Cryptography-Digest Digest #131, Volume #9 Wed, 24 Feb 99 12:13:04 EST
Contents:
Re: Define Randomness (Patrick Juola)
Re: True Randomness (Herman Rubin)
Re: Define Randomness (Herman Rubin)
Re: Define Randomness (R. Knauer)
Re: Define Randomness (Patrick Juola)
Re: True Randomness (R. Knauer)
Re: True Randomness (R. Knauer)
Re: Testing Algorithms (Patrick Juola)
Re: Block cipher in the smallest PIC (Bruce Schneier)
Re: Quantum Cryptography (R. Knauer)
Re: What do you all think about the new cipher devised by a 16 year old? (Robert
Scott)
Re: Define Randomness (R. Knauer)
Re: Define Randomness (R. Knauer)
Re: Testing Algorithms (fungus)
Re: Randomness of coin flips (Herman Rubin)
Re: True Randomness (Herman Rubin)
REVIEW: "Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Michael Rosing (Rob Slade,
doting grandpa of Ryan and Trevor)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: Define Randomness
Date: 24 Feb 1999 09:23:07 -0500
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
R. Knauer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>On Tue, 23 Feb 1999 23:05:32 -0500, Nicol So <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>wrote:
>
>>Equal probability of outcome is not necessary for randomness. Even a
>>source with a very skewed distribution of outcomes can be random--it
>>just has less entropy.
>
>That all depends on what kind of randomness you are talking about.
>Some kinds of random numbers must be normal in the Borel sense,
>therefore there can be no skew.
>
>But I agree with you that there can be numbers produced by a TRNG that
>are highly skewed. In fact, if you filter such numbers out, then your
>TRNG has lost some of its ability to produce unbreakable ciphers.
You're confusing generator skew with sequence skew again.
>BTW, what does it mean to speak of a given number having an entropy.
>Randomness and entropy both apply to the process by which numbers are
>generated, not the actual numbers themselves.
The point is that a *generator* can be skewed (I prefer the term
'bias', but they're largely equivalent) and still be random.
As an example : suppose I have a bit-generator that works like this :
I roll a die ("randomly") and output a zero if the result is a six,
a one otherwise.
This isn't a very good generator (it's biased), but it's still
random. And the entropy of this generator is less than the entropy
of a generator consisting of a fair coin.
-kitten
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Herman Rubin)
Subject: Re: True Randomness
Date: 24 Feb 1999 09:20:39 -0500
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
R. Knauer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>On Mon, 22 Feb 1999 09:19:37 -0700, "Tony T. Warnock"
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>If they don't know these terms, they could look them up. They are rather common.
>That's strange - I do not recall seeing either term in Li & Vitanyi's
>book. I wonder if it is in Feller's book.
It is not usual to have statistical terms in a probability book, although
maximum likelihood might be found there.
Hidden Markov models are far too recent to be in Feller's book.
And even later probability textbooks might not have this.
--
This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views
are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University.
Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907-1399
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Herman Rubin)
Subject: Re: Define Randomness
Date: 24 Feb 1999 09:24:22 -0500
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Tony T. Warnock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Actually, the future positions (and momenta) of the balls often depends in a
>chaotic way on the initial conditions. It is possible (I haven't done the
>computations.) that the initial conditions must be known so accurately that
>quantum effects obtain. That is to say, if you have to know the initial
>conditions to a greater degree of accuracy than QM allows, even large
>systems can show random behavior. A simple example would be to have a ball
>(the usual perfect weightless, frictionless, odorless, shameless, particle)
>bouncing back and forth in a 1 dimensional space 1 meter long. If the ball's
>velocity is 1 meter per second with an uncertainty of 1 part in 10000, then
>by the next day one cannot say where the ball is. The same for an
>uncertainty in position.
I remember a physicist stating that a perfectly round and perfectly
elastic ball bearing, dropped from its own height onto another "dead
center", would have an expected number of hits of the bearing on the
bottom less than 4, due to quantum effects. They cannot be ignored
for macroscopic events.
--
This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views
are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University.
Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907-1399
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: Define Randomness
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 13:28:19 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Tue, 23 Feb 1999 20:38:24 -0800, Anthony Stephen Szopa
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> You know, I was reading this thread and I had an interesting thought. If
>> naturally occurring phenomenon are random, and they repeat periodically,
>> such as in the adage about history, then shouldn't 'crypto-grade randomness'
>> actually be something completely different than randomness?
>Who passed this law that "naturally occurring phenomenon are random?"
I think the poster was referring to certain Quantum Mechanical
processes, like radioactive decay.
Bob Knauer
"Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they
want, and deserve to get it good and hard."
--H.L. Mencken
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: Define Randomness
Date: 24 Feb 1999 10:04:13 -0500
In article <7b13hs$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Alan DeKok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>R. Knauer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> A PRNG is a process that calculates
>> pseudo-random numbers algorithmically from some initial state.
>> A TRNG is a process that is capable of generating all possible finite
>> sequences equiprobably. It is known that algorithms cannot be TRNGs
>> (von Neumann).
>
> As a physicist, I'll have to call you on this topic.
>
>Q: When is an algorithmic PRNG identical to a TRNG?
>
>A: They're identical when you are unable to distinguish the two.
>
>>But conducting statistical tests on their output does not certify that
>>they are crypto-grade. You have to use them to make test ciphers and
>>then try to break those test ciphers. If the test ciphers withstand
>>such attacks, you might have some confidence that they cannot be
>>broken. But that depends on your intended usage of the system. If you
>>use it too much, you need to test it some more.
>
> And from Chaitin, there is no one method by which to determine the
>difference between a PRNG and a TRNG. So *any* tests are necessarily
>incomplete.
Possibly incomplete. But the incompleteness is largely theoretical
when you're talking about design analysis.
There's a big difference between inspecting the design of a generator
and examining only the output sequences produced by a generator.
It's reasonable to claim that "an indistinguishable difference
doesn't make a difference." But you can't then go on and define
an acceptable set of methods for distinguishing.
-kitten
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: True Randomness
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 15:14:23 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 24 Feb 1999 08:58:37 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
wrote:
>Um, Li and Vitanyi doesn't have everything about probability theory;
Um, Li & Vitanyi's book most certainly has a considerable amount about
probability. In fact, they assert that Kolmogorov's theory is all
based on probability theory.
You need to revisit that book. Apparently it has been several years
since you last read it. Try the 2nd edition - it may be different from
the one you first read. Go to the index and see how much probability
theory there is. Just the list of references to Feller is monumental.
Bob Knauer
"Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they
want, and deserve to get it good and hard."
--H.L. Mencken
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: True Randomness
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 15:16:13 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 24 Feb 1999 09:20:39 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Herman Rubin)
wrote:
>It is not usual to have statistical terms in a probability book, although
>maximum likelihood might be found there.
>Hidden Markov models are far too recent to be in Feller's book.
>And even later probability textbooks might not have this.
What book(s) do you recommend for these two concepts?
Bob Knauer
"Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they
want, and deserve to get it good and hard."
--H.L. Mencken
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: Testing Algorithms
Date: 24 Feb 1999 08:46:28 -0500
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Trevor Jackson, III <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Steven Runyeard wrote:
>
>> >There's no garantee that this growth rate will continue. In fact
>> >everything points to the opposite.
>>
>> No, there is no quarantee of this. There is also no quarantee that the
>> speed of light will be a barrier.
>>
>> You are basing your calculations on the assumption that CPU speeds
>> will stop increasting. So far the trend has been a doubling around
>> every 1.5 years. I remember back in 1985 being told that my 1 MIP CPU
>> is about as fast as we can possible get because of 'physical
>> barriers'. Today we have CPUs that can run 2,000 times faster. Have we
>> got to that barrier yet? No, I don't think so.
>>
>> This whole thing comes down to speculation. As far as you're concerned
>> we are going to reach a ceiling in computer performance. I, on the
>> other hand think we will not. If there is money in it Intel will find
>> a way of making a faster CPU.
>>
>> It's your guess that we won't crack a 256 bit key. It's my guess that
>> we will. Each guess is just as valid.
>
>No. The guess is only as valid as the assumptions it is based upon.
