Cryptography-Digest Digest #116, Volume #14 Mon, 9 Apr 01 23:13:01 EDT
Contents:
CA for encryption ("Hanna")
Re: How good is steganography in the real world? (Paul Rubin)
Re: I got accepted (Scott Craver)
Re: latex quick help ("Matt Timmermans")
Re: latex quick help ("Augusto Jun Devegili")
Re: How good is steganography in the real world? (David Wagner)
Re: Delta patching of encrypted data (David Wagner)
Re: How good is steganography in the real world? (Charles Lyttle)
Re: I got accepted ("Tom St Denis")
Re: How good is steganography in the real world? (Charles Lyttle)
Re: How good is steganography in the real world? (Charles Lyttle)
Re: texts on factoring? (David Hopwood)
Re: Steganography with natural texts (Mok-Kong Shen)
Re: RC4 test vectors after gigabyte output?. (David Hopwood)
Re: Dynamic Substitution Question ("r.e.s.")
Re: I got accepted (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: latex quick help (David Hopwood)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Hanna" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: CA for encryption
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 06:55:49 +0700
Hi,
Does anyone ever heard of CA-1.1 ? it use cellular automata for
encryption/decryption.
What I need to know is, have anyone ever break it ?
Thanks in advance.
Hanna
------------------------------
From: Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: How good is steganography in the real world?
Date: 09 Apr 2001 17:41:10 -0700
"Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> > > That's not a good argument. A much better argument is that nobody
> > > has been able to suggest a plausible way to hide a backdoor in a
> > > cipher with structure similar to DES.
> > This is false, as the discovery of differential cryptanalysis shows.
> > But you knew that already.
>
> Sounds like you're accusing me of lying.
> I don't consider the so-called "differential cryptanalysis"
> to even come close to qualifying as a "back door".
No I wasn't accusing you, I just meant it sounded like you had
forgotten a very well known episode (we all forget things sometimes).
I'm sorry it came across like an accusation--that wasn't my intention.
There was deep suspicion for many years that the DES S-boxes were
cooked in some way to make the cipher breakable, various ways of
generating weak S-boxes were discovered and published, and it became
clear that the actual DES S-boxes were not randomly chosen,
intensifying the mystery. Eventually the explanation came to light,
that the S-boxes were designed to resist differential cryptanalysis.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Scott Craver)
Subject: Re: I got accepted
Date: 10 Apr 2001 00:49:58 GMT
Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>I got accepted to 1 out of the 3 (so far) universities I applied too.
>Yahooooo!
Congratulations. Which university, if I may pry?
>I would like to thank the posters in this group for if it weren't for my
>hours consumed posting and learning here I probably would not have made
>it!!!
If true, that would make you the first person in the
entire universe whose academic future was actually *improved*
by spending all day on usenet.
>Tom St Denis
-S
------------------------------
From: "Matt Timmermans" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: latex quick help
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 00:53:29 GMT
Try this:
http://www.colorado.edu/ITS/docs/latex/Ref/
or this:
http://zon8.physd.amu.edu.pl/LaTeX/ltx-2.html
Or, to paraphrase you: try a google search for "latex reference" ;-)
"Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:XXrA6.66600$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
>
> "Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> news:mxrA6.66513$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> > I installed MikTex 2.0 (with the update) I was just wondering if their
is
> > any quick tutorials on the web how to write tex or more specifically
latex
> > source files and how to translate them to postscript?
>
> I managed to figure it out enough to build my abstract :-)
>
> Is there a quick-ref guide for math symbols and section codings?
>
> Tom
>
>
------------------------------
From: "Augusto Jun Devegili" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: latex quick help
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 21:14:12 -0300
You may go to http://biquinho.furg.br/tex-br/links.html and search for
"tutoriais" -- you're going to find a set of links for LaTeX tutorials (in
English even though it is a Brazilian page).
