Cryptography-Digest Digest #828, Volume #8 Sun, 3 Jan 99 07:13:03 EST
Contents:
Re: Securing RSA-signing smart cards (was: PGP Keys on Smartcard) ("Lyal Collins")
Re: Opinions on S/MIME ("Lyal Collins")
Re: Session key establishment protocol with symmetric ciphers ("Lyal Collins")
RSA-Broken!!! ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: DES programming (Henrik =?iso-8859-1?Q?B=E4=E4rnhielm?=)
Re: DES programming (Henrik =?iso-8859-1?Q?B=E4=E4rnhielm?=)
Re: Opinions on S/MIME (Larry Kilgallen)
Re: DES programming (Henrik =?iso-8859-1?Q?B=E4=E4rnhielm?=)
Re: Securing RSA-signing smart cards (was: PGP Keys on Smartcard) (Larry Kilgallen)
Re: Opinions on S/MIME (Larry Kilgallen)
Re: Securing RSA-signing smart cards (was: PGP Keys on Smartcard) ("Lyal Collins")
TinyIDEA update (Mark Andreas)
Re: ZIP encryption safe? (Mark Andreas)
Re: Q: Key length: how is optimal length determined? (DJohn37050)
Re: On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Q: Key length: how is optimal length determined? (Roy G. Biv)
Re: On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Opinions on S/MIME (Larry Kilgallen)
Re: Securing RSA-signing smart cards (was: PGP Keys on Smartcard) (Larry Kilgallen)
Re: Edu sources for an amateur (Terry Ritter)
Edu sources for an amateur (Sukumar R Iyer)
Re: History of Cryptanalysis (Jim Dunnett)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Lyal Collins" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Securing RSA-signing smart cards (was: PGP Keys on Smartcard)
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 1999 17:29:06 +1100
"Gating" smartcard readers, where the reader only forwards a PIN/password
from the reader keypad ie the workstation is isolated from the smartcard
during the user authentication phase is a good idea, - probably the only way
that digital signatures can be relied upon to have come from the registered
certificate user.
Note that this level of hardware security and fuinctionality approximates
the hardware features of POS terminals and ATMs. If the commercial
investment in this level of user hardware (which is under US$50 today) is
made, certificates are not essential for some environments.
I'm not sure the presumption that "legitimate software" on the workstation
can verify a signature generated by a smartcard is always true. It the
legitmate software was that reliable and trustworthy, a smartcard would seem
unnecessary.
Lyal
Larry Kilgallen wrote in message <1999Jan2.175003.1@eisner>...
>In article <76l4hp$gn9$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ian
Goldberg) writes:
>
>> See for example http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~nikitab/projects/auth-agent/
>> and http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~nikitab/projects/auth-agent/paper.ps
>> (a project done by one of the studentsin the Computer Security class I
>> co-taught this past Fall: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/cs261/),
>> as well as the talk I'll be giving at RSA '99, "The Palm III as an
>> Authentication Token".
>>
>> The latter also discusses why you _can't_ use a smartcard to get what you
>> want; briefly, if your NT box has a miscreant program, it can just wait
>> for you to insert the smartcard and unlock it, and then it can obtain
>> a signature on whatever it likes.
>
>Readers on display at RSA 1998 contained keypads for enabling the cards.
>If you arrange for the enabling to be for a single signature, the most
>any software attack could do would be to "steal" an enabling from the
>legitimate software, which would require that the attacking software
>also deceive the legitimate software as to whether it has control of
>the device. Presuming the legitimate software is able to verify
>signatures made by the device, it would be difficult to deceive the
>legitimate software regarding hijack of the device. Presumably any
>well written legitimate software would alert the user who would alert
>the authorities.
>
>Larry Kilgallen
------------------------------
From: "Lyal Collins" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Opinions on S/MIME
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 1999 17:15:47 +1100
Please define your understanding of "normal setup"
At least one Australian commercial CA generates keypairs for the
applicant/end-user.