>Since you have based yours on nothing concrete, your guess is pretty
>useless. If you specify any level of technology less than divine you will
>find limits. Those limits will control the size of a key that can be
>broken with that technology in a reasonable amount of time.
On the other hand, if you specify any length of technology less than
divine, you run a grave risk of finding technology outstripping
your specifications.
I don't think there's a clear cut "smart" set of specifications.
-kitten
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Schneier)
Subject: Re: Block cipher in the smallest PIC
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 15:19:51 GMT
On 24 Feb 1999 10:30:47 -0000, Paul Crowley
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>It sounds like you want this: Gideon Yuval, "Reinventing the Travois:
>encryption/MAC in 30 ROM bytes", Proceedings of Fast Software
>Encryption Workshop 1997. This system, designed for the 8051, uses an
>eight-byte key and whatever program you happen to blow into the rest
>of the PIC as an extra source of nonlinearity. I don't know if the
>paper can still be found online.
That cipher is broken.
Bruce
**********************************************************************
Bruce Schneier, President, Counterpane Systems Phone: 612-823-1098
101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis, MN 55419 Fax: 612-823-1590
Free crypto newsletter. See: http://www.counterpane.com
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: Quantum Cryptography
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 15:27:31 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 24 Feb 1999 08:43:38 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
wrote:
>>Is this the same government who funded research into "remote viewing"
>>as a means of espionage???
>Yes. And also the same government that funded research into communication
>via computer networks.
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) funded the ArpaNet
project, which evolved into the Internet. That project was responsible
for spawning computer companies like DEC and Sun Microsystems.
ARPA is the R&D arm of the Dept. of Defense. They are hardly the same
entity as the domestic surveillance agencies that are designed to
infringe on citizen liberty.
BTW, to assist with the unemployment problem in the US, a special
agency was formed to produce periodic changes in govt acronyms, and
ARPA was transformed into DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency).
I am sure that acronym transformation, vital to national interests and
the security of the free world, cost taxpayers at least 10 million
dollars. I mean, just making sure that the new acronym was politically
correct could easily account for half that sum.
This is the same acronym transformation agency that changed the
National Alliance of Businessmen into the National Alliance of
Business, to make sure it was politically correct (never mind that the
term "man" is usually taken to be both masculine and feminine, like
its counterpart in German).
In this instance the cost of transformation was a lot less, since they
managed to pull it off without any actual change in the base acronyn,
namely NAB remained NAB. Such subtle transformations are always
cheaper to implement.
Bob Knauer
"Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they
want, and deserve to get it good and hard."
--H.L. Mencken
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Robert Scott)
Subject: Re: What do you all think about the new cipher devised by a 16 year old?
Reply-To: see text
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 15:36:51 GMT
On 24 Feb 1999 08:47:56 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>Anthony Naggs <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>After much consideration fungus decided to share these wise words:
>>>
>>>It's still a secret, until the "patents go through".
>>
>>Indeed.
>>
>>>This sounds like twaddle to me. Once a patent is filed, you can publish
>>>the algorithm, whether it finally gets granted or not.
>>
>>Only in the USA.
>
>I believe post-application publication is legitimate anywhere in the
>world.
>
> -kitten
Sure, it's legitimate. It does not jepordize your chances
of getting a patent. But if the patent application is ultimately
rejected, you have thrown away your option of at least
keeping the idea as a trade secret.
Bob Scott
Ann Arbor, Michigan (email: rscott (at) wwnet (dot) net )
(My automatic return address is intentionally invalid.)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: Define Randomness
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 15:40:23 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 24 Feb 1999 09:23:07 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
wrote:
>You're confusing generator skew with sequence skew again.
I do not believe so, not in the context of crypto-grade random
numbers.
>The point is that a *generator* can be skewed (I prefer the term
>'bias', but they're largely equivalent) and still be random.
>As an example : suppose I have a bit-generator that works like this :
>I roll a die ("randomly") and output a zero if the result is a six,
>a one otherwise.
>This isn't a very good generator (it's biased), but it's still
>random. And the entropy of this generator is less than the entropy
>of a generator consisting of a fair coin.
That generator is not crypto-grade random. If you used keystreams from
that RNG you would leak significant amounts of information.