If you want to generate a PostScript document from a LaTeX source file, say,
doc.tex, type the following commands at the command prompt (or MS-DOS
Prompt):
latex doc.tex
dvips doc
The first command will compile your LaTeX document and generate a DVI file
(which can be viewed with the program yap.exe, part of the MiKTeX
distribution). The second command will convert the DVI file into a
PostScript document.
Regards,
Augusto Jun Devegili
"Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:mxrA6.66513$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> I installed MikTex 2.0 (with the update) I was just wondering if their is
> any quick tutorials on the web how to write tex or more specifically latex
> source files and how to translate them to postscript?
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: How good is steganography in the real world?
Date: 10 Apr 2001 01:39:13 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
>A much better argument is that nobody
>has been able to suggest a plausible way to hide a backdoor in a
>cipher with structure similar to DES.
What about Rijmen & Preneel's construction, or Paterson's scheme?
Both seem plausible for hiding a backdoor in a DES-like cipher.
Rijmen and Preneel, ``A Family of Trapdoor Ciphers'', FSE'97.
http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~cosicart/ps/VR-9703.ps.gz
Paterson, ``Imprimitive permutation groups and trapdoors
in iterated block ciphers'', FSE'99.
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/1999/HPL-1999-12R1.html
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Delta patching of encrypted data
Date: 10 Apr 2001 01:45:31 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Let me try again. AES has a 16-byte block size. Let's take a maximum
chunk size of 256 blocks (= 4096 bytes). A chunk is represented as a
length byte M followed by an IV (16 bytes) followed by exactly M blocks
(16*M bytes) of ciphertext. The ciphertext is obtained by encrypting
the plaintext with padded-AES-CBC mode using the provided IV. A file
is a sequence of chunks.
Now suppose you want to insert a byte into a chunk. If the chunk
has length M < 256, then you can just decrypt, insert the byte, and
re-encrypt. If the chunk has length M = 256, decrypt and split it into
two halves, then insert the byte into the appropriate half, then encrypt
each half into a new chunk. (Each new chunk will have about 128 blocks
in it.) Deletion is even easier: if the chunk length is M > 1, then you
decrypt the chunk, delete the byte, and re-encrypt; if the chunk length
is M = 1, you delete the whole chunk. Thus, each insertion or deletion
involves modifying at most 256 blocks (4096 bytes) of the file.
This is one approach. It may not be the optimal one, but it might be
good enough for your purposes.
------------------------------
From: Charles Lyttle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: How good is steganography in the real world?
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 01:58:34 GMT
Good point. In the case of GOST, because the S-boxes were secret and
variable, they are part of the key. The S-box controversy was part of
the problem with the DES working papers being kept secret. No one knew
if the DES S-box was truly strong or not. Any number of weak boxes are
known.
Interesting Question : If you want to design your own S-Box for either
GOST or DES, how do you do it?
Benjamin Goldberg wrote:
>
> Charles Lyttle wrote:
> [snip]
> > As an example
> > the Russian GOST was cracked fairly quickly even though it was a minor
> > variant of DES. GOST turns out to have weak keys and strong keys. The
> > KGB was giving out weak keys to people it wanted to watch.
>
> Saying there are weak and strong keys with GOST is only valid if you
> consider the sboxes to be part of the key. I'll admit that this is
> stated in the specification ("The keys that determine the contents of
> the KMU and the tables of the substitution block K are secret elements
> and are distributed only in the proper channels.") but it's perfectly
> reasonable to fix the sboxes to known-good values, and for only the
> other part, the 256 bit key, to be secret.
>
> I'm sure the main (only?) reason the spec *doesn't* specifiy the sboxes
> (as the DES spec does) is so that they *could* give out weak sboxes to
> people they wanted to watch.
>
> Here's a quote from another paper: "The cryptographic key can be
> selected at random but the selection of S_i permutations is left to the
> central authority who know how to choose "good" permutations. Therefor
> from the users' point of view, the security is related to the secrecy of
> their key K. Note that the central authority can select weak
> permutations (for instance linear or affine), so that they can break the
> algorithm."
