
From: Tom Graham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Remarks at Wilton Park
David,
Attached is the text that served as the basis for my oral remarks at a
Wilton Park conference on Russian foreign policy last week.
Regards,
Tom Graham
U.S.-Russian Relations
Wilton Park, UK
March 15, 2001
Thomas E. Graham, Jr.
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Washington, DC
It is hardly a secret that U.S.-Russian relations are at one of their
lowest ebbs - if not the lowest - since the end of the Cold War.
Gratuitous anti-Americanism, once confined to the fringe, has in the past
few months become regular fare for the mainstream Russian press, while
Russophobia is increasingly penetrating into American discourse on Russian
developments. Russian leaders have been disturbed by what they see as
excessively harsh or dismissive rhetoric coming out of the new Bush
Administration, while American leaders have been shocked by rhetoric they
find reminiscent of the Cold War coming from the mouths of senior Russian
officials. The appearances of Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey
Ivanov and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at the Munich Conference
on European Security Policy in early February neatly encapsulated each
side's grievances. Ivanov reiterated the canard that NATO's use of depleted
uranium weapons in Kosovo has led to an ecological catastrophe equivalent
to Chernobyl. Rumsfeld, however, did not hear this. He left before Ivanov
spoke, and, in his own remarks, he did not see fit to mention Russia.
Both sides, of course, profess to want to improve relations. And with good
reason: Each side still stands to gain considerably - at least on security
matters - from constructive relations. They would facilitate stabilizing
the Caspian region and the exploitation of potentially significant energy
resources; reinforce the
weakening stability of Central Asia and lessen the risk of great-power
competition there; help manage China's
rise as a major world power; and ease concerns about the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. For Russia,
such relations would also greatly advance the urgent task of rebuilding its
economy.
Improving relations will require an appreciation of how the world is
changing and how that change affects both the United States and Russia.
Such an understanding will illuminate the causes of the strain in their
relations, as well as inform thought on how to repair them. In this light,
let me propose ten thesis.
1. Today's world is not the one we anticipated just a decade or so ago,
and the United States has become the worlds preeminent power by an
unexpectedly wide margin.
In the mid-1980's, talk of America's decline was in vogue. Even those who
disputed that claim did not foresee the preponderant position the United
States enjoys in the world today. There is simply no rival to the United
States across all dimensions of power - military, economic, financial,
cultural - and none looming on the horizon. As a result, the
United States' potential to shape the emerging international order is as
great as it has ever been.
In the mid-1980's, few predicted the impending collapse of the Soviet
Union. While the profound strains and stresses on the system were well
known, the conventional wisdom - even as late as 1989/90 - was that a
reassertion of centralized, authoritarian rule was much more likely than
radical breakdown. Similarly, few foresaw that during the last decade
Russia would suffer a socio-economic collapse unprecedented for a
great power not defeated in a major war.
In Europe, the process of integration has proceeded much more rapidly than
anyone had anticipated. NATO has already expanded, and further enlargement
is on the agenda. The EU is set to take in its first new members from
Central East Europe in the next few years. The EU has moved rapidly from
being a mere trade organization to being a genuine economic, political, and
security community.
In Asia, few predicted Japan's decade of stagnation or India's rapid
growth. There was, of course, much talk of China's emergence as a great
power, but the speed has been exaggerated.
These unanticipated developments mark an extraordinary geopolitical shift,
the consequences of which we are only beginning to grasp. In particular,
Russia's weakness has profound implications, eliminating a force that had
helped discipline the transatlantic community and could have played a
central role in managing China's rise.
2. The Cold War is over.
Some time in the past few years, the Cold War finally came to an end. To
be sure, a decade ago, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the breakup of
the Soviet Union, and the demise of Soviet communism eliminated the
fundamental building blocks of the Cold-War international system. Those
events accelerated the erosion of
bipolarity and reshuffled the relative standing of the various dimensions
of power. The economic dimension, which was truly multipolar with the
United States, several European states, and Japan acting as centers of
power, rose in importance, as the bipolar strategic nuclear one decline.
