"Arnold G. Reinhold" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > In any case, as I tried to point out before, perfect compression, what > ever it may be, does not prevent a know-plaintext attack. Actually it does: if the compression is perfect with respect to the document model of the attacker, and the plaintext is known, then it compresses down to zero bits so the attacker learns nothing. This supports your main point: perfect compression is a *much* less realistic idea than true randomness! -- __ \/ o\ [EMAIL PROTECTED] /\__/ http://www.cluefactory.org.uk/paul/
- Re: Cryptographic Algorit... Paul Crowley
- Re: Cryptographic Algorit... Kris Kennaway
- Re: Cryptographic Algorithm M... Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metric... Ben Laurie
- Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metric... Greg Rose
- Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics Paul Crowley
- Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics Bill Stewart
- Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics lcs Mixmaster Remailer
- Perfect compression and true randomness Nick Szabo
- Re: Perfect compression and true randomnes... Arnold G. Reinhold
- Re: Perfect compression and true rando... Paul Crowley
- Re: Perfect compression and true r... David Wagner
- Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics burton rosenberg
- Re: Cryptographic Algorithm Metrics lcs Mixmaster Remailer