>
> Presumably, the KGB gave out the sboxes so that people they were
> watching had weak sboxes, and the people they wanted to have secure data
> had strong sboxes. AFAIKS, if the sboxes are fixed, if the sboxes are
> fixed, all keys are equally strong.
>
> --
> Sometimes the journey *is* its own reward--but not when you're trying to
> get to the bathroom in time.
--
Russ Lyttle
"World Domination through Penguin Power"
The Universal Automotive Testset Project at
<http://home.earthlink.net/~lyttlec>
------------------------------
From: "Tom St Denis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: I got accepted
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 02:00:41 GMT
"Scott Craver" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:9atlbm$3dq$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >I got accepted to 1 out of the 3 (so far) universities I applied too.
> >Yahooooo!
>
> Congratulations. Which university, if I may pry?
University of Windsor :-)
>I would like to thank the posters in this group for if it weren't for my
> >hours consumed posting and learning here I probably would not have made
> >it!!!
>
> If true, that would make you the first person in the
> entire universe whose academic future was actually *improved*
> by spending all day on usenet.
Cool, I hope to set this record :-)
Tom
------------------------------
From: Charles Lyttle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: How good is steganography in the real world?
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 02:04:39 GMT
Frank Gerlach wrote:
>
> Charles Lyttle wrote:
>
> > I did read your article, but perhaps I misunderstood. I think it very
> > unlikely that there is a backdoor into either RC4 or DES. Cracking DES
> > would be of such economic value and so many eyes have looked at it, that
> > I am sure that any backdoor would have been found by now. As an example
> > the Russian GOST was cracked fairly quickly even though it was a minor
> > variant of DES. GOST turns out to have weak keys and strong keys. The
> > KGB was giving out weak keys to people it wanted to watch.
>
> This is speculation to be proved (did Mr Putin say that ?). My assessment is that
> they were deeply unsure about the capabilities of NSAGCHQ, and we nowadays now
> that they were right in *not* using fixed sboxes.
> Fixed sboxes are a juicy target to attack, which is what we see with DES. Check
> what Schneier writes about differential and linear cryptanalysis.
> There was no "backdoor" in Enigma, and the english tradition of codebreaking still
> found enough resources to break it. My suggestion is that given enough human and
> financial effort, RC4 and 3DES will be much easier than O(2^keylength) as well.
> Only properly used OTPs are secure forever.
>
> > As for OTPs from WW II being still secure, that isn't the case. Military
> > OTPs that I have used have all been limited to information that would be
> > invalidated after about 1 week.
>
> Your strange operational procedures prove nothing at all. Maybe the key material was
>bad
NO.
>or your superiors did not trust in folks like you to correctly use OTPs.
BINGO! The problem with OTPs for any real situation. Keeping control of
the pads is so difficult as to make OTP useless.
> > This is because it is assumed that the
> > pad itself is comprimised after that time. i.e. someone lost a copy or
> > the enemy captured a copy.
>
> Fools also blow themselves into bits if you give them a handgrenade.
Both of the above with suprising reqularity.
>
> > Much OTP from WW II is not secure because
> > copies of the pads are still around. Some might be secure because all
> > copies of the pads have been lost, but this won't be the majority.
>
> Pads should be *burned* after use. There should be only *two* copies, clearly
> marked for sending and receiving. And cannonfodder should be trained to use it
> properly...
Generals have to account for the fact that given any amount of training,
cannonfodder _won't_ use it properly. They will re-use pads, they will
lose pads, the enemy will capture pads, supply/crypto will distribute
the wrong pads.
>
> > Any one in this group got any WW II OTPs in a trunk in the attic? I
> > think my uncle has some he captured from a German officer in North
> > Africa.
>
> I am embarassed to say that most german officers (Rommel seems to be an exception)
> seem to be too silly to understand cryptography. Otherwise they would have used
> OTPs at least for submarine communications. Of course, this would have A) required
> some brain cells not affected by alcohol and B) a hub-and-spoke communications
> system (ie. no broadcasting from Uboat to Uboat) and C) a little more work for the
> radioman.