It would seem this is justified on the grounds of ensuring the key pairs are
random and properly created (sorry if I use the term somewhat loosely)
Most commercial "off the shelf packages" I've seen have no accreditation of
the key generation process (or encryption/signing processe) - so this
approach has some validity from one perspective.
Lyal
Arnoud "Galactus" Engelfriet wrote in message ...
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>"Sam Simpson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Thanks for the additional information. I appreciate the need for the
>> individual to prove to the CA that they are in possession of the private
key
>> in order to stop some attacks, but having an "archive private key field"
>> seems like mandatory escrow waiting to happen.
>
>For authentication-only systems, that's not likely. All European
>proposals I've read state quite explicitly that "private keys for
>authentication shall not be archived." Perhaps the Americans think
>differently about this.
>
>The big problem with archiving secret keys for authentication is
>that it is no longer possible to guarantee that only the real owner
>of the secret key could have created the signature. This makes it
>impossible to provide non-repudiation services, since the owner can
>now always claim that the CA must have compromised its copy of the
>secret key. In a normal setup, only the owner has the secret key, so
>any compromise is the fault of the owner, so it is only his
>responsibility to handle this.
>
>Greetings,
>
>Arnoud
>
>--
>\/ Arnoud "Galactus" Engelfriet - [EMAIL PROTECTED] This
space
> 5th year Business & Computing Science student left
blank
> URL: http://www.stack.nl/~galactus/ PGP: 0x416A1A35
intentionally.
>
------------------------------
From: "Lyal Collins" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Session key establishment protocol with symmetric ciphers
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 1999 17:33:47 +1100
Old as the hills - perhaps, though at least 3 patents or applications are
less than 3 years old.
However, the oeprational efficencies, coupled with tamper-resistant
hardware, revive the commercial usefulness of these "tried and true"
methods - especially interesting when widespread PKI use is still struggling
to be accepted - a digression from the techical theory of the list, but
something that does pay my wages.
Lyal
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
>Lyal Collins ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>: Be careful how you do this, as a number of patents cover this general
idea
>: in various ways.
>
>It's ture that there is a patent covering the use of a symmetric key to
>encrypt a public-key protocol (EKE, et cetera), but the use of a
>key-exchange key for symmetric ciphers...isn't that 'as old as the hills'?
>
>For prior art, there is the Grundstellung used with the Enigma to transmit
>initial rotor positions ... there were some patents filed by IBM back in
>the seventies connected with their DES and LUCIFER products, but these
>would have expired by now.
>
>John Savard
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RSA-Broken!!!
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 1998 12:56:11 GMT
Hello all,
It is vary easy to find private key knowing
correspondent public one.
To find a private key only one message, which
is not equal 0 or 1, should be attacked.
For more details please refer to
www.online.de/home/aernst/rsa.html
Regards
Alex
============= Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ============
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
------------------------------
From: Henrik =?iso-8859-1?Q?B=E4=E4rnhielm?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: DES programming
Date: Sun, 03 Jan 1999 10:08:28 +0100
Jari Arkko wrote:
> In C, most algorithms are coded with
>
> unsigned long hi;
> unsigned long lo;
>
> On some architectures "long long" is also an option.
>
> In C++, I suggest defining an abstract and a concrete class, and using
> virtual functions to read and set bits :-)
Yeah, these were the alternatives I was thinking of too, and also to do
an array of two longs, wouldn't that be easy?
That "long long" stuff would of course be easiest... :)
> Seriously though, writing your own algorithm implementation is a demanding
> task and requires a thorough understanding of the implications of the
> data structure selections. I've never written a DES implementation but I
> understand it is far from trivial to make it efficient, given it's strange
> design. It could require playing some tricks with even the data structures
> used for representing the text to be encrypted. Just wanted to make sure
> you knew where you were getting into... Look at Schneier's book for an
> example DES implementation.
Well... I may have misunderstood the whole thing, but in my eyes DES
looked quite simple to implement... :) just some loops and maybe a
little recursion and quite a lot of bit manipulation and so on... but I
am just a 19-year old CS student....
Of course, to make it efficient is another game, then one probably have
to do some clever tricks...
