David Honig writes:
> At 03:20 PM 1/25/00 -0500, Russell Nelson wrote:
> >
> >I'm trying to do forward stego -- that is, publish some encrypted
> >steganographic document, with the idea that, once everyone has a copy,
> >*then* you reveal the key.
>
> Fascinating, captain. Canna imagine why.
Blackmail? But you don't really need stego for that. You could just
send a private-key-encoded file to a list of friends, saying "Please
keep this until mm/dd/yy. I may send you the key later." Run a
watchdog process somewhere which checks a certain newsgroup for a
crypto-signed timestamped message. If it fails to see the message, it
sends the key to your list of friends.
You could also use it for "Oh, by the way, that gzipped file of the
Linux kernel that you downloaded, that's mirrored all over everywhere?
It's made with certain sub-optimal compressions. If you run it
through <this program>, it will produce a copy of the DeCSS code."
If you wanted to be really clever, you'd bury it inside some
government document, so you could at least obfuscate the prosecution
with claims of First Amendment rights.
But that's not stego either, whether the document is encrypted or not,
because you're adding bits, not replacing relatively random bits.
> >Problem is, how do you convince them to keep a copy of that
> >document if they're unaware that it has something buried inside
> >it??
>
> Now you're into psychology.
Yup. And I'm certainly (obviously not) competent at that.
--
-russ nelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://russnelson.com
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