Even the bipolarity of the strategic nuclear equation was attenuated as the
U.S. and Russian arsenals were reduced and nuclear weapons capabilities
proliferated.
As is the rule in history, however, perceptions lagged behind reality and
practice behind perceptions. While we talked of the post-Cold War, we
continued to operate within its conceptual framework. The United States
and Russia - well into the 1990's - viewed the world through the prism of
relations with one another. In both countries, there was a sense that the
U.S.-Russian relationship would play a decisive role in shaping the
post-Cold War world. That view, however, was predicated on the assumption
that Russia would begin to recover from the multiple ills of its Soviet
inheritance in short order, even if it was clear that full recovery was a
matter of years or decades. That, of course, did not happen.
3. The end of the Cold War, geopolitical shifts, and globalization have
changed the nature of power in the international system to Russia's
disadvantage.
The use of force may remain the ultimo ratio, but its relative importance
has declined, as fewer goals can be best advanced through seizing and
holding territory. Within the realm of force, the role of nuclear weapons
has been radically altered. While possessing them continues to bring
prestige, large arsenals are of little use other than for deterring other
large arsenals or massive conventional attacks. At the same time, a small
number of weapons could prove invaluable, if not to states per se, then to
sub-state actors, such as
terrorist organizations. In short, the fewer, the more useable.
As the role of force has declined, that of other factors - technology,
finances, trade, cultural, etc. - has grown. In the absence of any
plausible scenario leading to a war between great powers, the economy has
become the primary arena of competition and economic prowess the main
factor in determining a country's relative
standing in the world. In addition, globalization has both increased the
power and reach of non-state
actors and decreased states' ability to control activities even with their
own borders.
Unfortunately for Russia, its standing in the world has historically been
based on its military prowess, reinforced during the Cold War by its
ideological appeal, which has since vanished. In economic terms, Russia
has traditionally been a poor country, and the gap between it and the
world's leading powers only widened during the last decade. In short,
Russia has relatively little of what counts most in the world today, and
global developments have further eroded its already weak state structures.
4. Russia does not lie at the center of U.S. foreign policy, nor can it.
As a result of these changes, Russia no longer has the centrality for U.S.
interests it once enjoyed. While it remains an important country - by
reason of its nuclear capability, location in the heart of Eurasia, veto in
the UN Security Council, and rich resources - it must compete for the
United States' attention with other leading countries and regions,
including notably Europe, China, Japan, and India. Moreover, Russia's
importance varies from issue to issue. It has, for example, a central role
to play on proliferation, while its impact on the global economy is
negligible.
In the United States, few disagree with according Russia a lower priority.
The debate rages over where - below first place - to rank Russia and how
intensely to engage it. There are four schools of thought. (1) the "Forget
Russia" school, which would not spend devote much time or energy to Russia
in the belief that it simply does not matter that much any longer; (2) the
"proto-containment" school, which believes no matter what
happens, Russia is bound to be a problem for the United States and
therefore the United States' goal should be to limit the damage Russia can
do to its interests; (3) the "selective engagement" school, which would
engage only on issues of key interest to the United States, largely in the
security realm; and (4) the "broad engagement" school, which advocates
engagement over a wide range of issues in the belief that only such an
approach can restore the levels of trust necessary for progress on those
first-order security priorities.
5. The United States is no longer a status quo power.
Throughout the Cold War it was commonplace to think of the United States as
a status quo power engaged in global competition with a revolutionary
power, the Soviet Union, intent on changing the fundamental nature of the
international system. While the United States has not become a
revolutionary power, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the mounting wave of
globalization, and technological breakthroughs on information,
telecommunications, and biogenetics are revolutionizing the international
system. In other words, there is no status quo to preserve. The challenge
before the United States, as the leading beneficiary of these dramatic
changes, is to use its period of peak power to channel them and shape the
international order in ways that will perpetuate U.S. preeminence and
prosperity well into the future. This will require an overhaul of the UN
system - particularly, the Security Council; new or reformed institutions
to manage the global economy; new methods of dealing with transnational
problems - crime, ecological disasters, epidemic diseases; and a new
framework for strategic stability (The treaty framework that has regulated
U.S.-Russian nuclear relations for the past thirty years is obsolete, if
only because strategic stability - with the inevitable proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction - is no longer simply a bilateral matter).