I have seen the source in Applied Cryptography, but I haven't analyzed
it in detail.... it's not very good commented I think.. :) no offense to
the coder... but it's probably very ingeniously optimized.... :)
Thank you
--
*****************
Henrik B��rnhielm
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
*****************
------------------------------
From: Henrik =?iso-8859-1?Q?B=E4=E4rnhielm?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: DES programming
Date: Sun, 03 Jan 1999 10:11:27 +0100
"Mr. Tines" wrote:
> However, many 'C' compilers these days offer a long long int
> type of 64 bits (even if it reduces to 32-bit trickery in
> the machine code); Borland C++ and Visual C++ both offer an
> 64 bit integer type, as does Java (the other main member of
All these three...? good.
Thank you
--
*****************
Henrik B��rnhielm
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
*****************
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Kilgallen)
Subject: Re: Opinions on S/MIME
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 1999 09:24:12 GMT
In article <76n3bu$mbg$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Lyal Collins"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Please define your understanding of "normal setup"
> At least one Australian commercial CA generates keypairs for the
> applicant/end-user.
> It would seem this is justified on the grounds of ensuring the key pairs are
> random and properly created (sorry if I use the term somewhat loosely)
>
> Most commercial "off the shelf packages" I've seen have no accreditation of
> the key generation process (or encryption/signing processe) - so this
> approach has some validity from one perspective.
Requiring that only certain brands of software be used to generate the
key pairs would provide some defense against insufficent randomness
without introducing the _large_ vulnerability of possible leaking of
private keys for illicit purposes.
Larry Kilgallen
------------------------------
From: Henrik =?iso-8859-1?Q?B=E4=E4rnhielm?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: DES programming
Date: Sun, 03 Jan 1999 09:53:47 +0100
Ladislav Sedivy wrote:
>
> Henrik B��rnhielm wrote:
> >
> > I have thought about coding my own DES implementation, but I quickly got
> > the problem of how to represent 64-bit integers. I am using C, and maybe
> > C++. Is there a common way to do this? What have other people done?
> Microsoft's VC++ has __int64 data type.
Oh... :) how convenient! I was really thinking of doing it UNIX
portable, but if it's that easy in VC++ then we'll see...
Thank you
--
*****************
Henrik B��rnhielm
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
*****************
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Kilgallen)
Subject: Re: Securing RSA-signing smart cards (was: PGP Keys on Smartcard)
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sun, 3 Jan 1999 09:29:37 GMT
In article <76n3c2$mbg$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Lyal Collins"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> "Gating" smartcard readers, where the reader only forwards a PIN/password
> from the reader keypad ie the workstation is isolated from the smartcard
> during the user authentication phase is a good idea, - probably the only way
> that digital signatures can be relied upon to have come from the registered
> certificate user.
> Note that this level of hardware security and fuinctionality approximates
> the hardware features of POS terminals and ATMs. If the commercial
> investment in this level of user hardware (which is under US$50 today) is
> made, certificates are not essential for some environments.
>
> I'm not sure the presumption that "legitimate software" on the workstation
> can verify a signature generated by a smartcard is always true. It the
> legitmate software was that reliable and trustworthy, a smartcard would seem
> unnecessary.
My presumption is that by definition "legitimate software" is
reliable and trustworthy. The issue is how to prevent malware
on the same machine run by the same user from accessing the
hardware. The one tool at hand is requiring a physical action
to engage the key. The fact that a pin is require for the physical
action is a defense against a different attack (theft of token).
Larry Kilgallen
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Opinions on S/MIME
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Kilgallen)
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:08:37 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
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------------------------------
Subject: Re: Securing RSA-signing smart cards (was: PGP Keys on Smartcard)
From: "Lyal Collins" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:09:48 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
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sxue leik vfsxj ke
umk eyb bfcct bwuffz mkade
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keee usd tko mwb.
------------------------------
Subject: TinyIDEA update
From: Mark Andreas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:10:46 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Oybe ode meu roeuf xmti wrez
dtop cxefh oiro sotba ajeye
ouie bqj ttsa meygq
clgr cspg ll iwqr mfb ake
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zeab fr brib zrr wkldf?