Not just German Officers, but Japaneese Officers, US Officers, Italian
Officers, and almost any other Officer in the world.
--
Russ Lyttle
"World Domination through Penguin Power"
The Universal Automotive Testset Project at
<http://home.earthlink.net/~lyttlec>
------------------------------
From: Charles Lyttle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: How good is steganography in the real world?
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 02:05:17 GMT
Jack Lindso wrote:
>
> > Any one in this group got any WW II OTPs in a trunk in the attic? I
> > think my uncle has some he captured from a German officer in North
> > Africa. If still there, the date, time, and place of capture will be
> > available. People doing historcal research can contact me, and if you
> > check out, I can try to dig them up. Nothing guaranteed though.
>
> If you're serious about the WWII OTP, I'll be glad to have a look at them,
> this could be a real bonus for the document I'm writing on classical
> ciphers.......
>
> cheers.
Can't guarantee anything. Send me an e-mail and we'll talk.
--
Russ Lyttle
"World Domination through Penguin Power"
The Universal Automotive Testset Project at
<http://home.earthlink.net/~lyttlec>
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 02:08:00 +0100
From: David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: texts on factoring?
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> BTW, does anyone have a pointer to a good (easily
> understandable) and sufficiently concrete explanation
> of Polard's kangaroo method? Thanks.
See Edlyn Teske's course notes:
http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/~eteske/teske/course/course_notes.html
- --
David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Home page & PGP public key: http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/
RSA 2048-bit; fingerprint 71 8E A6 23 0E D3 4C E5 0F 69 8C D4 FA 66 15 01
Nothing in this message is intended to be legally binding. If I revoke a
public key but refuse to specify why, it is because the private key has been
seized under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; see www.fipr.org/rip
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------------------------------
From: Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Steganography with natural texts
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 04:14:03 +0200
Joe H Acker wrote:
>
> Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >First, synonym is a well-established notion.
>
> No, sorry, it is not. It might be a well established notion in
> denotational semantics but it is not well established from the point of
> view of the cognitive linguist. What expression a speaker usually uses
> is determined by factors like social environment, age, education,
> geographic origin (the variety of the language spoken, formerly called a
> "dialect"), communication situation, text sort and so on. Such factors
> shine through at all linguistic levels. If a speaker is not consistent
> in his lexcial choices, a linguist can draw various conclusions. He
> might, for example, draw the conclusion that the text has been written
> by several people. At least, the linguist will become suspicious and
> recognize that something odd is going on.
>
> Synonyms are called synonyms because they denote the same (or almost the
> same) entity, but still they differ a lot in stye, sociolect and variety
> etc.
>
> Just imagine someone starting a sentence with Suebian dialect and ending
> it in Bavarian. Sounds odd, doesn't it? Same for lexical choice,
> although it seems less obvious there.
I am not a linguist. I understand the term 'synonym' in
the sense it is exemplified by specific dictionaries
which are named 'synonym dictionaries'. Certainly the
synonyms are rarely exact equivalences. There are
nuiances and foreigners are especially likely to miss
these. Yet I am of the opinion that there exist
equivalences in some more or less limited, yet for the
present purpose useful, cases where the author of
certain sentences would himself consider that these
are interchangeable. That is, he can think of equally
probable scenarios where these can be true and hence
use them correspondingly. (See again the example below
that is quoted from my previous post.) It is this kind
of equivalence that is to be strived at, when he is
editing his own writing as he is asked by the software
to employ alternative words. If he finds that there are
difficulties in doing that, because the said equivalence
could not be sufficiently well obtained, he could change
whole sentences.
> >Second, if the opponent hasn't
> > yet seen what I have written before, how is he going
> > to do any style analysis or the like?
