Cryptography-Digest Digest #116, Volume #12 Tue, 27 Jun 00 14:13:00 EDT
Contents:
Re: Algo's with no easy attacks? (Eric Lee Green)
My new cipher sended to contest (Runu Knips)
Re: Encryption on missing hard-drives (Alexander Kjeldaas)
Re: Remark on practical predictability of sequences (jkauffman)
Re: TEA-wmlscript question ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Tiny hash? (Donald Welsh)
Re: Tiny hash? (Volker Hetzer)
News blurb about our friends in Ft. Meade MD (Secret Squirrel)
Re: Observer 4/6/2000: "Your privacy ends here" (Phil Partridge)
Re: Surrendering Keys, I think not. ("CrakMan")
Re: Surrendering Keys, I think not. (Andru Luvisi)
Thoughts on "Cracking" of Genetic Code (Information System)
Re: Key agreement in GSM phones (David A. Wagner)
Re: Enigma... (JPeschel)
Re: Surrendering Keys, I think not. (Simon Johnson)
simple crypting
Re: Idea or 3DES ("Joseph Ashwood")
Re: Observer 4/6/2000: "Your privacy ends here" (JimD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Eric Lee Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Algo's with no easy attacks?
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 15:21:24 GMT
matt wrote:
> I don't have much experience in matters such as this, so are there
> any/many algorithms which are freely available, which don't suffer
> from any known attacks such as this.
No commonly-accepted public algorithm, such as 3DES, IDEA, Blowfish, or
Twofish, has known attacks upon the algorithm itself. However, a secure
algorithm is no help if you do not have a secure protocol.
For example, one early version of Windows NT password handling sent an
encrypted version of the password across the network to the NT server, which
the NT server then compared against its own copy of the password and then said
"Okay, this guy has permission to log in to me." The problem was that there
was no "salt" value mixed in with the password. Thus someone could intercept
the encrypted password using a network sniffer tool, then log in and send
that same encrypted password -- despite not knowing the plaintext of the
password (i.e., the encryption algorithm was secure). Thus an unauthorized
person could gain access to the server.
This is called a "replay" attack. It is typical of the kinds of attacks
against modern networked systems, none of which directly attack the cipher,
but, rather, attack the system around it. Heading off replay attacks means
using sequence numbers, salt values, message authentication digests, and
public key encryption (used to authenticate that you are talking to the proper
machine). Each of these components could in itself be secure and the system
itself be insecure because the components were assembled improperly. For
example, Microsoft's next version of the Windows NT password handling was also
insecure, despite using all of the above components. It took yet another try
before they finally got it right.
This is a good example of what happens when the software system's designer is
not aware of the attacks against a protocol, and is why protocol design is the
next frontier in cryptography. We have secure ciphers. Now we need secure
protocols to tie them together. There has been some work done in this area,
such as SSL, but it is by no means as cut-and-dried as the current
state-of-the-art in ciphers -- any creator of a modern networked system is
still likely to find areas that need actual protocol design, as vs. being able
to securely use off-the-shelf protocols to solve his particular problem. This
is completely unlike the cipher area, where for any problem set you find,
there is an off-the-shelf cipher which solves the problem.
--
Eric Lee Green [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Software Engineer Visit our Web page:
Enhanced Software Technologies, Inc. http://www.estinc.com/
(602) 470-1115 voice (602) 470-1116 fax
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 17:22:54 +0200
From: Runu Knips <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: My new cipher sended to contest
I've written a very simple cipher, Paranoia. It should
appear soon on the contest page (well unless there was
an error in it). It is basically a (big) modification
of RC5, which uses 32 instead of 5 bits in each round
for bit transformations.
------------------------------
From: Alexander Kjeldaas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Encryption on missing hard-drives
Date: 27 Jun 2000 17:29:54 +0200
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mike Andrews) writes:
> Scripsit [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
>
> : On a more sci.crypt note, noone's answered my original question which
> : is if it's possible to encrypt a device such that it's impossible to
> : read the contents without leaving a trail. Something similar to a one
> : time password system, where a series of keys must be used or some
> : other clever algorithm. Just for fun, we'll allow a secure connection
> : to a trusted party.
>
> Since these are disk drives, I'd bet real money that at most
> the contents were encrypted. I suppose it _is_ possible that
> the US gov't has special disk controllers and hard drives,
> such that if you don't do just the right thing when trying
> to read the drive, the data all go away. But it is a real
> stretch of the imagination to come up with that, and it
> would preclude using any off-the-shelf WIN-based OS.