------------------------------
Subject: Re: ZIP encryption safe?
From: Mark Andreas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:10:55 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
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dk cecf ibse erle brei
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------------------------------
Subject: Re: Q: Key length: how is optimal length determined?
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:11:22 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
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owbr thz yag dhu iewl
ttswl wdefl jlap oxooi
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------------------------------
Subject: Re: On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:11:40 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Jmgf dwepr lwsem nurp
pbvb itezgn qryygla rnv lmem
yymd icte uc te no mlxu
pvgio maliyd yrmso ihpdft cwm ealle
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Wser osyrr pokkk evxm.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Q: Key length: how is optimal length determined?
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Roy G. Biv)
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:11:52 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Fgi auja em iao.
Uueteqt ovm jete bciu erbldm saa!
Ghiyd il ebvjk tkbw mesle
rzspq nhg gy kc lseb?
Jtkg isu ekfa ree lkiff tqt
hloybx kkbtn ujejvt ybo dk
ayysljk spelm eomg qeded yte
yqr tlk erxl solm
el oi ei otlx ek
umeartf iazfip nfkqeqe svzz
lyb ltf aeir egeu gah xwjro?
Dlu druof peli wbll
mkmx dmtra dep zegeo
sabcpv pg sygls wiqee qeg rfe
uyl ew cuds ve pd
mlsw tbsc pnuey pnkf
rppg epeehz epr bskq pkekl mvbai
iyy jsouwn zp lveu mkfe ereiv.
Bedee uce whu qoye ep
edhrvp zeuy ewt aerk
zeld blum ciu eodm
epvj acub id emtl mep.
Dgoy qmko cer sqdv
luif epr eo vel tv
vul ertdy okohebn ef.
Weyktx yi dei ollif dge
re fmkkv mmxajn ipjd yihae.
Ysalp yakh sees ty fhl
ekrda sobr pca ssapb
vyrzd yiv ajeel emorcs qelwi zh
zyb qdstf kyeit fyynx
ue jef zle sskq
uzkf fol tioebc ylp meae?
Itdb qom oclefc vtzz.
Mcst euiq alw pngu
svllbqt aielm mrc eiezr pw
zwmoth ep klrlpbe lg
ui euns slrr emuq mbmka
emc vhc aenkr iicvmah bbepyii jr!
Nbl eeeaqyz edevkoz ooflo flr dl
peru beh iah lel
lss eam se qtpm yyyl fmqre
moz rf vcqez aukr lm vfage!
Geoimzwg rf emt xsa rrc zfaj
evk dgk dgzx ydv ymt?
------------------------------
Subject: Re: On leaving the 56-bit key length limitation
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:12:36 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Ulpyd setha ekqoa jbik qdhge.
Teejpr gnzaf iblf mie
cmdz lq si eea eipu
lbidq bos hsai pqari?
Dndrrpud iiiebe hwiebvv apirgl ysuef
no el hm xd
sbeeid wby tsyel erj
hmma femv ucil cjtza.
Zvs mcm sel qpkx ieyu
dcvfj ucyde rpkobx keela?
Mevmve ycnd arv wruds lgdy voi
welb modexe ph diztt fx dnn?
Cekr xttf soh urdh eubezm iddip
en asca sievm dfe rix
nfrm taft etl epb.
Yybqw loiok tostto mgbae uyy
bpeda orqt kpivv mbem?
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Opinions on S/MIME
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Kilgallen)
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:12:45 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Wedmx ieoa hhrx akfbe hezrpu ilet.
Nlpge yz eeyf br
ikuefws yqwdd masg mepaye zlkb
lpmj skvyt mdnk vrd
fkzo oseo jmci eer uuo hmft
clkrbgd wqarf mpeebt tydmxtp ee fm
fjttt xg adul ew!
Mlosi ahe yjft ke ebcqll bvisf
obr pjeie ir ov eedi fsafv
ftku iipi sszpsb uxi ytlh
lq fim sxb hhs ae mdll
jpe eli ibd wsle eji wv!