Bob Knauer
"Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they
want, and deserve to get it good and hard."
--H.L. Mencken
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: Define Randomness
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 15:36:52 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 24 Feb 1999 09:49:32 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Alan
DeKok) wrote:
> As a physicist, I'll have to call you on this topic.
How about that - I am a physicist too. Small world, eh.
>Q: When is an algorithmic PRNG identical to a TRNG?
>A: They're identical when you are unable to distinguish the two.
I remind you that obscurity does not produce security. The digit
expansion of pi might *appear* random, but that does not necessaruly
make it secure.
The crucial test is whether the keystreams are crypto-grade secure.
That can only be determined analytically by using them to produce test
ciphers and then try to break those test ciphers by some sort of
inferential attack, like the Bayesian method. If the ciphers do not
leak signifcant amounts of information, then you have an
(experimentally) proveably secure system to within the limits of
experimental error.
> And from Chaitin, there is no one method by which to determine the
>difference between a PRNG and a TRNG. So *any* tests are necessarily
>incomplete.
Chaitin is talking about algorithmic complexity randomness, which is
not the same thing as crypto-grade randomness. A TRNG can generate a
string that is not complex at all.
> Conclusion: There are probably very many PRNG's which are, for our
>purposes, at least as strong as a TRNG.
I will reserve judgement until I see analytical tests that confirm
that assertion, such as tests on ciphers constructed to expose
weaknesses.
Statistical tests performed on the output of such PRNGs is not
satisfactory since many PRNGs satisfy such tests and are completely
unsuitable as keystreams.
Bob Knauer
"Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they
want, and deserve to get it good and hard."
--H.L. Mencken
------------------------------
From: fungus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Testing Algorithms
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 07:14:31 +0100
Steven Runyeard waved his hands in the air and spouted:
>
> This whole thing comes down to speculation. As far as you're concerned
> we are going to reach a ceiling in computer performance. I, on the
> other hand think we will not.
And your basis for believing this is...?
(providing evidence is called an "argument")
> If there is money in it Intel will find
> a way of making a faster CPU.
>
Of course.
> It's your guess that we won't crack a 256 bit key. It's my guess that
> we will. Each guess is just as valid.
Mine isn't a guess, it has numbers and reasoning behing it.
You're saying "computers got faster before, they'll get faster again".
This is just idle thought and handwaving. What is the basis for your
belief?
--
<\___/>
/ O O \
\_____/ FTB.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Herman Rubin)
Subject: Re: Randomness of coin flips
Date: 24 Feb 1999 10:44:29 -0500
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Michael Sierchio <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>"R. Knauer" wrote:
>> What on God's Green Earth (tm) is a "quincunx"?
>It's in the heavens and not on the Earth (it is a mildly favorable
>aspect of two planets).
This is a device in which balls negotiate a grid of the following type:
.
. .
. . .
. . . .
etc. If it is drawn correctly, ideally, the balls should, when they
hit a pin in the grid, be equally likely to go in either direction.
This was used by Galton to demonstrate the binomial distribution
empirically, by using a "large" number of balls.
--
This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views
are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University.
Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907-1399
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Herman Rubin)
Subject: Re: True Randomness
Date: 24 Feb 1999 10:55:33 -0500
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
R. Knauer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>On 24 Feb 1999 09:20:39 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Herman Rubin)
>wrote:
>>It is not usual to have statistical terms in a probability book, although
>>maximum likelihood might be found there.
>>Hidden Markov models are far too recent to be in Feller's book.
>>And even later probability textbooks might not have this.
>What book(s) do you recommend for these two concepts?
Any reasonable statistics book discusses maximum likelihood, among
other methods of inference.
As for hidden Markov models, one is only likely to find applications.
The idea that what is observed is a function of an unobserved Markov
chain is simple to state, and can be quite difficult to work with.
--
This address is for information only. I do not claim that these views
are those of the Statistics Department or of Purdue University.