>
> I agree that he will have a hard time recognizing that there's a message
> hidden by your method. As I've said, it depends on the amount of data
> available, be it steganified or not. But the adversary can use various
> kind of additional knowledge like age, sex, education, geographic origin
> and so on. Still, the analysis is very difficult and your scheme is much
> better than many other steganographic methods. I do not doubt that. That
> is, if you want to prevent automated detection in a flood of
> data---things look different if someone specifically analyses all
> messages sent by you.
I have said elsewhere that the scheme is certainly not
recommendable for high throughput applications, for
it would mean too much work, if for no other reasons.
>
> >When he starts
> > to see my messages, I am already using my scheme to
> > constantly tweak a little bit the words that I would
> > otherwise have employed out of my head directly. Could
> > he ever know that that couldn't be really my natural
> > writing (my style)?
>
> If there's enough data available to him, I would clearly say yes. I'm
> not able to tell you, how much "enough" would be. You'd have to ask
> someone who knows better than me about that. ;)
I suppose that this is trivially true.
> > Consider also an extreme example:
> > Is there ANY detectable difference for him if, instead
> > of the sentence 'I met X this morning', I write 'I met
> > Y this afternoon' (unless he has some guys that follow
> > me in person)?
>
> No, I think in this case there's no difference from a linguistical
> viewpoint. But of course, a big difference from the extralinguistical
> viewpoint.
I don't understand what do you mean by 'extralinguistical'
in the present context. We are arguing whether the
difference is such as to cause the opponent to 'know'
that the first sentence is genuine (if he gets the first)
and that the second is 'artificial' (if he gets the second),
isn't it?
> >We don't know each other in person. If
> > I post a sentence to the group that is not the Queen's
> > English, are you sure that it is not because of my
> > not having been very diligent im my foreign language
> > class in school but that it is rather an intentional
> > modification of an otherwise impecable English
> > expression?
>
> Hard to say. As you probably know, it's possible to draw conclusions
> about the origin of a foreign language speaker by examining the errors
> he makes. This is well researched. But there's unlikely to be any public
> research about finding out intentional changes made for steganographic
> purposes.
If I make some typical errors in sentences written out
directly from my head without my noticing them, wouldn't
I be likely to make the same kind of errors with much
the same probability in materials that are 'edited' by
myself? I mean this problem is not relevant to the
issue of modification of sentences.
> >If the opponent has materials comparable
> > in volume to Shakespeare's work, you may be right.
>
> My estimate is far less optimistic. I do not dare to give an exact
> estimate, but I'd guess a dozens of steganified emails might be enough
> to raise suspicion.
>
> Please don't get me wrong: I agree that your method is excellent for
> sending an occasional secret message like you have proposed. Like
> always, it depends on how much data the attacker can collect and how
> many efforts he makes to find out that there's hidden data and find it.
> I just wanted to point out the line of attack. It seems we differ on how
> practical the steganalysis of your scheme is, and that's an open
> empirical question I guess we both cannot answer.
As a discipline, crypto is yet not (and perhaps will
never be) comparable to math in rigour. Much subjectivity
is involved in estimating the security in specific given
environments. Unless you have very concrete and exact
knowledge in all aspects, which I doubt, you are operating
with your 'subjective probabilities'. Similarly, I am
operating with my 'subjective probabilities'. Optimismus
and pessimismus naturally differ in different persons.
This is well known in all situations of life. Since my
propopsed scheme is yet new and has never been tried out
in practice, your concluding sentence is certainly true.
M. K. Shen
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 02:35:32 +0100
From: David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RC4 test vectors after gigabyte output?.
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
David Eppstein wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > From the RC4 entry in SCAN
> > (http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/crypto/scan/):
>
> You appear to be missing
>
> M. Robshaw. Security of RC4. Technical Report TR-401, RSA Data Security,
> Inc., July 1994.
>
> unless you are deliberately omitting non-publically-available stuff
Yes, I was - I don't consider non-publically-available papers to have
been published in the proper sense of the word.
> -- I haven't seen this paper, but it was cited by Robshaw's RSA TR 701,
> http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/25566.html, which you might also include, and by
> another paper available at http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/zenel98proxy.html)
Thanks for these.