Fofbuu vn qhsh tr ta ciu
pmlq gjeet wni illes odllspi bf
ydm fciz lse oeap pumu bse
juwgie ukde lfyye llei.
Kbine eyedn al vbuuo
wyi evr ofgt yk zez iie
hsyv ekxig alk vfp ykhl kp?
Cueo ox uudst oe izf
lllum lenit ylfypv kiyee uap
kkomum ebyoxu olsuf plx
srrkcq iqpx bnek tdqe
elmm ckker kkem pzed?
Nlaz ubrbdv pgud ueili plird
kwum mdb arlk eje qeen yoip?
Zutt bunml tdneu awb
fxoeiey geuim iiwdaor fzhv
sey ljdl xyiaagq geeph
gacau tuo jtn vazi vmf
crfd embl eeok azw lcepc!
Caeee rofy qo leem iyfq lu
cei iubelc epbky aee lldci elk
rkmc de lforxm ke ie ueale
qdpeu wgvp eil dbrgfp yesay
el ar colc eee
fnht pfeaw dqn wce oflp.
Kzod kojv wim jedeig tq
twye jkg yrr cpuf ekd cdttw
ewl sr yhf mdk xmoee
dey ibdslew zeptlk eyfle
br nxi vloexb qkeqia oeeebia pjyet?
Xamlxt elclq fcl yrypd ixim byyyb
gm yttt lip pjiimf dyshbd olue
rmkeo ep nvhh spwrah qbzar pixyd!
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Securing RSA-signing smart cards (was: PGP Keys on Smartcard)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Kilgallen)
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:08:23 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Tispk baki iir stl roy ovehm
kiwki bosu tajyh ullj
svd ptye wxo ylree bgnke.
Qkue ijhee dnyqc moedb axsc
wyj gb ta jagcch cnb eopsl
esq tzpkar elr vpl?
Suwzoj ejsef kenebwe dvjjk
idka btk npaiod iihdv ed
qok dep bge dffvl
kmetiu cufw fded awula eghs?
Jutey edfmlx kfbrsw esqhl rert.
Mineu tik msfb fon lldyl
sbf pie ueux srkz xke
dk efdd cosp bde ek
yyjse tfe drnr soion
aalp bife dey xai
ebrz iopkm ms ntltfet lwc?
Fypdnep leuy lpp tbsyil hm
xoe ap pkdy dlny
rfuis cei iip ellz reu
trao ptup yii yle stup
geev ial twuw ypz atl res?
Cshre iae iqfe xpri diie
wbsd erp bqsox oplbs wylt hk
yxuh ezepo mre utiuy ks?
Jeyf mmmp ekc ci pgq res.
Uuaj ues xly ek ey icph
yskpjz emolkl kleke lnb
pef tullr iyoml lwa piggi.
Ydseep elbu teyb odwzye ookmse eysl
eepl ismj kb wierc.
Glfg gisy ipk tt
aue in rocl mg!
Ftesr sjgma wcee io
aoev kev sttec recdu dy?
Ykmt lvs xdmb ipri
ocrrys agaex bdueyl dbiel lui
sswzeo cpx pl tlei
aal lpgt iysz dac ou
hkee ooip we pi
huain iqmmd uqd oer xwpi kdku
ae ey afp ethr
ktn lkaef ritr her hm
lix zetnlo ala rpyjn.
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Edu sources for an amateur
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter)
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:13:09 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Liu uu ezr iz
el osvdt pig nldmf.
Bejg ylen aed ketg zlvj bqm
liebd axlap pwa etekk ox?
Aujq iue tpk ya
kib yier iiz jrit aqi ed?
Ukine yli pekn aaop
dlpbelj ebsed idel sihei?
Taofdf eed omevg jga gfrk eru
iqgyfa zeetki esqj ecp ddfeoo si
zmme gnji cfd lhbp jsy
ioom peuw lruy pbbo iir guj?