Herman Rubin, Dept. of Statistics, Purdue Univ., West Lafayette IN47907-1399
[EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: (765)494-6054 FAX: (765)494-0558
------------------------------
Crossposted-To:
alt.security,alt.computer.security,comp.security.misc,misc.books.technical,alt.books.reviews,alt.books,alt.books.technical,biz.books.technical,fido7.books.computing
Subject: REVIEW: "Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Michael Rosing
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Rob Slade, doting grandpa of Ryan and Trevor)
Date: Wed, 24 Feb 1999 16:30:34 GMT
BKIMPECC.RVW 990115
"Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Michael Rosing, 1999,
1-884777-69-4, U$47.95/C$67.95
%A Michael Rosing [EMAIL PROTECTED]
%C 32 Lafayette Place, Greenwich, CT 06830
%D 1999
%G 1-884777-69-4
%I Manning Publications Co.
%O U$47.95/C$67.95 [EMAIL PROTECTED] 516-887-9747
%P 313 p.
%T "Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography"
Modern asymmetric (or "public") key cryptography uses mathematical
operations that are fairly easy to do in one direction, but extremely
hard to do in reverse. The standard example used (indeed, the one
that is almost synonymous with public key encryption) is that of
factoring. Given two large prime numbers, it is a straightforward
task to multiply them together and find the resulting multiplicand.
However, given a large number that is a product of two large prime
factors, it is extremely difficult to find those two primes.
Elliptic curves have a similar property. A characteristic of an
elliptic curve is that any two points on the curve can be "added," and
the resulting point will also be on the curve. However, it is
difficult, given only the final point, to find the original two that
were added. Thus, this attribute can be used as the basis of an
asymmetric encryption system.
Rosing doesn't get around to explaining what an elliptic curve is
until chapter five, so you have to take a fair amount on faith. In
spite of the comments in the first few pages of the book promoting the
advantages of understanding the fundamentals, it is quite easy to
believe that the text was written to explain some sample code, since
there is far more emphasis on dealing with carry bits than there is in
the background explanations. He starts in chapter one by talking
about exponential curves (as in, a good crypto system is one where the
work done to encrypt a message grows more slowly than the work
required to crack it) and the enormous magnitude of address spaces.
Chapter two doesn't really deal with number theory until halfway
through, concentrating on coding for arithmetic with large integers,
and rushing through conceptual explanations in order to get into yet
more programming. Polynomials are introduced in chapter three, but,
again, I couldn't say that the subject is really covered. At one
point a new term, undefined, is introduced. The comment, "If you
don't know what that means, just remember that it works!" is not
terribly helpful when we have no idea what it works for. Normal basis
is given a mathematical definition, but almost no explanation, in
chapter four. The explanation of elliptic curves, in chapter five, is
much better, but, relying as it does on some understanding of
polynomial and normal basis, still leaves a lot to be desired.
It is interesting to note, in chapter six, that the basics of
cryptology is treated every bit as cavalierly as the math. The
explanation of public key cryptography is extremely terse, and, in
fact, contains several minor errors. Chapter seven looks at some
practical building blocks like random number generation and
"handshaking" protocols. The elliptic curve encryption scheme and
IEEE P1363 standard mask and hash functions are reviewed in chapter
eight. Chapters nine and ten discuss advanced topics in key exchange
and digital signatures respectively. Fine details for performance
enhancement in specific sections of code are covered in chapter
eleven. A sample analysis and design is given in chapter twelve.
Now, granted, Rosing's purpose is engineering and implementation and
not math tutorials. And, to be fair, he does provide information on a
number of points of programming not often dealt with in the more
academic texts. However, as he points out, you cannot simply use the
sample code in the book and expect it to work in all cases and for all
purposes. Therefore, if the programmer does not understand, to some
extent, how the system works, the eventual system may have flaws and
weaknesses. However helpful the programming pointers handed out in
every chapter, design must be based on concepts, and these are very
poorly provided. If, on the other hand, you learned UNIX by studying
the source code, you might do reasonably well with this book.
copyright Robert M. Slade, 1999 BKIMPECC.RVW 990115
--
======================
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Find virus, book info http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev/rms.htm
Mirrored at http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade/rms.htm
Linked to bookstore at http://www97.pair.com/robslade/
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Robert Slade's Guide to Computer Viruses, 0-387-94663-2 (800-SPRINGER)
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