>
Well, standard, cheap IBM "StarDesk" IDE drives have password
capabilities. You get N tries (N=5 or something). If you fail to
authenticate yourself, your only option in order to use the disk is
either to simulate a reboot, in which case you get N more retries, or
use a special "master unlock" password. However, if you use this
master password, the entire disk will be erased.
astor
------------------------------
From: jkauffman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Remark on practical predictability of sequences
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 08:44:22 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Mok-Kong Shen
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Pseudo-random sequences, being deterministically
> generated,
> always involve the issue of predictability. On the
> other
> hand, a good cipher prevents the opponent to obtain the
> plaintext from the ciphertext. It seems logical to
> conclude
> that, if one feeds a pseudo-random sequence to a good
> cipher,
> the resulting output sequence is practically
> unpredictable,
> since he can't recover the original sequence which he
> needs
> to do the inference in the first place.
> I should appreciate comments on this view.
Yes, this is essentially what an ANSI X.917 generator does
using 3DES.
* Sent from AltaVista http://www.altavista.com Where you can also find related Web
Pages, Images, Audios, Videos, News, and Shopping. Smart is Beautiful
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: TEA-wmlscript question
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 16:32:05 GMT
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Hash: SHA1
dexMilano wrote:
> Thanks for your complete explanation.
> I think i'ts clear the meaning of Phi number
>
> Do You mean that for crypto algoritms I don't need a particular number
> but i can choose the one I prefer (for example 1234567)?
> dex
you cant - 1234567 - its too small - only 21 bit
(1234567 == 0x12D687 == 100101101011010000111)
you should use 32 bit number
> > > Why the number Golden number is so great?
it should be 32 bit number
== <EOF> ==
Disastry http://i.am/disastry/
http://disastry.dhs.org/pgp.htm <-- PGP half-Plugin for Netscape
http://disastry.dhs.org/pegwit <-- Pegwit - simple alternative for PGP
remove .NOSPAM.NET for email reply
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE=====
Version: Netscape PGP half-Plugin 0.14 by Disastry / PGPsdk v1.7.1
iQA/AwUBOVi6ozBaTVEuJQxkEQIElACgomVRodUS/+poSNyOQoBoixWr110AnRNR
D57Y/YbL6CGIm2LKJ2q3xsFD
=Zoy+
=====END PGP SIGNATURE=====
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Donald Welsh)
Subject: Re: Tiny hash?
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 16:45:21 GMT
On Sat, 24 Jun 2000 17:38:05 GMT, Rex Stewart <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>In this case, what he probably needs to find is a good
>ASM programmer who can fiddle with the old CRC-16 routine
>to create a keyed version.
Why not concatenate the key with the message, and "hash" that?
------------------------------
From: Volker Hetzer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Tiny hash?
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 16:48:17 +0000
Benjamin Goldberg wrote:
>
> I'm looking for a keyed hash that produces a small [8-bit] output,
> and is very fast/efficient. Anybody know of any?
Why not use HMAC with a 8 bit CRC?
Greetings!
Volker
--
The early bird gets the worm. If you want something else for
breakfast, get up later.
------------------------------
Date: 27 Jun 2000 16:56:28 -0000
Subject: News blurb about our friends in Ft. Meade MD
From: Secret Squirrel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
as reported in EE Times, 6/20/2000, p49
"To Upgrade IT equipment, NSA will buy off the shelf"
The NSA will turn to private industry to develop and maintain most
of its unclassified information technology infrastructure as part of
an initiative "to refocus agency assets on core functions that
directly support its national security missions," agency officials
said.
NSA announced the decision earlier this month after completing a
15-month feasibility study called Project Groundbreaker. The study
was designed to assess whether the agency's IT infrastructure
requirements could be met by the private sector and to compare
government and industry performance in providing information
technology such as desktop computers, servers, and voice and data
networks. The agency said it will stage a "managed competition" to
purchase equipment. A single, 10-yr contract could reportedly be
worth $5 billion.
NSA officials called the decision to purchase commercial equipment a
"dramatic change to NSA's long-standing IT operations."
"In order to remain successful in our foreign signals intelligence
and information assurance missions," said Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael
Hayden, NSA director, "we must immediately begin to invest in our IT
infrastructure to secure NSA's agility and adaptibility in the
Information Age. It is critical that we have a robust and reliable
infrastructure capable of supporting our missions."
NSA was hit by a major computer failure in January that crippled its
global spy network, preventing the processing of signals intelligence
for several days. The massive failure reportedly inspired the IT
modernization effort.