> You might also update your AES section to reflect the fact that an
> algorithm has been selected.
That will be in the next update, as will most of the NESSIE and CRYPTREC
algorithms, and modes from the AES modes conference.
- --
David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Home page & PGP public key: http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/
RSA 2048-bit; fingerprint 71 8E A6 23 0E D3 4C E5 0F 69 8C D4 FA 66 15 01
Nothing in this message is intended to be legally binding. If I revoke a
public key but refuse to specify why, it is because the private key has been
seized under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; see www.fipr.org/rip
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------------------------------
From: "r.e.s." <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Dynamic Substitution Question
Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 19:40:45 -0700
Regardless of what the method is called,
what do you see as the "very big hole"?
-- r.e.s.
"newbie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote ...
| Is it the way dynamic substitution is functionning?
| If yes, I can show you a very big hole in this process.
|
| "r.e.s." wrote:
| >
| > "newbie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote ...
| > | Is your idea working in this way
| > | (as explained by John Savard)?
| > |
| > | Plaintext: 4 3 1 9 0 2 4 7
| > | Keystream: 1 7 0 9 8 1 6
| > | Table: 0|5 5 5>7 7>6 6 6
| > | 1|2>7 7>5 5 5>9 9
| > | 2|9 9 9 9 9 9>5 5
| > | 3|0 0>4 4 4 4 4 4
| > | 4|7>2 2 2 2 2 2>3
| > | 5|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
| > | 6|3 3 3 3 3 3 3>2
| > | 7|4 4>0 0 0 0 0 0
| > | 8|6 6 6 6 6>7 7 7
| > | 9|8 8 8 8>8 8 8 8
| > | Ciphertext: 7 0 7 8 7 9 2 0
| > |
| > | If it is the case, then this process
| > | contain big hole.
| >
| > What do you see as the "big hole"?
| >
| > --r.e.s.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: I got accepted
Date: 10 Apr 2001 02:50:24 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom St Denis) wrote in
<dPtA6.67621$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> Congratulations. Which university, if I may pry?
>
>University of Windsor :-)
>
> >I would like to thank the posters in this group for if it weren't for my
>> >hours consumed posting and learning here I probably would not have made
>> >it!!!
>>
>> If true, that would make you the first person in the
>> entire universe whose academic future was actually *improved*
>> by spending all day on usenet.
>
>Cool, I hope to set this record :-)
Tom watch the internet. My daughter when she went to Berkeley
said there were guys smarter than her that bombed out due to
there extreme additction to the internet.
Did you try MIT or Berkeley?
Then you could have meet Dave or Ron. I would rather meet Ron I
hear his a nice guy.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE "OLD VERSIOM"
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
My website http://members.nbci.com/ecil/index.htm
My crypto code http://radiusnet.net/crypto/archive/scott/
MY Compression Page http://members.nbci.com/ecil/compress.htm
**NOTE FOR EMAIL drop the roman "five" ***
Disclaimer:I am in no way responsible for any of the statements
made in the above text. For all I know I might be drugged or
something..
No I'm not paranoid. You all think I'm paranoid, don't you!
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 03:09:18 +0100
From: David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: latex quick help
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
Tom St Denis wrote:
> I installed MikTex 2.0 (with the update) I was just wondering if their is
> any quick tutorials on the web how to write tex or more specifically latex
> source files
http://www.giss.nasa.gov/latex/
> and how to translate them to postscript?
Do this:
latex source_file
dvips source_file
(and for PDF, 'dvipdfm source_file'. dvipdfm is in one of the optional
MiKTeK packages - level 3, I think.)
- --
David Hopwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Home page & PGP public key: http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/
RSA 2048-bit; fingerprint 71 8E A6 23 0E D3 4C E5 0F 69 8C D4 FA 66 15 01
Nothing in this message is intended to be legally binding. If I revoke a
public key but refuse to specify why, it is because the private key has been
seized under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act; see www.fipr.org/rip
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------------------------------
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