6. Russia is a backward-looking power.
This is true in two ways. First, acutely aware of its own weakness, Russia
wants to delay the consolidation of a new international system until a time
when it has greater capacity to shape it. It also seeks to slow down
changes that would further erode its standing in the world: This is one
reason for its adamant opposition to any form of national missile defense,
no matter how limited, and insistence on maintaining the treaty
framework. Nuclear parity is its last remaining attribute of great-power
status.
Second, Russian leaders continue to operate with a zero-sum, 19th century
geopolitical or Cold War mindset, insisting that Russia is a major pole
(even if they harbor deep doubts on that score). Putin has spent the last
year seeking to create strategic partnerships capable of eroding America's
preponderance or to divide Europe from the United States. While he has
underscored the need to rebuild Russia's economy, he has moved
aggressively to sell Russian weaponry abroad, in part because this helps
maintain Russia's military capabilities. In this context, trade is a
handmaiden of security concerns.
7. Russia acts as if the United States views the world through the prism of
relations with Russia.
The Russian elites have yet to reconcile themselves to the fact that much
of U.S. policy treats Russia as at best a secondary consideration. This is
true even of the security realm, where Russia counts most in the world.
Russian leaders insist that national missile defense is directed against
them. The reality is that the United States' first concern is rouge states
- North Korea, Iran, and Iraq - with accidental launches from
Russia (resulting from the deterioration of Russian command and control
systems) a lesser concern. NATO enlargement is focused first of all on
promoting democratic development in Central East Europe, bolstering
security, and maintaining the United States' position in Europe; it is not
directed against Russia. Multiple
pipeline routes from the Caspian are about energy security; they are not
aimed first of all at undermining
Russia's presence in the region.
8. There is a gaping and growing asymmetry between Russia and the United
States in power, fortune, attitude, and perceptions.
As a result of the developments of the past decade, American and Russian
elites live in radically different worlds and they are intent on building
radically different ones over the next decade and beyond. The United
States is the world's preponderant power; it exudes optimism and
self-confidence as it looks toward the future; it revels in being
indispensable to world developments; and it believes itself called to lead
in the world. Russia, on the other hand, is a state in decline; it is mired
in self-doubt and an identity
crisis; it fears it is being marginalized; and yet it aspires to be a world
leader. This asymmetry precludes a wide-ranging, substantive relationship
of equals, corrupts communication, and fuels suspicions.
9. Russia matters to the United States more because of its weakness than
because of its strength.
This is perhaps the most radical change of the past generation. A
generation ago, the United States was worried about the great military
capabilities of the Soviet Union wedded to hostile intentions. Now it is
more concerned by the risk of loose nukes, by the deterioration in
Russias capacity to ensure the safety and security of weapons of mass
destruction and the proliferation problems that lessened capacity creates. A
generation ago, the United States worried about Soviet aggression in Europe
and the Middle East. Now it is far more concerned that instability and a
breakdown in governance in Russia could spill over and destabilize its
neighbors, many of which are fragile states themselves. A generation ago,
the United States worried that the Soviet Union's veto in the Security
Council undermined the effectiveness of the U nited Nations. Now it is -
or at least should be - concerned that Russia's weakness, coupled with
growing resentment of the United States, has increasingly tempted it to
circumvent the Security Council in pursuit of its goals. A generation ago,
the United States worried about the implications of the Soviet Union's
economic potential for its military might. Now it is more concerned that
Russias decline could reach levels that would transform Russia into an
object of competition among more advanced economic powers.
10. Improving U.S.-Russian relations requires an approach that is less
ambitious and more practical than the one of the last decade.