The agency has traditionally developed spy technology in-house at
its Ft. Meade MD headquarters. It was instrumental in developing the
first supercomputers that were used to process signals intelligence
gathered from listening posts around the world. However, the
proliferation of encryption and fiber-optic technology has forced
the agency to reforcus its development efforts on spy technology and
to consider buying IT equipment off-the-shelf.
"Explosive growth in the global network and new technologies makes
our partnership with industry more vital to NSA's success than ever
before," Hayden said.
======> Hmmmmm, sure would like to know more about this "partnership
with industry". Where to begin: Clipper chip, key-escrow, NSAKEY built
into Microshaft's OS and thus there's a little bit of Ft. Meade in 90%
of all desktop PCs in the world. Why, it's enough to make one almost
patriotic. <======
NSA has also attempted to reach out to industry and US universities
to develop information security policies and standards. For instance,
it created the National Information Assurance Partnership in 1997
with the Commerce Department's NIST to address security testing
needs for IT equipment manufacturers and users.
======> What better way to ensure it can crack whatever manufacturers
come up with? <======
Despite these outreach efforts, critics of US restrictions on exports
of encryption technology viewed the initiatives with suspicion.
======> What a vast understatement! Really, no more needs to be
said. <======
Four areas will be covered under NSA's IT contract: distributed
computing; enterprise/security management; networks; and telephony.
The modernization effort is expected to save government as much as
$1 billion over 10 years. The agency said it would select a
contractor by the spring of 2001.
The agency's initiave builds on a 1998 pilot program to develop an
approach for outsourcing 20 legacy software systems.
------------------------------
From: Phil Partridge <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To:
uk.media.newspapers,uk.legal,alt.security.pgp,alt.privacy,uk.politics.parliament,uk.politics.crime,talk.politics.crypto,alt.ph.uk,alt.conspiracy.spy,alt.security.scramdisk,uk.telecom
Subject: Re: Observer 4/6/2000: "Your privacy ends here"
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2000 22:01:24 +0100
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, JimD <dynastic@REMOVE_T
HIScwcom.net> writes
>On Fri, 23 Jun 2000 00:36:12 +0100, "Anarchist Lemming"
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>
>>"Danny Johnson" <[email protected]> wrote in message
>>news:8iu66p$aik$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>> Hash: SHA1
>>>
>>> (CROSS POSTED)
>>> Please repost the URL so I can try it (In the US)
>>
>>You probably could have worked it out, but it's www.shayler.com. I still
>>haven't had a reply to the message I sent the webmaster. Maybe the
>>webmaster's been assassinated by MI6.
>
>They don't do assassinations. They hire other criminals to
>do that sort of thing.
>
***********ARE YOU SURE!**********
--
Phil Partridge
------------------------------
From: "CrakMan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Surrendering Keys, I think not.
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 10:08:50 -0700
If the encryption is one time pad there are an infinite number of keys which
will decode to any message of that length you can imagine.
So if you have a 10 megabyte cipher text this could be the Bible encrypted,
or the phrase "Eat My Shorts" followed by a bunch of zeros. Computing the
key to produce any desired message is easy.
If any government agency claims the right to view the plain text of some
arbitrary cipher text, just XOR the cipher text with the message you want
the government to see and give them the result as the one time pad XOR key
(say your mom's chocolate chip cookie recipe). Now let them prove that this
is not the correct plain text. Botta bing...one government off your back!!
:--)
Just another stupid law made by ignorant people.
JK
--
CRAK Software
http://www.crak.com
Password Recovery Software
QuickBooks, Quicken, Access...More
Spam bait (credit E. Needham):
root@localhost
postmaster@localhost
admin@localhost
abuse@localhost
webmaster@localhost
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Tony T. Warnock <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
>
> "Douglas A. Gwyn" wrote:
>
> > Simon Johnson wrote:
> > > I was wondering how they would ever be able to *prove* that this
> > > key is correct. Since one of the requirements for the AES is
> > > that the output of data encryption produces cipher-text that
> > > cannot be told apart from random data. If some person said the
> > > cipher-text was a message encrypted using an OTP, then the
> > > police must brute-force the underlying algorithm to prove
> > > otherwise.
> >
> > The decryption key (which is what must be provided) would produce
> > putative plaintext that could readily be validated. With nearly
> > any decent cryptosystem, using the wrong decryption key produces
> > "random" noise, not a coherent plaintext, so it would be obvious.
>
> So, take a dozen (or 12**12 even) plaintexts; XOR (or equivalent) them
> together; XOR with a one time pad. Then there are 12 "keys" which
> decrypt into 12 different messages.
>
------------------------------
From: Andru Luvisi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Surrendering Keys, I think not.