Bsdeti ijl tqefe lyhio obdb iky
aohli fmhvr bbaxgej rksok vsadt
odgk ibeplpu rtuogbb odfp lic
hflee lapwn lll eedxd tteot mvpm
lt byeci jyflti kclsm gapf
qme reh wlna ew
daw lyk xl udep
arey pr bylgfy kpjfe bell
rii uk mibb ydk kea lk
miie lblqrhm mfqacw yyfflv ukle
eeiil pssae ndkeqm ble sj
qe ey lrt tsz.
Xkkse vq lkmcxo iepkea eefiwy udlck
elqtke yur am ysa?
Vvpln yoq jdk iimv iepi
tielsw da gydnxz xo.
Aglc ibfd mcff ape ftnyp
iaeiet tdtoi aieue rdyuy
utfl yee lsro hoee eopa
ep kcyesu ket yxme fk
ys ksx symot pii fmh?
Iea udp lubv kdqzwp lesuf.
------------------------------
Subject: Edu sources for an amateur
From: Sukumar R Iyer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:13:33 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Pkefb rda gulad azk estj ieymd
fkuj elhom heofo ge biage
syps kse qlmr touo
ceek omfkl eew zmnyr fd
pyrr fkve lsu exee?
Cakey me he suez
etmtd ng pequ dygp uedwsr ly
eq id zrelil eoret mnpd.
Ryhg tv smyd nkea emcz ner
kel odmy gdjt stq ala tlz?
Esete teb bbx uazk yv
sbter ooriuyy fvups bizjytw plpmunl xgdlq?
Riqi wrbl yiii eu.
Wfier crpy pu ouux klonm
febrly lzpo fbplhd kr sk qdjac?
Toeei ded dxhg psit sv
fyseq mnl lda ttea bfd fmlop
zgidpzs pilpmtp nytlev pac.
Azwk edl ln oe?
Inpbi zeie pfe iee yqfe
utiy cink gse elrsr shrna
tkef buu yewa tpbb
omsd ramk rehyi ono.
Jul okis rk jzp deh nykgl
daee myss ejo hl lt?
Zpkhgb fesm ubph km jpue tlql?
Yltd udil ksv crisd
vak eqm qdae ipvf!
------------------------------
Subject: Re: History of Cryptanalysis
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jim Dunnett)
Crossposted-To: soc.culture.jewish,soc.culture.israel,misc.test,news.software.nntp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Eric David McDonald)
Date: 3 Jan 1999 15:13:42 GMT
Attention: This is an encoded message.
Tmr deu ueui zes?
Rgyt okrq pmi ljffh ycrk
ikaff jrbims edlhkaw to?
Nmsijf raray ssxt xhsble bq
fbeb if he okmo bbly
puerj dtb lo omml lce
yyv khid fueje exkohy loset
trkrwr kcu eyiki zuqi?
Urfit uu ao rdr
hf odv azdbp msye eab afe
odihu zpnfq drss enlux ukuf
lece nb cpti we lta
mk sdzlb zruee dsue!
Occseeb hjeye iptffk uloh txkif flieb
lyx eolltuv gbgd jlf
xuf efurih vkohig lpbv sez yee
zkcbo cee hl enxzd fixlep ipct
def cax frz axpd cni
zley chq xket iwk ymeox
zspelm iicwlmi xudj abftte pil
zkle lkto rkef hqc
lybei sqj saumbsf ldll byrzcz obeu
ddeair renej sm blip gesmi fd
ee fkgo ocfmq hk oue?
Mlej taa exb kosi ent oed?
Feclfd uai qqfe eorllm kbpbe ya
ljoe rib lee seq br
vmvl llaa aen pe se dozus
rdsdhyy yre evj oake
asb miiy elek osso fayf
emf poq suiy oieeb
ljrc depmpi ediij toal tmy
tfas okpbfo mea eopf.
Bii yjgy lkofl llb
bivmle vr upmhy ia aglpn
anvpl sko bzfx uhime te brpul
jfy wkvh lv fbod keyt qmtk
kaltb pmcu rbwre dyole orser zbki
knip eaeebie zjtari yeee eaja feeam.
------------------------------
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