The Clinton Administration came to office with grand plans for Russia and
U.S.-Russian relations. The goal was nothing less than a massive
transformation of Russia into - as Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott was wont
to put it - "a normal, modern state - democratic in its governance, abiding
by its own constitution and by its
own laws, market-oriented and prosperous in its economic development, at
peace with itself and with the rest of the world." The Administration
spoke boldly of a strategic partnership with Russia. By the time it left
office, the Administration's policies lay in ruins, and that failure,
coupled socio-economic depression in Russia, fueled the deterioration in
relations we have witnessed over the past two to three years.
The first step in improving relations is restoring the trust that has
suffered so greatly. And doing that requires a more focused agenda. The
United States needs to take into account Russia's diminished capacity to
engage and avoid overwhelming the relationship with secondary and tertiary
issues. Rather, the two countries need to concentrate on those issues
where Russia truly matters and where there is some hope of success. That is
critical to generating and sustaining the public support needed for
improved relations.
-----
I think you will find that much of what I have said reflects the views of
senior Bush Administration officials. Let me end with some thoughts on
what this will mean for the actual conduct of policy.
First, the Administration is not going to treat Russia as a special case.
We have already seen that in the way it has organized itself
bureaucratically. At the National Security Council, the Russia/Eurasia
Directorate was stripped of independent status and subsumed within the
European Directorate. At the State Department,
something similar might happen, although the decision has been postponed.
Such steps should be seen not
so much as downgrading Russia as according it the treatment we do all other
major
countries.
Second, the focus is going to be on security affairs, most notably
proliferation. Russia's domestic transformation will be a second-order
priority. That said, the Administration will be prepared to respond to
Russian initiatives on its domestic economic and political matters if it
believes they make sense, but it is
not going to be deeply involved in giving advice. At the same time, it
will monitor closely the human
rights situation - as the United States has since the mid-1970's; it will
be critical of violations; and it will be prepared to take tough measures
against gross violations, such as Chechnya. It will press for a concerted
campaign against organized crime and corruption, in part because it
believes both jeopardize American interests.
Third, the Administration will be inclined to deal with Russia as part of
clusters of other states, that is, there is very little that the
Administration believes it can resolve by dealing solely or primarily with
Russia. Missile defense, for example, will involve a cluster including
Europe, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and China. Caspian issues will be dealt
with in a cluster that includes Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the states
of the region. Europe will be the primary interlocutor on NATO enlargement,
although Russia will also be a concern.
Fourth, the Administration is persuaded that those issues that appear most
troublesome, namely, missile defense and NATO enlargement, offer in fact an
opportunity to improve relations. In both cases, the Administration wants
to engage the Russians in a discussion of long-range possibilities and
threats. There is
ample room for cooperation, in meeting the challenge of proliferation, in
building missile defenses, and
bolstering Europe's security. But for the promise to be met, Russia will
have to adjust its own approach. That will require, in the first instance,
Russia moving beyond a posture of simply saying "No, never" to missile
defense and of non-acceptance of NATO enlargement. Missile defense and
NATO enlargement are going to proceed no matter what Russia does, and
rejecting them out of hand will do nothing to warm relations with the West.
The more enlightened approach for Moscow would be to work to shape missile
defense and NATO enlargement in ways that advance its own strategic
interests, as well as those of the United States and Europe. There is
indeed some encouraging evidence that Moscow had already come to this
realization on missile defense. Its
recent talk of joint European-Russian missile defenses could be a signal
that it is prepared for serious
discussions about the nature of the threat and ways to meet it. Diplomacy
will play a role, but so will defenses. And the building of defenses would
provide an opportunity to wed U.S., European, and Russian technology in
ways that promote cooperation, eonomic growth, and security for all the
parties involved. Similarly, on NATO enlargement, we need to look beyond
enlargement to the threats that a united Europe and
Russia will face over the next generation, particularly from the south.
Here again, there is ample opportunity for cooperation
In sum, the new Administration wants to improve relations with Russia.
Whether it will succeed depends, of course, on whether Russia is prepared
for serious engagement. And so I want to end with a question for our
Russian colleagues: Does Russia have sufficient confidence in its own
strength to engage the United States
constructively? Or will doubts about its capabilities and wounded pride
lead it to continue to work at
cross-purposes to the United States, as it has in the recent past?
_______________________________________________
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