Date: 27 Jun 2000 10:01:05 -0700
zapzing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
[snip]
> The police may want to see that the recipient also has a copy
> of the OTP. The recipient, however, cannot have a message
> he has not recieved yet. Dummy_Key, you will observe, depends
> on the message sent. What happens if the police intercept the
> message, preventing the intended recipient from recieving it,
> and then demand of the recipient that he produce the OTP ?
[snip]
Somewhere in AC, Schneier describes this:
Take a "fake" message and compress it.
Tack the real message onto the space saved through compression.
Encrypt it for real.
Send it.
The recipient can read the real message, and the compressed fake
message. Uncompress the fake, xor it against the transmitted
ciphertext, and voila, they have the same one time pad as you. There
are, however, still issues of the modification date, position on the
hard drive potentially indicating that the pad was newer than the
encrypted file, and so on.
Andru
--
==========================================================================
| Andru Luvisi | http://libweb.sonoma.edu/ |
| Programmer/Analyst | Library Resources Online |
| Ruben Salazar Library |-----------------------------------------|
| Sonoma State University | http://www.belleprovence.com/ |
| [EMAIL PROTECTED] | Textile imports from Provence, France |
==========================================================================
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Information System)
Subject: Thoughts on "Cracking" of Genetic Code
Date: 27 Jun 2000 13:31:34 EDT
I know that this is off the explicit subject of the
group, but I am interested in the reaction of others to the
wording of news stories that state that the genetic code has
been "cracked," drawing comparisons to a cryptographic
solution. As I understand it, what has been accomplished is
the compilation, in crypto terms, of a complete and possibly
accurate transcription of the ciphertext. This is a
beginning, but hardly a "cracking." As a continuation of the
original thought, my other question is to ask if anyone has any
thoughts on the potential or actual applications of
cryptanalytic techniques to the decoding of DNA in the sense
of decoding meaning from existing sequences, or even encoding
desired messages to create desired results.
Ernest Brandt
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David A. Wagner)
Subject: Re: Key agreement in GSM phones
Date: 27 Jun 2000 09:45:38 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Gerard Tel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> - Is it possible for an intruder to tap the Ki information from
> the network? (Intruder = criminal, police, or government)
Yes. (Police wiretaps are done in the network, I'm told.)
> - I learned that the A8 computation differs from provider to provider.
> Now if you use your phone in another provider's network where
> the phone and base do not share the A8, what happens?
The other provider's network contacts your own provider.
There are plenty of details in standard texts on GSM security; a websearch
should turn up a description or two, with any luck.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JPeschel)
Subject: Re: Enigma...
Date: 27 Jun 2000 17:45:20 GMT
"Fortunato" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
>Does anyone have got enigma's crypto scheme ?
>I want to study how it works !!!
You'll find some Enigma information on the"Historical"
page of my web site. Included there are links to
other fine Enigma sites. You'll also find Enigma and
Bombe simulators, and Jim Gillogly's paper, in which
he describes a ciphertext-only attack on Enigma.
Joe
__________________________________________
Joe Peschel
D.O.E. SysWorks
http://members.aol.com/jpeschel/index.htm
__________________________________________
------------------------------
Subject: Re: Surrendering Keys, I think not.
From: Simon Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 10:47:04 -0700
Lets get this straight, before i start, the idea for the system i
am proposing is to stop the police gaining circumstanial evidence
against you.
The prosecutors could say: 'He's using encryption and not
handing over the keys, therefore he's got something to hide.'
To the average juror would see this as a convincing argument.
However, with my system, the prosecurtors case is weakened:
The prosecutor says: 'He's got an encryption program, but he
claims not to have used it and used the unbreakable OTP instead.
He has surrendered the OTP key which reveals an confidential,
but legal bank-statements. We believe he has used this algorithm,
to conseal a more incriminating file, but we can't prove anything
without trying to brute-force the algorithm he may have used.
Which is unworkable.'
I think you have to agree that the prosecutor's case looks very
poor indeed. I certainly wouldn't agree with him since the OTP is
far more secure than any algorithm out there, it makes sense that
a rather parinoid indiviual would use this. The real point is
that your forced to believe his story or brute-force the
algorithm.
Someone posted that this security through obsecurity -> Frankly
this is wrong, since i have disclosed exactly how it can be done
and the aim of cryptography is to prevent undesirables reading
your personal files, even if that is the police.
S. Johnson
Got questions? Get answers over the phone at Keen.com.
Up to 100 minutes free!
http://www.keen.com
------------------------------
From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: simple crypting
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 20:00:24 +0200
if i post e crypted message here...
is there anyone here who could decrypt it?
