As seems universally the case in security design, there must
be ugly tradeoffs. In particular (and without quoting acres
of prior material), the proposed requirements for verifiability
and non-coercibility are at odds and one must yield to the
other. Paper systems make this tradeoff by, on the one hand,
the polling booth (non-coercibility once within) and, on the
other hand, the supervision of the counting process by opponents
(verifiability by proxy), at a cost of zero technology. Bettering
this in the real world is challenging.
--dan
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as used here
verfiability
-- voter may verify that his vote counted as he intended it to count
non-coercibility
-- voter cannot be compelled to show how he voted, during or after
proposition:
If the voter can verify, then he can be coerced to do so.
contrapositive:
If voter cannot be coerced, then he cannot verify.
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