From: Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> after he began talking about some very curious, very complex, very
> undocumented instruction he discovered in late-model CPU's. Instructions
> that will put the processor into a mode that makes OS protections
> irrelevant.
This is scary. It could be time to hoard antique computers.
> " Protect sensitive investigative techniques and industry trade secrets
> from unnecessary disclosure in litigation or criminal trials involving
> encryption, consistent with fully protecting defendants' rights to a
> fair trial."
> Having just read the proposed bill, what this paragraph refers to is that
> under the proposed bill, LE will be able to enter evidence gathered by means
> of factory-installed backdoors, intrusion, and other means without needing
> to disclose to the defense or the Jury how this evidence was obtained.
But how new is this in real practical terms ?
Suppose an incriminating message is produced in evidence as a set of
ciphertext, plaintext and key.
"We found this on Mr Green's disk, and you can see the files yourselves
on his disk which we've been holding for several months. And he can't
produce an alternative decryption."
"That was not on my disk at or before the moment you seized it."
"What ? It's here visible isn't it ? We have all the forms signed by
officers showing this never left the sealed bag from time X to now."
That conversation seems possible to me even before the recent announcement.
(I could rant about audit trails and the difference between error and
dishonesty in the context of ISO 9000 audits. Many of the auditors I have
met had no idea what was really evidence of (non)compliance and didn't always
understand what they were auditing against.)
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# Antonomasia [EMAIL PROTECTED] #
# See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ #
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