------------------------------
From: "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Idea or 3DES
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 10:52:22 -0700
Crossposted-To: alt.security.scramdisk,comp.security.pgp.discuss
Ok, so I'm late to the party, but I've got something to say.
Stepping beyond considerations of patent, and other such non-security
considerations, there is a large amount of evidence on either side, perhaps
it would be useful to summarize the arguments briefly.
IDEA is a very well designed cipher, designed after DES, and it's hampering
factor in getting analysis is actually it's patent, I for one generally
choose not to examine ciphers which are not public domain, unless the
designer/owner is paying me for it, basically, if you get paid I better get
paid for my work. This alone pushed the amount of analysis in favor of 3DES.
Adding to this is the fact that DES is a couple decades old, and 3DES is
heavily favored from an analysis point of view. There's also a downside to
this, because DES is so popular as an algorithm, it is likely that various
countries/large corporations have invested significant money in the analysis
of it, the results of this analysis may or may not be published. It is my
opinion that the likelihood of there being a significant known break in
either is exemplified by the US Governments willingness to prosecute the
author of PGP, indicating that neither is broken.
However, we must also note that 3DES is a situation that was unconceived of
for 3DES, perhaps a situation that it is poorly suited for, the immediate
reduction from 168 bits to 112 (in terms of security) is a possible
indication of just such a situation, this certainly has the potential to
weigh in favor of IDEA. However, analysis of DES has shown that it does not
form a 2-group, however we have not shown that it does not form a 3-group,
at least as far as I know, but the likelihood of such an occurance is
astroundingly low (again reinforced by the PGP case)
Speed is actually a rather important factor, and a more complicated one than
it at first seems. At first glance IDEA seems preferable for this, simply
because it is faster. Countering this is the simple fact that if it takes
longer to do one operation, it takes a whole lot longer to do 2^100
operations. In speed the two really seem evenly matched from an attacker's
point of view, so IDEA wins out simply due to the increased speed, but this
win is of minor interest, unless you're encrypting a very large number of
blocks.
Each of us has other criteria, perhaps we really like 3DES because we are
comfortable with the still conservative design, or we like the extra speed
of IDEA. Personally I almost always recommend 3DES for high security
applications, because for high security speed takes a back seat to
understood security and conservative design.
Joe
"jungle" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Lucks from Fast Software Encryption in 1998 explained that :
>
> - about 2^108 steps are sufficient to break triple DES ...
> - when one concentrates on the number of single DES operations & assumes
the
> other operations to be much faster, 2^90 steps are sufficient ...
>
> IDEA on the other hand needs 2^128 steps ...
>
> therefore,
> - IDEA should be considered extremely more secure than triple DES ...
> - exactly, from 2^38 to 2^20 steps more secure ...
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> > jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > IDEA ...
> > >
> > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Of the two ciphers IDEA and triple DES, what provides the best
> > security? I
> > > > read somewhere that DES had been broken.
> >
> > FWIW, I disagree with Jungle. My paper PGP DH vs PGP RSA
> > (http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/pgpfaq.html) explains why.
>
>
>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (JimD)
Crossposted-To:
uk.media.newspapers,uk.legal,alt.security.pgp,alt.privacy,uk.politics.parliament,uk.politics.crime,talk.politics.crypto,alt.ph.uk,alt.conspiracy.spy,alt.security.scramdisk,uk.telecom
Subject: Re: Observer 4/6/2000: "Your privacy ends here"
Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2000 17:04:07 GMT
Reply-To: JimD
On Mon, 26 Jun 2000 22:01:24 +0100, Phil Partridge <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, JimD <dynastic@REMOVE_T
>HIScwcom.net> writes
>>On Fri, 23 Jun 2000 00:36:12 +0100, "Anarchist Lemming"
>><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>"Danny Johnson" <[email protected]> wrote in message
>>>news:8iu66p$aik$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>>>> Hash: SHA1
>>>>
>>>> (CROSS POSTED)
>>>> Please repost the URL so I can try it (In the US)
>>>
>>>You probably could have worked it out, but it's www.shayler.com. I still
>>>haven't had a reply to the message I sent the webmaster. Maybe the
>>>webmaster's been assassinated by MI6.
>>
>>They don't do assassinations. They hire other criminals to
>>do that sort of thing.
>>
>***********ARE YOU SURE!**********
Absolutely. There was that woman from Shrewsbury they had
murdered. Probably bungled by the hoods MI5/6 hired to
assasinate her.
--
Jim Dunnett.
g4rga at thersgb.net
------------------------------
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